9/05/2020

Berlin Alexanderplatz


03 septembre 2020

Berlin Alexanderplatz : a "perpetuum mobile" of the human dance of love and death, par Tom Tykwer

Ce texte de Tom Tykwer (remarquable, essentiel) fut publié initialement dans le Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung daté du 8 février 2007. Tykwer l’avait rédigé à l’occasion de la première berlinoise de Berlin Alexanderplatz (qui venait d’être restauré). Il affirma qu’il s’agissait d’un hommage au film et d’« une déclaration d’amour au cinéma expérimental ». La traduction anglaise que voici a été réalisée par Stephen Locke pour Criterion Collection, qui offrit au public américain une superbe édition du film en coffret de DVD/BD.
[Merci au FAZ et à Criterion. Mais je n’ai pas trouvé de version française, désolé, Ch.T.]

~~~

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I The Anti-Television Film

« To listen to this, and to meditate on it, will be of benefit to many who, like Franz Biberkopf, live in a human skin, and, like this Franz Biberkopf, ask more of life than a piece of bread and butter. » Alfred Döblin, from the preface to Berlin Alexanderplatz

It is once again time to think, to speak, and to write about this fifteen-hour film, which, at the onset of the eighties (that decade that would later bring with it an end to the cold war and a comeback for capital), enraged the national spirit and occasioned assaults by the yellow press and (in the wake of this) protests from "millions of television viewers" who felt themselves "robbed of their subscription fees" (Bild newspaper).

The public protest against this work, which everyone who was in the vicinity of Germany at the time remembers – and many remember the outrage even better than the film itself – was directed against the television stations, the filmmakers, the ensemble, and naturally, above all, against the director, Rainer Werner Fassbinder. Although the film’s alleged unacceptability in technical matters (it was accused of considerable flaws in image and sound quality) was thrust into the center of attention, these problems, it appeared, were hardly worthy of such a storm of indignation. The pain caused by the film somehow went deeper, and with each further episode, broadcast one week after the other, it seemed like a dirty thorn was boring itself deeper and deeper into the wound of this republic, a country that wasn’t very comfortable in its own skin anyway and, accordingly, was soon thereafter to fall into a cultural and political stupor (Fassbinder died in 1982; Kohl became chancellor). At the time, Germany had no desire at all for the celebrated excesses of this film, its prancing obscenity and unshrinking crassness, a kind of German swan song, and all the more so since all these elements meandered – freely floating and without commentary, always asking but never answering, in other words completely ignoring the brief for public edification vested in public television – over a period of thirteen long television weeks.

If you take into account the almost unlimited freedom – despite, for that time, the considerable expense of the production – with which Fassbinder was able to realize this extremely introspective, almost inaccessible film concept, it sheds light on the exceptional position he enjoyed as a filmmaker then. Just having turned thirty-four years of age, he already had some forty films under his belt, including his latest and greatest box-office triumph, The Marriage of Maria Braun. Nowhere in Berlin Alexanderplatz does one get the feeling that he is holding back or censoring himself; it is one of those films, perhaps like only Jacques Rivette’s Out 1, that completely turns its back on traditional, economical narrative conventions – and that at the same time, seemingly paradoxically, feels bound to the narrative, coming back to it time and time again, sometimes even in a compulsively conservative way, only to undermine it right away for the sheer delight of it. It is a film that plunges directly into its topic, a story straight out of everyday life, tears it piece by piece away from its concrete, reality-oriented style, and, with an extremely intimate, almost private view, dissects it, stretches it, and then, above all, spins it out into time, expands it, as it were, to such a degree that interim spaces are torn open in this drawn-out time; and Fassbinder wants to gaze down into the fissures in this vastly stretched-out time, to rip them even farther apart, to look even deeper, until time itself seems no longer expansible – and then splits completely asunder.

What follows this is merely an epilogue, a final chord in the midst of the Black Hole of this temporal rift.

In other words, Berlin Alexanderplatz, this thirteen-part film plus the said "epilogue", was never really a TV movie. It is a narrative experimental film that, juggling various theatrical principles, seeks a hideaway between the traditional and the avant-garde.

Concerning the visual aspect, Fassbinder and his cameraman, Xaver Schwarzenberger, appear to have been flouting the medium of television here as well: their joint disdain for the alarm signal on the camera’s light meter as it no doubt wildly lashed out seems otherwise too provocative. As a result, the night shots, which were obviously composed for the big screen and a sensitive film emulsion, were watered down into a faint, flat, gray-black blur on most of the German Telefunken TV sets available at the time.

From then on the film seemed ostracized as "unbroadcastable", even "unshowable", but resistance arose on the part of some festivals and individual movie theaters, and, long after Fassbinder’s death, a few increasingly scratched 16 mm prints began touring through the art houses and film museums of the world — until these prints, too, were no longer watchable.

Now, Juliane Lorenz, with her Fassbinder Foundation, has been able to convince a number of cultural and film subsidies, as well as technical film companies, to undertake, under Schwarzenberger’s direction, the painstaking restoration of the negative of the film – originally shot on 16 mm and blown up to 35 mm – and above all to dare to make a new optical and color correction, which, in view of the technology now available, appeared to be a very promising undertaking. And in fact the legendary "darkness problem" has more or less disappeared; except for a few shots, it was possible to bring out the contrasts in the monochrome night compositions to such a degree that there is always an intelligible picture and not just a picture puzzle. Never before have the filigree compositional stylistics of Berlin Alexanderplatz been seen – one could hardly even have imagined them – in this form. At the same time, Schwarzenberger has taken care not to lose the quality of this intimate night spectacle, precisely because the choking confinement evoked by the slightly soft-focused darkness of the images reflects the narrowness of a world that is constantly threatening to crush Franz Biberkopf.

II The Story

« You have to hear stories. It is pleasant and sometimes even makes one better. » From Mahabharata, an Indian epic

Franz Biberkopf (Günter Lamprecht) is let out of prison after having served a four-year sentence for the manslaughter of his lover. He is spit out into the raw, increasingly impoverished city of Berlin in the late twenties and tries to get a foothold again, an ongoing effort at which he is seldom able to prevail. He gets to know a number of women with whom he spends a short time, or sometimes a bit longer, but it is only when he encounters Mieze (Barbara Sukowa) that he believes he has found the right one. He has a few close or looser friendships with various men, among them Reinhold (Gottfried John). The feelings between Franz and Reinhold are stronger than they are able to fathom, and thus this involvement develops a momentum of its own that finally leads to Franz’s undoing.

At the beginning of the story, Franz swears to "become an honest soul", but fate is not on his side, and he suffers setback after setback, until one finally gets to him with such force that it breaks his iron will, and in the end, robbed of all hope for a piece of happiness, he is left alone and broken.

