une
société qui s’était montrée prête structurellement à accepter le crime
sous la forme du vice serait bientôt prête à se laver de son vice en
accueillant ouvertement des criminels et en commettant publiquement des
crimes.
Enfin
et surtout, on découvrit dans des slogans tels que « Mort aux Juifs »
ou « La France aux Français » des formules presque magiques permettant
de réconcilier les masses avec l’état existant du gouvernement et de la
société.
Car
le pouvoir livré à lui-même ne saurait produire autre chose que
davantage encore de pouvoir, et la violence exercée au nom du pouvoir
(et non de la loi) devient un principe de destruction qui ne cessera que
lorsqu’il n’y aura plus rien à violenter.
« Ce
que nous appelons progrès, c’est [le] vent [qui] guide irrésistiblement
[l’ange de l’histoire] jusque dans le futur auquel il tourne le dos
cependant que devant lui l’amas des ruines s’élève jusqu’au cieux »
La
forme de possession la plus radicale et la seule vraiment sûre est la
destruction, car seules les choses que nous avons détruites sont à coup
sûr et définitivement nôtres.
Peu
d’idéologies ont su acquérir assez de prépondérance pour survivre à la
lutte sans merci menée par la persuasion, et seules deux d’entre elles y
sont effectivement parvenues en écrasant vraiment toutes les autres :
l’idéologie qui interprète l’histoire comme une lutte économique entre
classes et celle qui l’interprète comme une lutte naturelle entre races.
Toutes deux ont exercé sur les masses une séduction assez forte pour se
gagner l’appui de l’État et pour s’imposer comme doctrines nationales
officielles. Mais, bien au-delà des frontières à l’intérieur desquelles
la pensée raciale et la pensée de classe se sont érigées en modèles de
pensée obligatoires, la libre opinion publique les a faites siennes à un
point tel que non seulement les intellectuels mais aussi les masses
n’accepteraient désormais plus une analyse des évènements passés ou
présents en désaccord avec l’une ou l’autre de ces perspectives.
Rien
ne caractérise mieux les mouvements totalitaires en général, et la
gloire de leurs leaders en particulier, que la rapidité surprenante avec
laquelle on les oublie et la facilité avec laquelle on les remplace
Une
croyance répandue veut que Hitler ait été un simple agent des
industriels allemands, et que Staline ait triomphé dans la lutte pour la
succession après la mort de Lénine par le seul biais d’une sinistre
conspiration. Ce sont là deux légendes, que réfutent de nombreux faits,
et d’abord l’indiscutable popularité des deux dirigeants.
Les mouvements totalitaires sont des organisations de masse d’individus atomisés et isolés.
À
une époque de misère croissante et de désespoir individuel, il semble
aussi difficile de résister à la pitié lorsqu’elle devient une passion
exclusive, que de ne pas réprouver son universalité même, qui semble
tuer la dignité humaine encore plus sûrement que ne le fait la misère.
Rien
ne s’avéra plus facile à détruire que l’intimité et la moralité privée
de gens qui ne pensaient qu’à sauvegarder leur vie privée.
Le
totalitarisme, une fois au pouvoir, remplace invariablement tous les
vrais talents, quelles que soient leurs sympathies, par ces illuminés et
ces imbéciles dont le manque d’intelligence et de créativité reste la
meilleure garantie de leur loyauté.
En
effet, d’un point de vue démagogique, il n’est pas de meilleur moyen
d’éviter la discussion que de déconnecter un argument du contrôle du
présent et de dire que seul l’avenir peut en révéler les mérites.
Les
nazis ont prouvé qu’on peut conduire un peuple entier à la guerre avec
le slogan « sinon c’est la catastrophe » […] et cela à une époque sans
misère, sans chômage ni ambitions nationales frustrées.
Les
mouvements totalitaires se servent du socialisme et du racisme en les
vidant de leur contenu utilitaire, les intérêts d’une classe ou d’un
nation. La forme de prédiction infaillible sous laquelle étaient
présentés ces concepts est devenue plus importante que leur contenu.
Le pouvoir réel commence où le secret commence.
Mais,
une fois acquise la possibilité d’exterminer les Juifs comme des
punaises, au moyen de gaz toxiques, il n’est plus nécessaire de propager
l’idée que les Juifs sont des punaises.
L’ennui
avec les régimes totalitaires n’est pas qu’ils manipulent le pouvoir
politique d’une manière particulièrement impitoyable, mais que derrière
leur politique se cache une conception du pouvoir entièrement nouvelle
et sans précédent, de même que derrière leur Realpolitik se
trouve une conception entièrement nouvelle, sans précédent, de la
réalité. Suprême dédain des conséquences immédiates plutôt
qu’inflexibilité; absence de racines et négligence des intérêts
nationaux plutôt que nationalisme; mépris des considérations d’ordre
utilitaire plutôt que poursuite inconsidérée de l’intérêt personnel;
« idéalisme », c’est-à-dire foi inébranlable en un monde idéologique
fictif, plutôt qu’appétit de pouvoir – tout cela a introduit dans la
politique internationale un facteur nouveau, plus troublant que n’aurait
pu l’être l’agressivité pure et simple.
L’hypothèse
centrale du totalitarisme selon laquelle tout est possible conduit donc
à l’élimination systématique de tout ce qui pourrait gêner la
réalisation de son absurde et terrible conséquence : que tout crime
imaginé par les dirigeants doit être puni, sans se soucier de savoir
s’il a ou non été commis.