III Not the Story

« So the crucial part of Berlin Alexanderplatz isn’t the story; this is something the novel has in common with some other great novels in world literature; its structure is, if possible, even more ludicrous than that of Goethe’s Elective Affinities — the essential part is simply the way in which this incredibly banal and unbelievable plot is narrated. And the attitude toward the characters, whom the author exposes in all their dreariness to the reader, while on the other hand he teaches the reader to see these characters, reduced to mediocrity, with the greatest tenderness, and to love them in the end. » R.W. Fassbinder, 1980

The story, in other words – normally the Holy Grail of every screenwriter and filmmaker – is not the point. With this Fassbinder establishes a method that marks Berlin Alexanderplatz to a greater degree than any of his other works. While almost stoically ignoring all the demands of a plot, he sets out to circle around singular human conditions, to penetrate them, and to bring forth a reflexive (referring back to the subject) truthfulness that shows that nothing is more foreign to a person than himself and that he is therefore constantly in search of himself. And therefore the voice-over commentaries, spoken by Fassbinder, never serve as parentheses or interlinkings of plot elements; they lack, in fact, all narrative-binding impulse. Rather, they draw closer attention to moments in which something entirely individual comes to the fore or in which a thought or a feeling by or about a person is brought to a halt, prolonged, or protracted. What Fassbinder recounts are passages from the novel that reveal that it, too, is strewn with unconventional, prosaic digressions that constantly, by means of facts, associations, and rebounding fragments of an idea, demonstrate the disjunction of the narration.

The gist of the identificatory conception of Berlin Alexanderplatz is that in the beginning the protagonist appears as a rather simpleminded, coarse soul; but as the narrative progresses we soon recognize that our assessment is in no way adequate to account for the complex, deep sensibilities with which Franz Biberkopf comes to grapple. Which doesn’t mean that Biberkopf is not, in fact, simpleminded and coarse – but rather that we must nevertheless concede to him "such a differentiated subconscious, combined with an almost unbelievable imagination and capacity for suffering, that one would have to look long and hard for [its] equal in world literature" (Fassbinder).

IV Repetition and Expansion

« Cinema is there to show us what we would not see without cinema. To expand the word and the image. To make visible what is normally invisible. » Jean-Claude Carrière, in The Secret Language of Film

By repeating, prolonging, or stretching out events, Fassbinder is seeking something that he assumes is to be found in the ritualistic gestures of human behavior, in our tendency to make a rule out of things, to repeat them, to find the way to an inner order through outward order, creating an organized course of events, until these finally strike us as compulsory.

Seen in this light, Fassbinder is an epigone of Pina Bausch and a precursor of Christoph Marthaler, two theater people who through the repetition and prolongation of social gestures reveal people’s addictive potential for self-destruction, culminating in the ritualistic.

One of the strange things about the experience one has viewing Berlin Alexanderplatz is that the stretched-out temporality does not leave the impression of making the story more precise, but rather creates an elliptical sensation. For a while your concentration is so completely distracted from the narrative chain of cause and effect that you almost lose your orientation and ask yourself, in view of such a total standstill, whether the story will ever get moving again. In the fascinating part 4, above all, it plods along like almost no other film has, except perhaps Bruno Dumont’s recent Twentynine Palms. Or maybe like in the first act of Richard Wagner’s Parsifal.

V Structural Folk Theater

« What we once again appreciate in Young Werther, even though it sometimes almost makes us mad [...] is precisely the inappropriate, even exotic alliance of the natural with the artificial, which brings to light a truth that is not too far away from that of theater. » Thierry Jousse on Jacques Doillon, in Autorenkino und Filmschauspiel, by Anja Streiter

Jacques Doillon, the director of such films as Young Werther and The Pirate, is another next of kin of Fassbinder’s, an auteur who rips situations out of their so-called authenticity in order to search for their meaning on an alternative, artificial field of play. For Fassbinder it is extremely important that with all his prolongings and repetitions he is not only working through some formal experiment but is at the same time exploring the figures themselves as soon as they climb onto the hamster wheel and satisfy truly human needs, both sublime and primitive. But for all the choreography, his characters are not just at the mercy of some directorial tick, not just puppetlike shells as with Robert Wilson, for example, but rather they act out and live through these sequences as psychological beings, as three-dimensional individuals.

In the ritualized romantic rondel that unfolds between Mieze and Franz, for example, the desire for the infantile, brotherly-sisterly, escapist pleasure of togetherness formulates itself for both characters to an exaggerated degree that only naively innocent lovers are capable of celebrating – which, actually, should be familiar to everyone, since after all, every love is innocent. To cite another example of a different nature: the seemingly infinitely repeated, traumatic murder of Ida by Biberkopf expresses the accidentalness with which vehement rage can suddenly turn into bloody madness, and feels at the same time somehow unreal, like a remote-controlled danse macabre.

At least this is the way the actors play it. And they don’t play it with even the slightest bit of detached nuance. On the contrary, the acting style that marks Berlin Alexanderplatz is (not always, but often) earthy, extroverted, sometimes even declamatory—and thus obviously indebted to folk theater, alternating by choice between burlesque and dramatic sketch. That kind of folk-theatrical gesture, which already suggests itself in the dialect from the novel, was used by Fassbinder in many of his works as an instrument of stylization. Folk theater, historically defined through its distinction from court theater, had stamped its mark on the director just as much as had the avant-garde stages of the late sixties, and his very own personal style, which grew out of a fusion of these two influences, was taken to the extreme and to perfection in Berlin Alexanderplatz.

VI Biberkopf and Other Men

« As director it could also be possible, of course, to show particular consideration to the leading actor, in so far as the director shouldn’t drive him crazy with other things, since he has such a difficult task to perform [....] In fact, the only source of disturbance I had was my director, who continually interfered in my work. » Günter Lamprecht, 1981

Nonetheless, or maybe because of it, Günter Lamprecht as Franz Biberkopf – and this can be stated unconditionally – was perfect casting for this film. And even if Lamprecht might have quarreled with Fassbinder so much, he did in fact delve down deeply into Fassbinder’s cosmos, adapt himself congenially to the elegiac fragment of a screenplay, and give just as much energy and variation to each subtle individual moment as to the blaring pamphleteering. Lamprecht’s Biberkopf is (probably like the director as well) a fragile berserker for whom the world has proved too narrow, the heart too big, the passion too oppressive, and the intellect too weak, and who lets himself fall, eyes wide open, but with limited knowledge, into the shredding machine of human fate.

With a tour de force performance as varied as it is graphic, as loud as it is gentle, Lamprecht is a huge, violent child in the body of a man – and thus all of the thematic threads of the film logically come together in his character.

Everything this man goes through in his tortured life turns his (erroneous and roundabout) fateful course into a kind of Passion, and as if this perfect fool were a preacher in disguise, apostles are hanging at his heels. They are called Nachum (Peter Kollek), Meck (Franz Buchrieser), Lüders (Hark Bohm), Baumann (Gerhard Zwerenz), and Reinhold – and they all use him, either as psychic membrane for their neuroses, as patient for their promises of salvation, or as willing victim for their exploitative intentions. For Biberkopf’s perfect foolishness is both a provocation and a promise for all the fallen angels around him: they hope for redemption at his side, as if his simplicity could heal their neuroses, their despair, and their impairments. But Biberkopf is not all that simple after all, and he has no desire to be membrane or patient or victim, and this makes the whole thing complicated.