Ce
qui heurte le sens commun, ce n’est pas le principe nihiliste du « tout
est permis » que l’on trouvait déjà au 19ème siècle dans la conception
utilitaire du sens commun. Ce que le sens commun et les « gens normaux »
refusent de croire, c’est que tout est possible. Nous essayons de
comprendre les faits, dans le présent ou dans l’expérience remémorée,
qui dépassent tout simplement nos capacités de compréhension. Nous
essayons de classer dans la rubrique du crime ce qu’aucune catégorie de
ce genre, selon nous, ne fut jamais destinée à couvrir. Quelle est la
signification de la notion de meurtre lorsque nous nous trouvons en face
de la production massive de cadavres? Nous essayons de comprendre du
point de vue psychologique le comportement des détenus des camps de
concentration et des SS, alors que nous devons prendre conscience du
fait que la psyché peut être détruite sans que l’homme soit, pour
autant, physiquement détruit; que, dans certaines circonstances, la
psyché, le caractère et l’individualité ne semblent assurément se
manifester que par la rapidité ou la lenteur avec lesquelles ils se
désintègrent. Cela aboutit en tout cas à l’apparition d’hommes sans
âmes, c’est-à-dire d’hommes dont on ne peut plus comprendre la
psychologie, dont le retour au monde humain intelligible, soit
psychologiquement, soit de toute autre manière, ressemble de près à la
résurrection de Lazare. Toutes les affirmations du sens commun, qu’elles
soient de nature psychologique ou sociologique, ne servent qu’à
encourager ceux qui pensent qu’il est « superficiel » de « s’appesantir
sur ces horreurs »
l’homme peut réaliser des visions d’enfer sans que le ciel tombe ou que la terre s’ouvre
La
curieuse logique de tous les « ismes », leur foi simpliste en la valeur
salutaire d’une dévotion aveugle qui ne tient aucun compte des facteurs
spécifiques et changeant, contiennent déjà en germes le mépris
totalitaire pour la réalité et les faits en eux-mêmes.
Le
danger d’échanger la nécessaire insécurité, où se tient la pensée
philosophique, pour l’explication totale que propose une idéologie et
sa Weltanschauung n’est pas tant le risque de se laisser
prendre à quelque postulat généralement vulgaire et toujours
précritique, que d’échanger la liberté inhérente à la faculté humaine de
penser pour la camisole de la logique, avec laquelle l’homme peut se
contraindre lui-même presque aussi violemment qu’il est contraint par
une force extérieure à lui.
Hannah Arendt, Les origines du totalitarisme, 1958, Gallimard, trad. Micheline Pouteau, Martine Leiris, Jean-Loup Bourget, Robert Davreu, Patrick Lévy.
Ne
subsiste bien souvent de certains livres, dans nos esprits assommés par
la « nouveauté » , qu’une vague idée, que le souvenir lointain (et
bien souvent déformé) de commentaires. N’en surnage que l’impression
d’un déjà connu, d’un déjà lu, qui les fait irrémédiablement verser dans
les limbes de ce qui n’est définitivement plus à lire. D’où l’idée de
cette série de chroniques de retours aux textes lus. Sans commentaires.
Bernard Stiegler est mort. Il n’est pas
exagéré de dire que la philosophie (française) en est dévastée. Au sens
propre de ce terme : là où Stiegler se tenait singulièrement, se tient
désormais un vide inouï. Le désert croît, et ne cessera de croître. La
grande séquence philosophique française des années 60, à laquelle
Stiegler, s’il n’y appartenait pas déjà, était le plus ardent héritier,
touche à sa fin. Il faut le regretter. D’autant plus que ce qui se
prépare après sera ni plus ni moins que le règne du quelconque, et de la
bêtise rendue systémique (que Stiegler avait diagnostiqué dans Etats de chocs. Bêtise et savoir au XXI° siècle).
La philosophie n’y échappera pas : elle est déjà pleinement affectée.
Tout le discours sur la mort de la philosophie, sur son incapacité à
forger des propositions d’orientation pour la pensée, la vie ou la
politique ; tout ce qui, en elle, la mésestime, la discrédite – voilà
déjà des mots stieglériens ! –, au profit d’autres disciplines pouvant,
dit-on, la supplanter (comme s’il y avait à opposer l’anthropologie,
l’ethnologie, la sociologie, et la philosophie!), en vertu des nouvelles
modes de la fashion week culturelle (lesquelles ne dureront
pas plus qu’une saison printemps-été) ; tout ce qui, encore, la cantonne
à n’être qu’une spiritualité méditante qui conviendrait à tous les
anxieux de la Terre ; ou pis encore, ce qui, la niant, avec toute
l’ironie et la dérision dont le nihilisme mondain est capable, veut en
faire un instrument d’happening, ou de sémiologie du
dérisoire ; tout cela abêtit la philosophie, et ne la destine à n’être
rien de plus qu’une rubrique journalistique. Si Stiegler laisse dès lors
un paysage dévasté derrière lui, c’est au sens où bientôt ce seront les
falsificateurs (les apôtres de la post-vérité, qu’il critiquait tant!),
les lâches et les crétins (soit ceux qui, n’ayant pas le courage de
penser, découragent ceux qui pensent de penser), qui deviendront les
gardiens de ce continent à la dérive. Que les derniers capitaines
d’espoir (Nancy, Badiou, Rancière, Balibar, Milner…) tiennent bon d’ici
là ! Et que la relève s’assure et s’assume pour éviter le pire !
« Etats de choc : Bêtise et savoir au XXIe siècle », Bernard Stiegler (Mille et Une Nuits, 2012)
Avant d’en venir au fond des choses,
j’aimerais dire ce que Stiegler évoquait pour moi – ou pour certains de
ma génération de trentenaires. Et ce qu’il évoquait, avant toute chose,
c’était le courage de la pensée, la vie comme force de
proposition, la ténacité et la persévérance comme mode d’existence. « Je
soutiens que… » : le verbe « soutenir » hantait sa langue et son
écriture ; il se soutenait en soutenant des hypothèses, en cherchant un
arsenal conceptuel pour mener la guerre à son temps de bêtise. Constat :
« face à la catastrophe en cours : – nous sommes gravement désarmés ; –
il est urgent de reconstituer notre arsenal conceptuel »[1].
Tous les pense-petit s’en offusquaient : Stiegler était « trop » – trop
philosophe, trop conceptuel, trop jargonneux ; il était trop aux yeux
de ceux qui ne sont pas assez, c’est-à-dire pas assez digne de la
philosophie, pour savoir qu’elle ne les a pas attendue pour recevoir les
compte-rendus des petits inspecteurs des travaux finis, devenus
inspecteurs pour n’avoir pas les moyens de devenir des investigateurs,
c’est-à-dire des pa/enseurs. Puisque penser n’est pas panser,
pour eux (oh le vilain jeu de mots qui suffit, comme toujours, pour tous
ces impuissants, à discréditer une pensée!), penser, c’est dès lors
déprécier, ironiser, abêtir, rabaisser à leur bassesse ; et donc, tout
sauf penser, mais à la rigueur, ré-fléchir, au sens de faire fléchir
tout ce qui s’élève au-dessus d’eux (soit, à peu près tout). Si ma plume
est si méchante, c’est que ce qui arrivera après la pensée de nos
maîtres, est l’apensée, la destruction de toute pensée, sa privation ou
son impossibilisation par les lâches ricaneurs.
Autrement dit, rien n’arrivera sinon ce que Stiegler annonçait déjà sous le terme d’ « anthropie »[2].
Qu’est-ce que l’anthropie ? Terme forgé sur l’homophonie d’avec
« entropie » (concept de la thermodynamique exprimant la tendance pour
l’énergie de se dégrader et de se disperser), il indique la manière dont
l’humanité – anthropos , « l’homme » – crée une dynamique
destructrice, tant au niveau de l’esprit (destruction de l’attention, de
l’individuation et de la transindividuation, toxicité des dépendances
aux techniques amenant à la dépression), que de l’environnement.
L’anthropie est donc la tendance fondamentale de l’Anthropocène,
entendu, selon la conceptualité stieglerienne, comme Entropocène,
c’est-à-dire période géologique où la technique humaine a dégradé non
seulement nos capacités noétiques (de pensée), mais encore l’habitat de
vie des vivants. Dès lors, la bêtise, dont je parlais, tout à l’heure,
et qui règnera, si elle ne règne pas déjà, en maîtresse sur l’im-monde
qui vient, est conditionnée par l’anthropie de notre époque.
Ce à quoi nous assistons, par conséquent,
c’est à une destruction réglée de la pensée et du monde. Stiegler
n’envisageait pas simplement l’écologie comme relation du vivant à son
milieu naturel, mais également comme « écologie de l’esprit »[3],
relation du vivant humain à son environnement technique. Il n’y a pas à
opposer les écosystèmes de la Nature aux sociétés de culture, puisque
l’écologie qui cherche à préserver les premiers est mise sous condition
de la seconde, en ceci que cette dernière est le lieu ou l’élément de
l’anthropie, et donc de l’Entropocène, lesquels sont la cause de
l’anéantissement de la vie terrestre. Dès lors, si l’anthropie détermine
l’Anthropocène, c’est que l’écologie de l’esprit détermine l’écologie
naturelle. Autre version pour dire : que la régression psychique
humaine, causée par la disruption (le web comme instrument du
consumérisme, etc.), la conduit à se suicider, par cette compulsion
d’achat – la fameuse fièvre acheteuse – congénitale à une pulsion de
mort, pour ceci que ce consumérisme nécessite la dépense d’énergie
inutile et polluante (pétrole pour faire un pull, kérosène pour
l’acheminer de manière aérienne, etc.) déréglant le climat, et par
conséquent, l’équilibre de la vie sur Terre. Il n’y aura donc d’écologie
politique, digne de ce nom, que si l’on commence à panser cette
relation de l’individu à son milieu technique, lieu de toutes les
addictions de consommation, provoquées par le « psychopouvoir » du
numérique ou de la publicité, et pilotant les individus à n’être rien de
plus que des consommateurs, c’est-à-dire de proche en loin, à n’être
rien de moins que les propres destructeurs de leur milieu naturel de vie
et d’existence. Une écologie de l’esprit tendrait ainsi à faire de
l’économie libidinale, conditionnant l’économie politique, non pas une
alliée de l’anthropie, mais une alliée de la néguanthropie, permettant
de mettre un terme, ou à tout le moins, de mettre un coup d’arrêt à la
marche funèbre de l’Entropocène. La néguantropie indique ainsi, chez
Stiegler, l’anthropie négative, soit la capacité positive pour un
individu ou un collectif de s’organiser et de produire une énergie afin
de nous sauver du danger qui croît.
Ce qu’il y a d’admirable dans les travaux
de Stiegler, dans son œuvre, c’est qu’il n’a pas simplement été, dans
la droite ligne de Derrida, un grand déconstructeur de la philosophie,
ruinant les oppositions figées et abêtissantes de la tradition, mais
aussi l’archéologue des restes irréductibles restant à penser afin de
panser le monde qui vient. Déconstructeur, il fut donc également
restitueur. En tant que restituer, c’est aussi proposer et non pas
seulement s’opposer ; c’est affirmer, et non pas seulement infirmer.
Partout a-t-il cherché, dans tous les domaines du savoir (la biologie,
la physique, l’informatique, etc.), ce qui était resté en reste à la
philosophie, afin de l’en nourrir, de l’en aviver, de l’en inspirer, de
resituer le débat, de l’innerver jusqu’à son point névralgique, et ce,
en vue d’endiguer la destruction systémique à l’œuvre. Que nous
reste-t-il à penser et à panser ? Qu’est-ce qui demeure en reste à la
pensée pour se dépasser et éviter le désastre ? Ce sont ces questions
qui animèrent, de toujours, Bernard Stiegler, et qui l’amenèrent à
s’aventurer sur tant de terrains sur lesquels les philosophes ne
s’aventuraient pas. Sonder ce qui reste à panser, la restance de la
pensée comme ce qui demeure à inventer pour prendre soin des générations
à venir, était la manière dont Stiegler résistait. Car ce qui reste
résiste et persiste : penser ce qui subsiste en reste à la pensée, comme
son dehors qui pourrait venir l’affecter pour la faire bifurquer (autre
mot de Stiegler), c’était pour lui penser la résistance et panser pour
résister.