VII Reinhold and Other Women

« [This is] by no means a question of something sexual between two people of the same gender; Franz Biberkopf and Reinhold are in no way homosexual [...] No, what exists between Franz and Reinhold is nothing more nor less than a pure love. » R.W. Fassbinder, 1980

The most important person in Biberkopf’s life is not called Mieze nor Eva (Hanna Schygulla) nor Lina (Elisabeth Trissenaar) but rather Reinhold, and is in fact a man. A deadly radiant energy emanates from this friendship, a magnetism that has fatal consequences for both of them and that in the more than ten hours in which Reinhold is present in the film is never entirely understandable, but rather remains unexplained to the end. It is simply that Franz loves Reinhold, no matter how much Reinhold takes it out on him, and Reinhold no doubt loves Franz, too, and it’s too much for him. This therefore brings about a destructive downward spiral, at the end of which, in an endless single take, Reinhold’s attempt to seduce Mieze leads to her murder.

By contrast, the women in Biberkopf’s life rule his everyday routine, they are the signature figures (and bear the wounds) of the various periods of his life, they take each other’s place like relay runners and, with the exception of Eva, are easily seduced. But then love gets in their way. Biberkopf gives each of them his affection and protection but not his heart. This is first captured by Mieze, who seems almost related to him in her childlike, cheerful nature. Franz can mirror himself naively in Mieze, and the two of them soon behave together with confidential playfulness, like Cocteau’s "enfants terribles". And if it weren’t for Reinhold, Franz might have found happiness with Mieze.

VIII Rainer Werner Biberkopf

« My life would have turned out differently, certainly not as a whole, but in some respects, in many, perhaps more crucial respects than I can even say at this point, differently from the way it turned out with Döblin’s Berlin Alexanderplatz embedded in my mind, my flesh, my body as a whole, and my soul – go ahead and smile. » R.W. Fassbinder, 1980

Certainly almost everyone who occasionally or more often reads a book can name their favorite hero or heroine, a literary figure onto which their identity-seeking projections are directed, prose characters to which they feel related or in which they even find themselves embodied, and their own insular life therefore seems less lonely and a bit protected.

That this literary character for Fassbinder was Franz Biberkopf is obvious; elements or direct quotations from Berlin Alexanderplatz show up time and again in his earlier films, and the Döblinesque view of destructive yet yearning, sensitive men appears like a blueprint for tragic heroes throughout Fassbinder’s oeuvre. It is, of course, at the same time a direct reflection of Fassbinder’s own emotionally chaotic life, with all its complicated polygamous bonding dynamics. The most conspicuous predrafts of a Biberkopf figure can probably be found in In a Year of 13 Moons (1978) and Fox and His Friends (his somewhat underrated masterpiece from 1975, where the figure played by Fassbinder himself is even called Franz Biberkopf).

« And indeed, what would a person raised just like us, or similarly, see in a love that doesn’t lead to any visible results, to anything that can be displayed, exploited, and thus made useful ? » R.W.Fassbinder, 1980

Franz’s love of Reinhold is a mystery not only to himself but also to us – and yet we know what he’s talking about. The film touches here on a collective secret knowledge that, rumbling in our subconscious, brings to mind on some strange evening of our life a confusing feeling of deepest tenderness for a person we never really thought played an important role in our life.

IX Legato/Staccato

« Good close-ups have a lyrical effect. They were ‘seen’ not by the good eye but by the good heart. » Béla Balázs

Berlin Alexanderplatz is for considerable stretches a film of long takes, uninterrupted sequence shots, sometimes for minutes without a cut, which means that the cut takes place in the camera, as it were, by moving the camera position with the dolly and changing the frame by zooming. The close-up, for example, is often used not as a response to a long shot or as a follow-up to a countershot but rather as something sought out by the camera, which glides silently up to the figures – above all Biberkopf – who dance toward their marked positions, as in slow motion, until finally lens and object come together.

The target reached is often an image of limitation, because Xaver Schwarzenberger’s camera again and again finds window frames, gratings, or wooden beams that narrow the framing of the picture like a passe-partout, a frame within a frame that clamps in and firmly holds the personnel like prisoners of an image. Or like the ever-present parakeet in the birdcage.

But at some point in every long take the cut has to come, and every time it must have been a great challenge to find the exact right moment for it, sometimes as a break, sometimes in a state of flux, and there are times when the image simply vanishes into a fade-out.

Then, time and again, especially in the epilogue, editor Juliane Lorenz counteracts this method with quick, aggressive stretches of associative montage, and out of the contrast of these dynamic poles arises the unnerving rhythm of the film, which, underscored ubiquitously and with evocative insistence by Peer Raben’s music, swings unpredictably and erratically to and fro between elegy and adrenaline – which is an attempt on the one hand to do justice to Biberkopf’s subjectively varying perception of time, and on the other to capture the delirious energy of Döblin’s prose.

X Laughter in the Dark

« Not by wrath does one kill but by laughter. » Friedrich Nietzsche

And this Biberkopf does himself.

In the laughter that sometimes bursts forth out of Biberkopf like a machine-gun salvo and then seems never to stop, distorting his face into a grimace and revealing him as someone who overcomes his failure with the booming gesture of a winner – in this laughter that is never a pure light laugh but always a bellowed, demanded, longed-for burst – herein is Biberkopf’s fear laid bare. Laughter is Franz’s weapon to keep panic, doubt, and worry in check.

In the end, the laugh turns into a cry, the never-ending cry of a man whom life does not want to deliver from his guilt, his innocence, his offense.

Epilogue

We don’t understand him, this Biberkopf, and yet we know what he does, and we suspect why. That is the viewer’s dilemma in Berlin Alexanderplatz: we know what to make of it but then again we don’t, and we are sometimes angry to be left so alone by a film that doesn’t want to help us decipher Franz Biberkopf and his emotions but that succeeds at the same time by dispensing with all interpretative aids and instead insisting on observation in order to create a close rapport with the figure. A rapport that is exceptional even for Fassbinder’s cinema.

The way we see films and how they have an effect on us changes over the years, just as one changes as a person; this is an impression familiar to everyone. In the past I had no trouble at all sitting in the movies for days on end, watching one film after the other, with no qualms about jumping among genres, from Tarkovsky to Spielberg, from Bergman to Hitchcock. There was a seemingly endless reservoir of time and patience, and I felt an ever-playful openness; it was never too much for me. The emotions had their effect and then spread out rather diffusely and without reflection in the cosmos of memory.

When I watch a film today, however – even an admittedly exceptional one, like United 93 – or, for that matter, simply stick it out to the end, then it seems to me completely impossible, even physically, to move along without a break to the next cinematographic impression, to slip smoothly into another story, another rhythm, another atmosphere, and the realm of impressions that develop out of it. In other words, the half-life of an intensive filmic experience has slowed down appreciably, or else a film finds, potentially, a greater echo in one’s own history, in the personal zones of resonance in the memory.

So I sit there after an emotionally intensive film and vibrate. Then I need time, and also to talk about it, in order to digest what I have virtually experienced.

I saw the fifteen-hour Berlin Alexanderplatz Remastered – twenty-six years after the first time – in January 2007 over two days in a small, cozy theater. I was very excited and looked forward to the demanding and yet luxurious task of writing an exclusive text after attending an exclusive screening. And I must admit that for some stretch of the time it was surprisingly hard work.

The film is not only long but, above all, as was laid out earlier, is committed to a narrative method that on the one hand repulses the viewer, while on the other aims to swallow him up, drawing him into the decelerated, asthmatic environment of its story. I almost want to say that you are held down underwater and, gasping for breath, look at the shimmering reflections on the surface, but from below. They are beautiful, these reflections, but if you want to look at them more closely, the film pulls you down deeper underwater. The pressure increases, and you are afraid of suffocating. That might sound fascinating, and after all it is an amazing film that can generate this feeling – but I wouldn’t be telling the truth if I didn’t admit that the whole procedure demanded an enormous amount of patience, curiosity, perseverance, and density of feeling.

If one considers once again the importance Döblin’s novel had for Fassbinder’s development and his attempt to come to terms with Germany and the Germans, it seems almost inevitable that this mammoth film adaptation would rank as a key work in his oeuvre. And yet the film will not let itself be forced into the idea of the sum of all parts, will not be the coherent focal point among all the other parts of his life’s puzzle. Berlin Alexanderplatz is, still today, a visual, conceptual, and emotional megaquarry, a sometimes unfocused, often even chaotic, but also constantly fascinating excess consisting of violence, passion, contempt, desire, and, yes, somehow also love, a film in which people scream, laugh, cry, and screw outrageously and which never entirely comes together as a whole, never wants to come together, a film that has no desire at all to be packed away into a well-formulated crate in order to sit on the shelf as a key work, deciphered or not.

What is left of Berlin Alexanderplatz, this endless canon of the sublime and the trivial, is thus a perpetuum mobile of the human dance of love and death.

To examine and to listen to all this in its very impertinence and truthfulness and beauty and hideousness will be of benefit to many who, like Franz Biberkopf, live in a human skin and who share a feeling with the author of this text, namely the desire to ask more of cinema than merely a story.

Tom Tykwer, 2007

 

The Seven Bridges of Königsberg


The Seven Bridges of Königsberg



A map of the city
The Map of Königsberg

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Leonhard Euler

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Constructing the map’s equivalent graph

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Wolfram MathWorld

Rahul Sethi

Written by

As a college sophomore at IIT Kanpur, Rahul is passionate about AI and Math. He aims to create a positive, global impact on the society using technology.

Stamatics is a society of IIT Kanpur under the Department of Mathematics and Statistics. Throughout the year, Stamatics organises mathematical competitions, talks by various professors and students, workshops, and numerous other informal and formal sessions.


9/01/2020

The Unattainable Speed of Light




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The Velocity Illusion. View the image with the centre covered. Then with the sides covered. Which perception of velocity is correct? Both? Neither?

The Unattainable Speed of Light

How does special relativity add velocities? Welcome to the world where 1 + 1 is not quite 2.


Aug 3 · 9 min read


A letter poured in

I received a letter with some questions about special relativity. Here is a part of that letter:
…let’s say we hypothetically were able to send a space ship across space at the speed of light minus 5 mph. Couldn’t a person run from the back of the space ship to the front at 10 mph? — Luke Copko
The implication is that the runner has now broken the light barrier. That’s a no-no in the world of special relativity.
An observer (call him Luke) is on Earth, witnessing this whole scenario. Let’s have another observer (call her Leia) sitting aboard the ship, monitoring the dilithium. Won’t the runner (call him Anakin) be moving at 5 mph above the speed of light?
Here’s what we might expect from Luke’s frame of reference.

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Our intuition tells us to add velocities, meaning Anakin moves away from Luke at greater than light speed. Special relativity says no.

How do we explain this apparent breach of relativistic protocol?
Now consider Leia’s frame of reference. Wouldn’t she see Anakin moving one way at 10 mph, and Luke moving the other way at 5 mph short of the speed of light? That also totals 5 mph above the cosmological speed limit.

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According to Leia, Luke and Anakin are separating faster than light speed. Why does special relativity allow this?

It turns out that this arrangement is legal. Why is one okay and the other forbidden? Why is special relativity so fickle?

The two commandments of relativity

The theory of special relativity has two rules:
  1. All inertial reference frames are equivalent.
As long as that space ship is moving in a straight line at a constant speed, it is an inertial reference frame. Leia measures the Anakin’s speed to be 10 mph. That’s a valid measurement. Leia also measures Luke’s speed on Earth in the opposite direction: 5 mph short of the speed of light.
2. The speed of light is the same in all inertial reference frames.
Suppose Anakin fires a pulse from a laser. He will measure the pulse leaving the laser at 186,000 miles per second. Won’t an Leia measure the pulse moving at an additional 10 mph? Won’t Luke measure it to be moving at twice light speed plus 5 mph? Nope. Everyone measures the speed of the laser pulse to 186,000 miles per second.
The second axiom may be the harder to swallow. Maxwell’s equations provide the theory behind Rule #2. Experiment provides the physical evidence. We won’t delve into it any further here. We will, however, examine the implications of Rule #2.
Let’s have the space ship travelling at ⅘ light speed. Within, Anakin clips along at ⅖ light speed. We’ll have V be his speed with respect to Luke. Here’s what we might expect:

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We know from previous articles that motion messes with time and distance. What will it do to Anakin’s velocity?
To check V, we will define an event upon which both Luke (on the ground) and Leia (on the ship) can agree. The trouble begins when we compare two events separated by distance or time.
The instant Anakin begins his run, he fires a light pulse from his laser. The far end of the ship reflects the pulse back toward Anakin. When the pulse strikes him, he drops on the spot. (Don’t worry. He’ll be okay.)
Where is Anakin?

Leia’s frame of reference


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The thick arrow shows Anakin’s motion. The thin arrows are the light beams. The light travels much further than does Anakin. How far does he get? Half way across the ship? A quarter of the way? Wherever he is, Luke and Leia will agree.
We’ll calculate this distance for both frames of reference. Then we’ll equate the two expressions and see what happens.

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The speed of light is our standard. We can define the distance travelled by the light in Leia’s frame as our unit length. That is the total length of the two thin arrows. Anakin was running at ⅖ light speed so the length of the thick arrow is ⅖. How long is the ship? The three arrows together have a total length of 1⅖. The length of the ship is half that total:

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What fraction of the ship’s length did Anakin travel? Take his distance and divide it by the length of the ship.