Le crétin dira que ce ne sont que des
mots. Je ne les justifierai pas. S’il n’était pas déjà pris dans la
bêtise systémique – soit la haine de la pensée –, cela ne lui
traverserait même pas l’esprit (ou ce qu’il en reste). Aussi pourrait-il
apercevoir – mais pour cela, encore faudrait-il qu’il lise –, que tous
ces concepts ont une nécessité. Chaque concept stieglérien – et Stiegler
était une machine à créer des concepts, ou des idiomes pour répondre,
justement, des et aux problèmes de son temps – s’inscrit dans un système
de pensée où l’anthropie figure le point nodal de celui-ci. Pierre de
touche de tant de concepts stieglériens (disruption, mécroissance,
prolétarisation, consumérisme, addiction, automatisation, misère
symbolique, etc.), l’anthropie lui permettait de diagnostiquer la
maladie époquale du présent, maladie humaine, trop humaine, qu’il
tentait d’inverser ou de réfréner par ce qu’il appelait de toujours : la
pharmacologie positive, thérapeutique alternative au système actuel de
l’économie disruptive et entropique (cette économie, donc, de
l’accélération de l’innovation prenant le pouvoir sur nos esprits, par
tant de procédés de captation de l’attention nous abêtissant – ce qu’on
appelle la gamification ou ludification –, ou d’automatisation nous vidant de nos savoir-faire).
« De la misère symbolique », Bernard Stiegler (Champs-Essais Flammarion, 2013)
Son style – presque un non-style, si l’on
peut dire, nerveux, sec, peu enrobé ni affecté, rugueux et
quasi-austère (son amour de Luther, et de la Réforme protestante s’y
reconnaissait) – figure cette tentative : à lire Stiegler, on constate
qu’en plus d’être un grand lecteur de la tradition philosophique (mais
pas que !, également historique, technique, scientifique, etc.), il est
aussi un lecteur de lui-même. A chaque livre, il branche l’essai qu’il
écrit, et le marque et le souligne, à son système tout entier : il crée
par là des embranchements, des réseaux signifiants, de résistance, comme
autant de résistances électriques cherchant à empêcher la disruption du
système (« mes livres veulent servir des luttes », écrivait-il dans De la misère symbolique) ;
il couple les concepts entre eux, pénètre toujours davantage dans les
boyaux de l’impensé en éclairant cette trouée ou ce frayage par les
flambeaux conceptuels qu’il a laissés dans sa traversée en amont de sa
galerie en forme de galère. L’œuvre de Stiegler est une œuvre de
frayage : un travail monstrueux, nécessitant tant de courage, un travail
de sape et de refondation inouï, qui l’aura aussi emporté (il ne faut
pas se voiler les yeux), même si dans sa mort elle-même, il nous aura
démontré encore une fois tout son courage.
Désormais, il nous faut – c’est un impératif ! – avoir son courage, le courage de sa pensée, soit le courage de panser, le courage de sa parrêsia,
c’est-à-dire de son « franc-parler », de son parler-vrai, de son
éthique de vérité. Le courage était son mot et sa chose, car pour la
pensée, écrivait-il : « (…) le courage est requis. Le courage est ce qui craint un danger sans en avoir peur,
c’est-à-dire : sans chercher à lui échapper, mais en le combattant
comme tel. Ce combat comme tel (…), c’est ce qu’après le 11 septembre
2001 j’ai appelé la pharmacologie. Le courage de cette pensée qui panse
est précisément celui de la parrêsia. »[4]
Qu’importe si des crétins détestent le « il faut », ne sachant pas ce
qu’il y a de fragile et de risqué dans cette injonction – puisque
« falloir » a la même étymologie que « faillir » – ; car pour pouvoir
écrire « il faut », pour pouvoir saisir l’injonction de pensée et
d’action d’une époque, il en faut du courage, et beaucoup de courage,
pour ne pas défaillir devant le poids écrasant de la charge. Ceux qui
soutiennent, sans rien soutenir comme responsabilité (ni comme
orientation de pensée), que la philosophie doit cesser avec ce « il
faut », ceux-là même n’ont pas commencé à penser, et à penser ce que
signifie, au sens de Stiegler : panser[5]. Il nous faut
nous tenir à sa hauteur, c’est-à-dire à la hauteur de l’urgence de
notre époque en détresse, sans nous décourager, afin de nuire à sa
bêtise, en cela que « nuire à la bêtise est d’abord combattre la
lâcheté »[6]. Bernard Stiegler sera, en vue de cette tâche, notre meilleur frère d’armes, notre meilleur allié.
[5] En
cela, faudrait-il appeler crétin : toute personne qui, impuissante pour
soutenir toute responsabilité de la pensée, tente de rendre impuissante
toute personne qui essaye d’en endosser la charge et le poids. Le
crétin, non seulement ne peut pas ne pas se signaler comme crétin, mais
ne peut pas ne pas abêtir ceux qui font. Esprit de vengeance :
le crétin abaisse pour n’être point en mesure de s’élever à la hauteur
des responsabilités. D’où sa dérision constante : il lui faut ricaner de
tout pour ne rien avoir à prendre au sérieux. Le crétin est un lâche,
ni plus ni moins.
[6] Stiegler, Qu’appelle-t-on panser ?, p.237. Ce qu’il disait dans De la misère symbolique (p.194) ainsi : « la pensée est plus que jamais ce dont la vertu première est justement le courage. »
How to spot a perfect fake: the world’s top art forgery detective
Jamie Martin in the offices of Sotheby’s in New York. Photograph: Joshua Bright/The Guardian
Forgeries
have got so good – and so costly – that Sotheby’s has brought in its
own in-house fraud-busting expert. By Samanth Subramanian
The
unravelling of a string of shocking old master forgeries began in the
winter of 2015, when French police appeared at a gallery in
Aix-en-Provence and seized a painting from display. Venus, by the German
Renaissance master Lucas Cranach the Elder, to describe the work more
fully: oil on oak, 38cm by 25cm, and dated to 1531. Purchased in 2013 by
the Prince of Liechtenstein for about £6m, Venus was the inescapable
star of the exhibition of works from his collection; she glowed on the
cover of the catalogue. But an anonymous tip to the police suggested she
was, in fact, a modern fake – so they scooped her up and took her away.