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Anakin makes it just over halfway across the ship. If we marked the floor off in 7th’s, he’d collapse at mark #4. Neither Luke nor Leia will dispute this.

Luke’s frame of reference

How does this play out for Luke?
We need not assume anything about how the times, distances and velocities in Leia’s frame compare to Luke’s frame. But they will have to agree on two measurements:
  • the speed of light, c
  • the proportion of the ship's length travelled by Anakin (4/7 in our example)
Luke measures Anakin running at some speed, V, which intuition tells us must be 1⅕ light speed. He also measures a laser pulse travelling at — according to Rule #2 — the speed of light. Finally, he measures the ship’s speed to be ⅘ light speed.

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First, the laser makes the trip to the far end of the ship. It has a little further than the length of the ship to travel because the ship is moving. Anakin has run ⅖ of that distance. Because the ship has also advanced, he is less than ⅖ of the way across.
At the end of the journey, Anakin has travelled a distance of V·tᵤ with respect to Luke. Here, tᵤ is some time as measured by Luke.
Although Anakin travels a distance of V·tᵤ, the ship has advanced a distance of u·tᵤ, where u is the speed of the ship. This is how far Anakin ends up from the rear of the ship:

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In our example, the ship’s speed, u, is ⅘ light speed. The thing we want to find out is V, and the time variable, tᵤ, will eventually disappear. Once we have the length of the ship, we hope to show:

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This is the distance along the ship divided by the length of the ship, as measured by Luke.
In the calculations below, it may help to print out the diagram of Luke’s reference frame. You can then refer to it as you follow each step of the argument.

Anakin’s position is the same in both frames

Recall how we worked this out for Leia’s frame of reference. She measures Anakin’s speed as ⅖ light speed. We can generalize the previous calculation by representing Anakin’s speed with the variable v.

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We need an expression for the length of the ship in Luke’s frame. This is the distance the light travels to the end of the ship, less the distance the ship moves in that time.

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The time, t₁, presents a problem. We need the times to eventually cancel, so we want only one time variable, tᵤ. First, we express in terms of tᵤ.

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Next, we use the fact that tᵤ=t₁+ t₂ to find an expression for t₁.

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We insert our t₁ into the above expression for Lᵤ and tidy it up a bit.

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We divide the distance Anakin travels across the ship with the length of the ship. This gives us a distance in terms of ship length. What proportion of the ship did Anakin cross?

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That proportion is frame independent.

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How fast is Anakin moving away from Luke?

We are left with the tedium of isolating V. This will give us the sought-after expression for Anakin’s speed according to Luke.
Cross multiply numerators with denominators.

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Expand.

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Bring the V terms to the left, and cancel equivalent terms.

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Isolate V.

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Tidy up the result by dividing top and bottom by c².

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If we are consistent about expressing velocities as fractions of light speed, c=1. We can eliminate c from the expression.

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Plug in the values from our example and…

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In Luke’s frame, Anakin chugs along at about 90% light speed.
We do add velocities. But then we apply an adjustment. That means dividing by 1 + uv. When u and v are small — which they usually are, uv is very close to 0. The adjustment is negligible.
We must be careful about mixing our reference frames. The distance between Luke and Anakin is increasing at 1⅕ light speed with respect to Leia, but not with respect to each other.
What about Luke and Anakin together from Leia’s point of view? Why no adjustment? In Leia’s frame, the distance between Luke and Anakin increases at 1⅕ light speed: Anakin at ⅖ to her right; Luke at ⅘ to her left.
We must be careful about mixing our reference frames. The distance between Luke and Anakin is increasing at 1⅕ light speed with respect to Leia, but not with respect to each other.
If Luke fires a light pulse at Anakin, we know it will overtake him. According to Luke, Anakin is moving away at about 90% light speed. Leia will see the pulse approach her at light speed, pass her, and overtake Anakin. Anakin will see it approach him at light speed also.
When we speak of the distance increasing at 1⅕ light speed, the distance isn’t a thing which can carry a signal at a super-luminous velocity. We must carefully select our frame of reference. Nobody is moving at greater than light speed in anyone’s frame.
All is well. God is in his curved space-time heaven.



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Les origines du totalitarisme

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une société qui s’était montrée prête structurellement à accepter le crime sous la forme du vice serait bientôt prête à se laver de son vice en accueillant ouvertement des criminels et en commettant publiquement des crimes.
Enfin et surtout, on découvrit dans des slogans tels que « Mort aux Juifs » ou « La France aux Français » des formules presque magiques permettant de réconcilier les masses avec l’état existant du gouvernement et de la société.
Car le pouvoir livré à lui-même ne saurait produire autre chose que davantage encore de pouvoir, et la violence exercée au nom du pouvoir (et non de la loi) devient un principe de destruction qui ne cessera que lorsqu’il n’y aura plus rien à violenter.
« Ce que nous appelons progrès, c’est [le] vent [qui] guide irrésistiblement [l’ange de l’histoire] jusque dans le futur auquel il tourne le dos cependant que devant lui l’amas des ruines s’élève jusqu’au cieux »
La forme de possession la plus radicale et la seule vraiment sûre est la destruction, car seules les choses que nous avons détruites sont à coup sûr et définitivement nôtres.
Peu d’idéologies ont su acquérir assez de prépondérance pour survivre à la lutte sans merci menée par la persuasion, et seules deux d’entre elles y sont effectivement parvenues en écrasant vraiment toutes les autres : l’idéologie qui interprète l’histoire comme une lutte économique entre classes et celle qui l’interprète comme une lutte naturelle entre races. Toutes deux ont exercé sur les masses une séduction assez forte pour se gagner l’appui de l’État et pour s’imposer comme doctrines nationales officielles. Mais, bien au-delà des frontières à l’intérieur desquelles la pensée raciale et la pensée de classe se sont érigées en modèles de pensée obligatoires, la libre opinion publique les a faites siennes à un point tel que non seulement les intellectuels mais aussi les masses n’accepteraient désormais plus une analyse des évènements passés ou présents en désaccord avec l’une ou l’autre de ces perspectives.
Rien ne caractérise mieux les mouvements totalitaires en général, et la gloire de leurs leaders en particulier, que la rapidité surprenante avec laquelle on les oublie et la facilité avec laquelle on les remplace
Une croyance répandue veut que Hitler ait été un simple agent des industriels allemands, et que Staline ait triomphé dans la lutte pour la succession après la mort de Lénine par le seul biais d’une sinistre conspiration. Ce sont là deux légendes, que réfutent de nombreux faits, et d’abord l’indiscutable popularité des deux dirigeants.
Les mouvements totalitaires sont des organisations de masse d’individus atomisés et isolés.
À une époque de misère croissante et de désespoir individuel, il semble aussi difficile de résister à la pitié lorsqu’elle devient une passion exclusive, que de ne pas réprouver son universalité même, qui semble tuer la dignité humaine encore plus sûrement que ne le fait la misère.
Rien ne s’avéra plus facile à détruire que l’intimité et la moralité privée de gens qui ne pensaient qu’à sauvegarder leur vie privée.
Le totalitarisme, une fois au pouvoir, remplace invariablement tous les vrais talents, quelles que soient leurs sympathies, par ces illuminés et ces imbéciles dont le manque d’intelligence et de créativité reste la meilleure garantie de leur loyauté.
En effet, d’un point de vue démagogique, il n’est pas de meilleur moyen d’éviter la discussion que de déconnecter un argument du contrôle du présent et de dire que seul l’avenir peut en révéler les mérites.
Les nazis ont prouvé qu’on peut conduire un peuple entier à la guerre avec le slogan « sinon c’est la catastrophe » […] et cela à une époque sans misère, sans chômage ni ambitions nationales frustrées.
Les mouvements totalitaires se servent du socialisme et du racisme en les vidant de leur contenu utilitaire, les intérêts d’une classe ou d’un nation. La forme de prédiction infaillible sous laquelle étaient présentés ces concepts est devenue plus importante que leur contenu.
Le pouvoir réel commence où le secret commence.
Mais, une fois acquise la possibilité d’exterminer les Juifs comme des punaises, au moyen de gaz toxiques, il n’est plus nécessaire de propager l’idée que les Juifs sont des punaises.
L’ennui avec les régimes totalitaires n’est pas qu’ils manipulent le pouvoir politique d’une manière particulièrement impitoyable, mais que derrière leur politique se cache une conception du pouvoir entièrement nouvelle et sans précédent, de même que derrière leur Realpolitik se trouve une conception entièrement nouvelle, sans précédent, de la réalité. Suprême dédain des conséquences immédiates plutôt qu’inflexibilité; absence de racines et négligence des intérêts nationaux plutôt que nationalisme; mépris des considérations d’ordre utilitaire plutôt que poursuite inconsidérée de l’intérêt personnel; « idéalisme », c’est-à-dire foi inébranlable en un monde idéologique fictif, plutôt qu’appétit de pouvoir – tout cela a introduit dans la politique internationale un facteur nouveau, plus troublant que n’aurait pu l’être l’agressivité pure et simple.
L’hypothèse centrale du totalitarisme selon laquelle tout est possible conduit donc à l’élimination systématique de tout ce qui pourrait gêner la réalisation de son absurde et terrible conséquence : que tout crime imaginé par les dirigeants doit être puni, sans se soucier de savoir s’il a ou non été commis.
Ce qui heurte le sens commun, ce n’est pas le principe nihiliste du « tout est permis » que l’on trouvait déjà au 19ème siècle dans la conception utilitaire du sens commun. Ce que le sens commun et les « gens normaux » refusent de croire, c’est que tout est possible. Nous essayons de comprendre les faits, dans le présent ou dans l’expérience remémorée, qui dépassent tout simplement nos capacités de compréhension. Nous essayons de classer dans la rubrique du crime ce qu’aucune catégorie de ce genre, selon nous, ne fut jamais destinée à couvrir. Quelle est la signification de la notion de meurtre lorsque nous nous trouvons en face de la production massive de cadavres? Nous essayons de comprendre du point de vue psychologique le comportement des détenus des camps de concentration et des SS, alors que nous devons prendre conscience du fait que la psyché peut être détruite sans que l’homme soit, pour autant, physiquement détruit; que, dans certaines circonstances, la psyché, le caractère et l’individualité ne semblent assurément se manifester que par la rapidité ou la lenteur avec lesquelles ils se désintègrent. Cela aboutit en tout cas à l’apparition d’hommes sans âmes, c’est-à-dire d’hommes dont on ne peut plus comprendre la psychologie, dont le retour au monde humain intelligible, soit psychologiquement, soit de toute autre manière, ressemble de près à la résurrection de Lazare. Toutes les affirmations du sens commun, qu’elles soient de nature psychologique ou sociologique, ne servent qu’à encourager ceux qui pensent qu’il est « superficiel » de « s’appesantir sur ces horreurs »
l’homme peut réaliser des visions d’enfer sans que le ciel tombe ou que la terre s’ouvre
La curieuse logique de tous les « ismes », leur foi simpliste en la valeur salutaire d’une dévotion aveugle qui ne tient aucun compte des facteurs spécifiques et changeant, contiennent déjà en germes le mépris totalitaire pour la réalité et les faits en eux-mêmes.
Le danger d’échanger la nécessaire insécurité, où se tient la pensée philosophique, pour l’explication totale que propose une idéologie et sa Weltanschauung n’est pas tant le risque de se laisser prendre à quelque postulat généralement vulgaire et toujours précritique, que d’échanger la liberté inhérente à la faculté humaine de penser pour la camisole de la logique, avec laquelle l’homme peut se contraindre lui-même presque aussi violemment qu’il est contraint par une force extérieure à lui.
Hannah Arendt, Les origines du totalitarisme, 1958, Gallimard, trad. Micheline Pouteau, Martine Leiris, Jean-Loup Bourget, Robert Davreu, Patrick Lévy.

Ne subsiste bien souvent de certains livres, dans nos esprits assommés par la « nouveauté  » , qu’une vague idée, que le souvenir lointain (et bien souvent déformé) de commentaires.  N’en surnage que l’impression d’un déjà connu, d’un déjà lu, qui les fait irrémédiablement verser dans les limbes de ce qui n’est définitivement plus à lire.  D’où l’idée de cette série de chroniques de retours aux textes lus.  Sans commentaires.
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8/31/2020

Hommage à Bernard Stiegler | « Panser signifie nuire à la bêtise » et à la lâcheté


Hommage à Bernard Stiegler | « Panser signifie nuire à la bêtise » et à la lâcheté #6

Bernard Stiegler, philosophe français, dans sa maison à Epineuil-le-Fleuriel (Cher) le 10/07/2017 © Joseph Melin
Bernard Stiegler est mort. Il n’est pas exagéré de dire que la philosophie (française) en est dévastée. Au sens propre de ce terme : là où Stiegler se tenait singulièrement, se tient désormais un vide inouï. Le désert croît, et ne cessera de croître. La grande séquence philosophique française des années 60, à laquelle Stiegler, s’il n’y appartenait pas déjà, était le plus ardent héritier, touche à sa fin. Il faut le regretter. D’autant plus que ce qui se prépare après sera ni plus ni moins que le règne du quelconque, et de la bêtise rendue systémique (que Stiegler avait diagnostiqué dans Etats de chocs. Bêtise et savoir au XXI° siècle). La philosophie n’y échappera pas : elle est déjà pleinement affectée. Tout le discours sur la mort de la philosophie, sur son incapacité à forger des propositions d’orientation pour la pensée, la vie ou la politique ; tout ce qui, en elle, la mésestime, la discrédite – voilà déjà des mots stieglériens ! –, au profit d’autres disciplines pouvant, dit-on, la supplanter (comme s’il y avait à opposer l’anthropologie, l’ethnologie, la sociologie, et la philosophie!), en vertu des nouvelles modes de la fashion week culturelle (lesquelles ne dureront pas plus qu’une saison printemps-été) ; tout ce qui, encore, la cantonne à n’être qu’une spiritualité méditante qui conviendrait à tous les anxieux de la Terre ; ou pis encore, ce qui, la niant, avec toute l’ironie et la dérision dont le nihilisme mondain est capable, veut en faire un instrument d’happening, ou de sémiologie du dérisoire ; tout cela abêtit la philosophie, et ne la destine à n’être rien de plus qu’une rubrique journalistique. Si Stiegler laisse dès lors un paysage dévasté derrière lui, c’est au sens où bientôt ce seront les falsificateurs (les apôtres de la post-vérité, qu’il critiquait tant!), les lâches et les crétins (soit ceux qui, n’ayant pas le courage de penser, découragent ceux qui pensent de penser), qui deviendront les gardiens de ce continent à la dérive. Que les derniers capitaines d’espoir (Nancy, Badiou, Rancière, Balibar, Milner…) tiennent bon d’ici là ! Et que la relève s’assure et s’assume pour éviter le pire !