The
painting had been placed in the market by Giuliano Ruffini, a French
collector, and its seizure hoisted the first flag of concern about a
wave of impeccable fakes. Ruffini has sold at least 25 works, their sale
values totalling about £179m, and doubts now shadow every one of these
paintings. The authenticity of four, in particular, including the
Cranach, has been contested; the art historian Bendor Grosvenor said
they may turn out to be “the best old master fakes the world has ever
seen.” Ruffini, who remains the subject of a French police
investigation, has denied presenting these paintings as old masters at
all. To the Art Newspaper, he protested: “I am a collector, not an expert.”
The
quality of these paintings – their faithful duplicity – jolted the
market. The sums of money at stake in art, never paltry to begin with,
have grown monstrous. Thirty years ago, the highest auction price for a
painting was $10.4m, paid by the J Paul Getty Museum for Andrea
Mantegna’s Adoration of the Magi in 1985. In contrast, while the $450m
paid for Leonardo da Vinci’s Salvator Mundi in 2017 counts as an
outlier, abstract expressionists and impressionists frequently come, in
auctions or private deals, with nine-figure price tags.
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In
lockstep, the incentive to be a proficient forger has soared; a single,
expertly executed old master knockoff can finance a long, comfortable
retirement. The technologies available to abet the aspiring forger have
also improved. Naturally, then, the frauds are getting better, touching
off a crisis of authentication for the institutions of the art world:
the museums and galleries and auction houses and experts who are
expected to know the real thing from its imitation.
What
was most unnerving about the alleged fakes sold by Ruffini was how many
people they fooled. The National Gallery in London displayed a small
oil painting thought to be by the 16th-century artist Orazio Gentileschi
– a battle-weary David, painted on an electric-blue slice of lapis
lazuli; the work is now suspect.
A portrait of a nobleman against a muddy background was sold by
Sotheby’s in 2011, to a private collector, as a Frans Hals; the buyer
paid £8.5m. Sotheby’s also sold an oil named Saint Jerome, attributed to
the 16th-century artist Parmigianino, in a 2012 auction, for $842,500.
With care, the catalogue only ventured that the work was from the
“circle of” Parmigianino– an idiom to convey that it was painted by an
artist influenced by, and perhaps a pupil of, Parmigianino. But the
entry also cited several experts who believed it was by Parmigianino
himself.
The works were full of striking,
scrupulous detail. On Jerome’s arm, for example, dozens of faint
horizontal cracks have appeared; every so often, a clean, vertical split
intersects them. In French canvases from the 18th century, cracks in
paint tend to develop like spider webs; in Flemish panels, like tree
bark. In Italian paintings of the Renaissance, the patterns resemble
rows of untidy brickwork. On the Saint Jerome, the cracks match
perfectly. Prof David Ekserdjian, one of the few art historians who
doubted that the painting was a Parmigianino, said he just didn’t feel
the prickle of recognition that scholars claim as their gift: the
intimacy with an artist that they liken to our ability to spot a friend
in a crowd. “But I have to be frank, I didn’t look at it and say: ‘Oh,
that’s a forgery.’”
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When
Sotheby’s sells an artwork, it offers a five-year guarantee of refund
if the object proves to be a counterfeit – “a modern forgery intended to
deceive”, as its terms specify. In 2016, after uncertainty crackled
over the Hals and the Parmigianino, the auction-house sent them to Orion
Analytical, a conservation science lab in Williamstown, Massachusetts.
Orion was run, and staffed almost solely by, James Martin, who has
loaned his forensic skills to the FBI for many art forgery
investigations. Within days, Martin had an answer for Sotheby’s: both
the Hals and the Parmigianino were fakes.
The
“Hals” contained synthetic pigments that the artist, in the 17th
century, could not have used. In Saint Jerome, similarly, Martin found
phthalocyanine green, a pigment first synthesised four centuries after
Parmigianino died. It showed up consistently across 21 paint samples
from various parts of the painting – “a bit like taking the pulse of a
corpse 21 times,” Martin told the New York Times last year. Sotheby’s
refunded both buyers, and filed suits against the sellers, demanding
they return their proceeds from the sales.
In
December 2016, in a signal of how attribution scandals have spooked the
market, Sotheby’s took the unprecedented step of buying Orion Analytical,
becoming the first auctioneer to have an in-house conservation and
analysis unit. The company had seen enough disputes over attribution to
mar its bottom line, its CEO, Tad Smith, said: “If you looked at
earnings reports from a year or two ago, you’d see little blips here and
there. These were expenses coming from settlements – not a slew, the
number was small and statistically insignificant, but they’re
expensive.” The cost of insurance that covers such settlements was also
rising. With Martin in the building, “the pictures and other objects
moving through Sotheby’s now have a much higher chance of being
checked”, Smith said. Last year, Martin analysed more than $100m worth
of artworks before they went under the hammer or into private sales.
Sotheby’s employs him, in part, as a conservator, so he ministers to the
health of the paintings and sculptures that pass through. But over the
past two decades, Martin has also become the art world’s foremost
forensic art detective. He has worked so many forgery cases with such
success that he also serves Sotheby’s as a line of fortification against
the swells of duff art lapping into the market.
The
first major painting sold by Sotheby’s was also a Hals – a real one:
Man in Black, a half-length portrait of a hatted gent. Until 1913,
Sotheby’s had dealt in books for a century or thereabouts; art made up
only a wan side business. In that year, though, a Sotheby’s partner
found a Hals consigned to the firm, and rather than forwarding it to
Christie’s, as was often the practice, decided to auction it. After a
spirited contest of bids, Man in Black sold for £9,000 – a 26% rate of
return per annum since Christie’s had last auctioned the work, in 1885,
for around £5. It was the first signal, for Sotheby’s, that there was
profit to be mined from paintings. Last year, it sold $5.5bn worth of
art, jewellery and real estate.