« Etats de choc : Bêtise et savoir au XXIe siècle », Bernard Stiegler (Mille et Une Nuits, 2012)
Avant d’en venir au fond des choses, j’aimerais dire ce que Stiegler évoquait pour moi – ou pour certains de ma génération de trentenaires. Et ce qu’il évoquait, avant toute chose, c’était le courage de la pensée, la vie comme force de proposition, la ténacité et la persévérance comme mode d’existence. « Je soutiens que… » : le verbe « soutenir » hantait sa langue et son écriture ; il se soutenait en soutenant des hypothèses, en cherchant un arsenal conceptuel pour mener la guerre à son temps de bêtise. Constat : « face à la catastrophe en cours : – nous sommes gravement désarmés ; – il est urgent de reconstituer notre arsenal conceptuel »[1]. Tous les pense-petit s’en offusquaient : Stiegler était « trop » – trop philosophe, trop conceptuel, trop jargonneux ; il était trop aux yeux de ceux qui ne sont pas assez, c’est-à-dire pas assez digne de la philosophie, pour savoir qu’elle ne les a pas attendue pour recevoir les compte-rendus des petits inspecteurs des travaux finis, devenus inspecteurs pour n’avoir pas les moyens de devenir des investigateurs, c’est-à-dire des pa/enseurs. Puisque penser n’est pas panser, pour eux (oh le vilain jeu de mots qui suffit, comme toujours, pour tous ces impuissants, à discréditer une pensée!), penser, c’est dès lors déprécier, ironiser, abêtir, rabaisser à leur bassesse ; et donc, tout sauf penser, mais à la rigueur, ré-fléchir, au sens de faire fléchir tout ce qui s’élève au-dessus d’eux (soit, à peu près tout). Si ma plume est si méchante, c’est que ce qui arrivera après la pensée de nos maîtres, est l’apensée, la destruction de toute pensée, sa privation ou son impossibilisation par les lâches ricaneurs.
Autrement dit, rien n’arrivera sinon ce que Stiegler annonçait déjà sous le terme d’ « anthropie »[2]. Qu’est-ce que l’anthropie ? Terme forgé sur l’homophonie d’avec « entropie » (concept de la thermodynamique exprimant la tendance pour l’énergie de se dégrader et de se disperser), il indique la manière dont l’humanité – anthropos , « l’homme » – crée une dynamique destructrice, tant au niveau de l’esprit (destruction de l’attention, de l’individuation et de la transindividuation, toxicité des dépendances aux techniques amenant à la dépression), que de l’environnement. L’anthropie est donc la tendance fondamentale de l’Anthropocène, entendu, selon la conceptualité stieglerienne, comme Entropocène, c’est-à-dire période géologique où la technique humaine a dégradé non seulement nos capacités noétiques (de pensée), mais encore l’habitat de vie des vivants. Dès lors, la bêtise, dont je parlais, tout à l’heure, et qui règnera, si elle ne règne pas déjà, en maîtresse sur l’im-monde qui vient, est conditionnée par l’anthropie de notre époque.
Ce à quoi nous assistons, par conséquent, c’est à une destruction réglée de la pensée et du monde. Stiegler n’envisageait pas simplement l’écologie comme relation du vivant à son milieu naturel, mais également comme « écologie de l’esprit »[3], relation du vivant humain à son environnement technique. Il n’y a pas à opposer les écosystèmes de la Nature aux sociétés de culture, puisque l’écologie qui cherche à préserver les premiers est mise sous condition de la seconde, en ceci que cette dernière est le lieu ou l’élément de l’anthropie, et donc de l’Entropocène, lesquels sont la cause de l’anéantissement de la vie terrestre. Dès lors, si l’anthropie détermine l’Anthropocène, c’est que l’écologie de l’esprit détermine l’écologie naturelle. Autre version pour dire : que la régression psychique humaine, causée par la disruption (le web comme instrument du consumérisme, etc.), la conduit à se suicider, par cette compulsion d’achat – la fameuse fièvre acheteuse – congénitale à une pulsion de mort, pour ceci que ce consumérisme nécessite la dépense d’énergie inutile et polluante (pétrole pour faire un pull, kérosène pour l’acheminer de manière aérienne, etc.) déréglant le climat, et par conséquent, l’équilibre de la vie sur Terre. Il n’y aura donc d’écologie politique, digne de ce nom, que si l’on commence à panser cette relation de l’individu à son milieu technique, lieu de toutes les addictions de consommation, provoquées par le « psychopouvoir » du numérique ou de la publicité, et pilotant les individus à n’être rien de plus que des consommateurs, c’est-à-dire de proche en loin, à n’être rien de moins que les propres destructeurs de leur milieu naturel de vie et d’existence. Une écologie de l’esprit tendrait ainsi à faire de l’économie libidinale, conditionnant l’économie politique, non pas une alliée de l’anthropie, mais une alliée de la néguanthropie, permettant de mettre un terme, ou à tout le moins, de mettre un coup d’arrêt à la marche funèbre de l’Entropocène. La néguantropie indique ainsi, chez Stiegler, l’anthropie négative, soit la capacité positive pour un individu ou un collectif de s’organiser et de produire une énergie afin de nous sauver du danger qui croît.