The
Frans Hals painting, Portrait of a Gentleman, supplied to Sotheby’s by
Mark Weiss. It sold for a reported £8.5m ($10.8m) but was later declared
fake. Photograph: Sotheby's
For
Sotheby’s, the question of authenticity is not merely, or even
primarily, academic. There is more at stake than a satisfying answer to
the fundamental conundrum of whether authenticity matters at all – a
debate that has been fought and refought in the history of western art.
“If a fake is so expert that even after the most thorough and
trustworthy examination its authenticity is still open to doubt,” the
critic Aline Saarinen once wondered, “is it or is it not as satisfactory
a work of art as if it were unequivocally genuine?” Typically, this
debate comes to rest at the same place every time. Of course
authenticity matters; to study a false Rembrandt as a true one would be
to hobble our understanding of Rembrandt as an artist, and of the
evolution of art. Now, however, the question’s philosophical whimsy has
been replaced by financial urgency. At a time when the art market is
synonymous with art itself, a lack of regard for attribution would
derail a trade that traffics in the scarcity of authentic Rembrandts.
Leaving
straight forgeries aside, any discussion about the “authenticity” of an
artwork opens suddenly, like a trapdoor, into the murk of semantics. On
the sliding scale of attribution that art historians use – painted by;
hand of; studio of; circle of; style of; copy of – each step takes the
artist farther from the painting. These variations, often subtle, are
compounded by the unease about overpainting; Salvator Mundi had been
worked over so many times and so heavily, critics argued, that it was
less by Da Vinci than by his restorers. Deliberate fakes,
misattributions and poor restorations all encroach into the realm of the
authentic. In two decades at the Met in New York, Thomas Hoving, the
museum’s director until 1977, must have examined at least 50,000
objects, he wrote in his book False Impressions. “I almost believe that
there are as many bogus works as genuine ones.”
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Like
criminals of every stripe, modern forgers have kept easy pace with the
techniques that attempt to trap them. The mismatch between the purported
age of a painting and the true age of its ingredients is the workhorse
of Martin’s technique. So forgers have grown more rigorous in their
harvesting of materials, taking the trouble, for instance, to source
wooden panels from furniture they know is dateable to the year of the
fake they are creating. (The trick isn’t wholly new; Terenzio da Urbino,
a 17th-century conman, scrabbled around for filthy old canvases and
frames, cleaned them up, and turned them into “Raphaels”.) Forgers also
test their own fakes to ensure they’ll pass. Wolfgang Beltracchi, a
German artist who served three years in prison for forging paintings
worth $45m, surveyed the chemical elements in his works by running them
under X-ray fluorescence guns – the same handheld devices, resembling
Star Trek phasers, that many art fairs now train upon their exhibits.
Georgina
Adam, who wrote Dark Side of the Boom, a book about the art market’s
excesses, told me that many forgers are sensibly choosing to falsify
20th-century painters, who used paints and canvases that can still be
obtained, and whose abstractions are easier to imitate. “The technical
skill needed to forge a Leonardo is colossal, but with someone like
Modigliani, it isn’t,” she said. “Now, scholars will say it’s easy to
distinguish, but the fact is that it’s just not that easy at all.” In
January, in a celebrated Modigliani exhibition in Genoa, 20 out of 21
paintings were revealed to be counterfeits.
As
the tide of money in the market has risen, making decisions about
authenticity has turned into a fraught venture. Collectors, realising
how much they stand to lose, are now happy to take scholars and
connoisseurs – traditionally the final authorities on the authenticity
of a work – to court for their mistakes. Realising that their
reputations, as well as their bank balances, may wilt under the
heat,these experts have begun to subtract themselves from the game
entirely.
The estates of several 20th-century
artists had once taken on the duty of resolving doubts over attribution,
setting up authentication committees, consisting of experts or the
artist’s former colleagues or friends – people expected to know the work
best. In 2007, a collector named Joe Simon-Whelan sued the Andy Warhol
estate’s authentication committee, claiming it had twice rejected a
Warhol silkscreen he owned because it wanted to maintain scarcity in the
Warhol market. Four years later, after spending $7m in legal fees, the
estate dissolved the committee. The authentication boards of other
modern artists – Jean-Michel Basquiat, Keith Haring, Roy Lichtenstein,
Alexander Calder – have followed. Individual connoisseurs – as the art
world calls its experts – won’t always challenge popular
identifications, wrote the critic Jerry Saltz in a scorching essay
on the vertiginous price of Salvator Mundi. They are reluctant to “rock
the already splintering institutional boat. As in the wider world,
where people sit by for fear of losing position, it’s no wonder that
many old master experts are keeping quiet, not saying much of anything.”
The
collapse of these committees feels like a victory of the market over
the academy, like a blow to the very cause of trustworthy
authentication. (In New York, a small band of lawyers is lobbying for
legislation that will protect scholars from being sued merely for
expressing their opinion.) In this void of opinion, Martin’s abilities –
premised not on the mysterious instincts of connoisseurship, but on the
verifiable results of the scientific process – have an even higher
valence.
Martin, a tall man with lumber-beam
shoulders, has a voice that never surpasses a murmur. He is a consummate
nerd; find someone who looks at you the way Martin looks at his
Fourier-transform infrared microscope. He trained as a conservator of
paintings, but now he assays them: picks out their chemical
constituents, inspects pigments and binders, peers under their washes of
colour. From a painting’s materials, he can extract the vital detail of
when it could, or could not, have been created.
The
field of scientific art conservation is not a crowded one; Martin, who
set up the first for-profit art lab in the US, has been consulted in
nearly every major fraud case in the past 25 years, often working
alongside the FBI or other investigators. When he is described as the
premier forensic detective working in art today, the accolade comes not
only from people such as John Cahill, a New York lawyer who has managed
dozens of art transactions, and who called Martin “hands-down the best
in the business,” but also from those on the other side of the fence, so
to speak. Beltracchi, the German forger, told me that, after his
arrest, he had seen an assortment of technical studies collected by the
police and the prosecution. He remembered Martin’s well. “His reports
contained the most accurate results. His reports were factually neutral
and without unrealistic guesses.” By folding Martin into its staff,
Sotheby’s has given itself a muscular chance to stamp out problems of
attribution before they flare into spectacular, expensive affairs. But
it’s hard not to feel, at the same time, that it has cornered a precious
resource, at a moment when the art world needs him most.
Martin
spent much of last year setting up a new lab in what used to be a photo
studio on the fifth floor of the Sotheby’s headquarters in Manhattan.
Soon, he will also have a London facility, in the building where the
Beatles once recorded A Taste of Honey for the BBC. The New York lab,
one large room, is as white and aseptic as a dentist’s clinic. Many of
the cabinets are still empty, and the desk surfaces often bear nothing
apart from one red pack of Martin’s Dentyne Fire gum. Outside the lab,
above the lead-lined double doors, is a warning light; if it’s on, so
too is the giant x-ray fluorescence machine, and no one is allowed in.
One
Friday in mid-February, the room held only two items of art. A carved
wooden chair sat on a counter; on a stand was a painting that, for
reasons of confidentiality, may be described here only as “a late-19th
century American work”. When a painting checks into the lab, it is first
submitted to a visual examination in bright, white light; then the lamp
is moved to one side, so that the light rakes over the surface at an
angle, showing up restored or altered areas. The canvas in Martin’s lab
was at the next stage; it had been photographed under ultraviolet and
infrared, and then under x-rays to discover some of the painting’s
chemical elements.
On a computer, one of
Martin’s two colleagues cycled through the images. Under infrared, the
painting’s browns and yellows and greens turned into shades of grey, but
no spectral underdrawings peered back out. (Not that underdrawings
would have suggested anything about authenticity one way or another;
they’d merely have been a further nugget of information to consider.)
Mapped for lead by the x-ray fluorescence unit, the painting looked
faded and streaked with dark rust; the streaks betrayed where restorers
had perhaps applied touchups with modern, lead-free paint. Mapped for
calcium, the painting showed yellow-green splashes where conservators
had made repairs with a calcium carbonate filler.
Not
every object needs to move beyond these non-invasive phases. (At Orion,
Martin was once able to unmask a fake Modigliani after seeing, under
infrared, a faint grid, which had been drawn by a forger who wanted to
guide his work.) If Martin has to disturb the painting, he will place it
under a stereo microscope and, squinting through the two eyepieces,
pick out a grain of paint with a scalpel. He demonstrated with a sample
of phthalocyanine blue, a synthetic pigment he picked out of a box that
held paint cakes of different colours. Working with the same steady,
cautious manner in which he speaks, he teased out a particle smaller
than the width of a human hair, flattened it gently, then nudged it on
to a slim, small rectangle of metal, where it was held in place between
two tiny diamonds.
“You don’t drink a lot of coffee before you do this,” he said, grimacing.
Cracks in the surface of a 16th-century painting as seen through Martin’s microscope. Photograph: Joshua Bright/The Guardian
The
metal plate then goes into the Fourier-transform infrared microscope,
like a slide. The spectrometer pumps infrared light through the flecks
of pigment; a computer analyses the light’s behavior and returns a tidy
spectrum graph. Martin has looked at so many of these spectra that he
recognises on sight the patterns thrown up by different pigments, but
even if he didn’t, the computer could rifle through databases of the
spectrum patterns of other known chemicals, find the nearest match, and
tell Martin what, in this case, he already knew: that his sample was
phthalocyanine blue.
By a system of triage –
sorting, for instance, for artists with a high incidence of being faked
in the past, or for works accompanied by scientific analysis reports
that are suspiciously long – only a small percentage of the tens of
thousands of objects passing through Sotheby’s is diverted to the lab.
Martin thinks of them as patients showing symptoms. Sometimes, like a
doctor doing general checkups, he will tour the galleries at Sotheby’s
just before a sale, reading every work with a handheld infrared camera.
In the past year, his lab has stopped several lots from going to market,
preventing possible disputes after the sale. In one case, a painting
valued at $7m was removed from sale after the lab found that it had been
completely and irretrievably overpainted by a restorer. “An appraiser
would’ve said it’s worthless,” Martin said. “So it wasn’t sold.”
The
arduous process of Martin’s work divorces art from its aesthetic. It
reduces compositions of great prestige or high beauty to their very
particles; it frees Martin up to think of art as pure matter. In this
way, he comes closer to the artist than anyone has before, often
becoming only the second person to think as intensely about the
materiality of the object, about the chemical nature of its pigments or
the physical properties of its canvas. The art he analyses derives its
worth from unique, flashing inspiration. His own talent, if anything,
has more in common with the forger. It lies in his capacity to be
unflashy but diligent – to perform a step time after time without a
slackening of attention, to never leave a molecule unturned, to never
conclude more about a work than what it tells him about itself.
When
Martin turned 13, his father gifted him a microscope, a chemistry kit,
and art lessons – a splendid piece of foreshadowing. He used them all,
but he was particularly attracted to art. The family lived in Baltimore,
and whenever they visited Washington DC, Martin spent his time at the
National Museum of Natural History, drawing the dioramas, while the
others wandered the capital. His father worked in army intelligence. “As
a child, I’m not sure I understood what he did. I do remember being in
airports and trying to guess who was a spy,” Martin said. He devoured
detective stories and loves them still, particularly Patricia Cornwell’s
novels about Kay Scarpetta, the forensic pathologist. “We both examine
patients that cannot speak their past,” he said.
In
a universe a twist away from ours, Martin might have become a forger
himself. Late in his teens, he joined an art school where students were
taught how to grind their own pigments and stretch their own canvases.
For practice, he set up an easel in the Baltimore Museum of Art and
copied the works he liked; he grew so accomplished that once, as he was
leaving with his copy of William Merritt Chase’s Broken Jug, the museum
director spotted him and asked if he was returning the painting to
storage.