Jacques Derrida chez lui, Ris-Orangis, mars 2004. © Laure Vasconi
Ce qu’il y a d’admirable dans les travaux de Stiegler, dans son œuvre, c’est qu’il n’a pas simplement été, dans la droite ligne de Derrida, un grand déconstructeur de la philosophie, ruinant les oppositions figées et abêtissantes de la tradition, mais aussi l’archéologue des restes irréductibles restant à penser afin de panser le monde qui vient. Déconstructeur, il fut donc également restitueur. En tant que restituer, c’est aussi proposer et non pas seulement s’opposer ; c’est affirmer, et non pas seulement infirmer. Partout a-t-il cherché, dans tous les domaines du savoir (la biologie, la physique, l’informatique, etc.), ce qui était resté en reste à la philosophie, afin de l’en nourrir, de l’en aviver, de l’en inspirer, de resituer le débat, de l’innerver jusqu’à son point névralgique, et ce, en vue d’endiguer la destruction systémique à l’œuvre. Que nous reste-t-il à penser et à panser ? Qu’est-ce qui demeure en reste à la pensée pour se dépasser et éviter le désastre ? Ce sont ces questions qui animèrent, de toujours, Bernard Stiegler, et qui l’amenèrent à s’aventurer sur tant de terrains sur lesquels les philosophes ne s’aventuraient pas. Sonder ce qui reste à panser, la restance de la pensée comme ce qui demeure à inventer pour prendre soin des générations à venir, était la manière dont Stiegler résistait. Car ce qui reste résiste et persiste : penser ce qui subsiste en reste à la pensée, comme son dehors qui pourrait venir l’affecter pour la faire bifurquer (autre mot de Stiegler), c’était pour lui penser la résistance et panser pour résister.
Le crétin dira que ce ne sont que des mots. Je ne les justifierai pas. S’il n’était pas déjà pris dans la bêtise systémique – soit la haine de la pensée –, cela ne lui traverserait même pas l’esprit (ou ce qu’il en reste). Aussi pourrait-il apercevoir – mais pour cela, encore faudrait-il qu’il lise –, que tous ces concepts ont une nécessité. Chaque concept stieglérien – et Stiegler était une machine à créer des concepts, ou des idiomes pour répondre, justement, des et aux problèmes de son temps – s’inscrit dans un système de pensée où l’anthropie figure le point nodal de celui-ci. Pierre de touche de tant de concepts stieglériens (disruption, mécroissance, prolétarisation, consumérisme, addiction, automatisation, misère symbolique, etc.), l’anthropie lui permettait de diagnostiquer la maladie époquale du présent, maladie humaine, trop humaine, qu’il tentait d’inverser ou de réfréner par ce qu’il appelait de toujours : la pharmacologie positive, thérapeutique alternative au système actuel de l’économie disruptive et entropique (cette économie, donc, de l’accélération de l’innovation prenant le pouvoir sur nos esprits, par tant de procédés de captation de l’attention nous abêtissant – ce qu’on appelle la gamification ou ludification –, ou d’automatisation nous vidant de nos savoir-faire).
« De la misère symbolique », Bernard Stiegler (Champs-Essais Flammarion, 2013)
Son style – presque un non-style, si l’on peut dire, nerveux, sec, peu enrobé ni affecté, rugueux et quasi-austère (son amour de Luther, et de la Réforme protestante s’y reconnaissait) – figure cette tentative : à lire Stiegler, on constate qu’en plus d’être un grand lecteur de la tradition philosophique (mais pas que !, également historique, technique, scientifique, etc.), il est aussi un lecteur de lui-même. A chaque livre, il branche l’essai qu’il écrit, et le marque et le souligne, à son système tout entier : il crée par là des embranchements, des réseaux signifiants, de résistance, comme autant de résistances électriques cherchant à empêcher la disruption du système (« mes livres veulent servir des luttes », écrivait-il dans De la misère symbolique) ; il couple les concepts entre eux, pénètre toujours davantage dans les boyaux de l’impensé en éclairant cette trouée ou ce frayage par les flambeaux conceptuels qu’il a laissés dans sa traversée en amont de sa galerie en forme de galère. L’œuvre de Stiegler est une œuvre de frayage : un travail monstrueux, nécessitant tant de courage, un travail de sape et de refondation inouï, qui l’aura aussi emporté (il ne faut pas se voiler les yeux), même si dans sa mort elle-même, il nous aura démontré encore une fois tout son courage.
Désormais, il nous faut – c’est un impératif ! – avoir son courage, le courage de sa pensée, soit le courage de panser, le courage de sa parrêsia, c’est-à-dire de son « franc-parler », de son parler-vrai, de son éthique de vérité. Le courage était son mot et sa chose, car pour la pensée, écrivait-il : « (…) le courage est requis. Le courage est ce qui craint un danger sans en avoir peur, c’est-à-dire : sans chercher à lui échapper, mais en le combattant comme tel. Ce combat comme tel (…), c’est ce qu’après le 11 septembre 2001 j’ai appelé la pharmacologie. Le courage de cette pensée qui panse est précisément celui de la parrêsia. »[4] Qu’importe si des crétins détestent le « il faut », ne sachant pas ce qu’il y a de fragile et de risqué dans cette injonction – puisque « falloir » a la même étymologie que « faillir » – ; car pour pouvoir écrire « il faut », pour pouvoir saisir l’injonction de pensée et d’action d’une époque, il en faut du courage, et beaucoup de courage, pour ne pas défaillir devant le poids écrasant de la charge. Ceux qui soutiennent, sans rien soutenir comme responsabilité (ni comme orientation de pensée), que la philosophie doit cesser avec ce « il faut », ceux-là même n’ont pas commencé à penser, et à penser ce que signifie, au sens de Stiegler : panser[5]. Il nous faut nous tenir à sa hauteur, c’est-à-dire à la hauteur de l’urgence de notre époque en détresse, sans nous décourager, afin de nuire à sa bêtise, en cela que « nuire à la bêtise est d’abord combattre la lâcheté »[6]. Bernard Stiegler sera, en vue de cette tâche, notre meilleur frère d’armes, notre meilleur allié.
© Valentin Husson

*Le titre est un extrait de Stiegler, Qu’appelle-t-on panser ? 1. L’immense régression, Paris, LLL, 2018, p.311
[1] Stiegler, Etats de chocs. Bêtise et savoir au XXI° siècle, Paris, Mille et une nuits, 2012, p. 58.
[2] Stiegler, Qu’appelle-t-on panser ?, op.cit., p.19.
[3] Stiegler, « L’hyperindustrialisation de la culture et le temps des attrapesnigauds. Manifeste pour une « écologie de l’esprit » », Art press.
[4] Stiegler, Qu’appelle-t-on panser ?, op.cit., p.7.
[5] En cela, faudrait-il appeler crétin : toute personne qui, impuissante pour soutenir toute responsabilité de la pensée, tente de rendre impuissante toute personne qui essaye d’en endosser la charge et le poids. Le crétin, non seulement ne peut pas ne pas se signaler comme crétin, mais ne peut pas ne pas abêtir ceux qui font. Esprit de vengeance : le crétin abaisse pour n’être point en mesure de s’élever à la hauteur des responsabilités. D’où sa dérision constante : il lui faut ricaner de tout pour ne rien avoir à prendre au sérieux. Le crétin est un lâche, ni plus ni moins.
[6] Stiegler, Qu’appelle-t-on panser ?, p.237. Ce qu’il disait dans De la misère symbolique (p.194) ainsi : «  la pensée est plus que jamais ce dont la vertu première est justement le courage. »

Un Philosophe