“I was very good technically,” Martin
said, “but like most art forgers, I didn’t have my own creative way of
doing things.” He thought he’d become an illustrator of medical
textbooks, but then heard about a conservation programme at the
Winterthur Museum in Delaware. The portfolio he submitted included his
copy of the Chase, as well as of other painters – all at such a high
level of craft, said Richard Wolbers, who taught him at Winterthur,
“that we were blown away”. He was such a good copyist, in fact, that he
was almost rejected. “Later, I heard that the committee worried that if
they trained me to be a conservator and taught me all the science, I’d
be a natural forger.”
After
Winterthur, Martin was hired by the Clark Art Institute, a museum in
Williamstown, Massachusetts, to conserve paintings. A couple of years
later, he set up the museum’s first conservation lab, filled with
equipment that he bought or begged from chemistry departments in nearby
universities. At the time, in 1990, the apparatus of analysis – the
microscopes, the spectroscopes, the infrared cameras – was bulky,
expensive and difficult to operate. Few museums had their own labs,
Martin said. “The Guggenheim, the Brooklyn Museum, MoMA [Museum of
Modern Art], the museums in San Francisco – none of them had the
facilities.”
In getting to know a painting,
conservators in these museums relied first on the tactility of their
craft – “listening to the sound of the swab on the canvas”, Martin said,
or “feeling the pull of the swab in the varnish”. Most conservation
departments owned microscopes, some perhaps even x-ray machines. But if
they needed some serious technology – Fourier-transform infrared
microscopes, say, or scanning electron microscopes – they could turn
only to the lab in the Metropolitan Museum of Art, or to those in
universities. Even then, an expert was still needed to interpret the
data. “Small museums really didn’t have any place to go. Some people
took paintings to the vet to get them x-rayed.”
Martin’s
lab began by assisting conservators who had no equipment of their own.
“If someone was trying to get a varnish off a painting and didn’t want
to damage it by using a solvent that was too strong, they’d send me a
sample,” he said. “I’d tell them: ‘It’s polyurethane. You’re not going
to get it off.’ Or: ‘It’s shellac. You need to use alcohol.’” A
conservator wondering if the strange sky in a landscape was overpaint –
paint applied by later restorers – could mail Martin a tiny
cross-section tweezed out of the work, so that he could examine it under
a microscope. “We’d see the layers in the cross-section: varnish,
varnish, varnish, then blue sky, then more varnish, then more sky. So
we’d establish that the topmost layer of blue was overpaint.”
In
its materials, an artwork holds its biography, so inevitably, Martin
became an arbiter of authenticity. Nearly all of the privately owned art
labs in Europe and the US have been founded in the past decade – not
coincidentally, around the time that the world’s multi-millionaires
realised how hollow their lives had been without art. But in the 1990s,
at Clark, and then again at Orion, which he founded in 2000, Martin was
often the sole resource for collectors and merchants.
James Martin using his stereo fluorescence microscope in his New York lab. Photograph: Joshua Bright/The Guardian
Some
of his stories from these years have the baroque pulpiness of Elmore
Leonard plots. Martin narrates these with care; he is alive to the
sensational aspects of his work, but by default, he wears an air of
studious detachment. There were the two questionable gentlemen from Tel
Aviv, who slipped a pair of paintings out of architects’ tubes, shook
them open as if they were rugs, and asked him to confirm that they were
Modiglianis. (They weren’t.) There was the client who sent Martin to
test a painting at an auction house, claiming he wished to bid on it,
but then also had Martin stop by a warehouse to assess “a horrible copy”
of the same painting. (Martin now thinks the client wanted to know how
close the fake was to the genuine work.) There were the two ferocious
dogs chained near the front door of a house in Los Angeles, guarding the
stolen Chinese sculptures held within. There was the collector who
offered to fly Martin to an undisclosed location, have him picked up by a
security detail, and bring him in to examine an old Mexican stele, a
stone carving supposedly worth $50m. The night before his flight, Martin
was unable to sleep, so he Googled the collector and found that he had
recently been released from federal prison after serving time on weapons
charges.
Next morning, Martin called the collector and turned down the case.
“Oh,” the collector said. “Did you read about the murders?”
“No,”
Martin said. “What murders?” The collector, it turned out, had once
been implicated in the killings of two people over a matter of Mexican
steles. Martin never got on that plane.
The FBI
first came to Martin in 1994. A suspicious number of works ascribed to
the 19th-century artist William Aiken Walker, who often painted black
sharecroppers in the American south, were emerging in the market.
“They’d sell at really small country auctions for $5,000 or $10,000 – so
low that nobody would pay for analysis,” Martin said. From the
paintings, Martin sampled a yellow pigment called PY3, which had been
manufactured in Germany and was not available to American artists until
the late 1940s, decades after Walker died. Walker also used lead white
paint, Martin found; the forger used zinc white. A former vitamin
salesman named Charles Heller was eventually indicted for a spree of
counterfeiting, but he pleaded guilty to lesser charges and served one
year in prison.
With
even a little study, a con artist would know not to use zinc white;
some forgers go on to become diligent researchers, accessing technical
journals and case studies to learn what experts search for. Martin
recalled a painting once referred to him, around 3.5 sq metres in size
and dated to 1932. In a first round of study, he discovered nothing
amiss. But the work’s provenance – its documented history of ownership –
was shaky, so he ran a second pass under a microscope. For most of a
day, he scanned the painting in dime-sized increments, until his eyes
dried up. Was anything embedded in the paint: dust, or hair, or an
insect wing? Did the dirt look as if it had been smeared on
deliberately? Finally, embedded in a speckle of blue, he found a slim
fibre; with a scalpel, he snipped it off and subjected it to infrared
spectroscopy. The fibre turned out to be polypropylene. Perhaps someone
had worn a polar fleece while painting the forgery?
For
a while, Martin cited this example in a two-day course he taught. Last
year, though, he read a translation of Faussaire (or Forger), a French
novel written in 2015 and containing a wealth of sound wisdom for
forgers. “If you want to get hold of antique lead,” one character
advises another, for instance, “then you can just pick up bits of it
from the old buildings in Rome.” The same character warns of the dangers
from “microparticles from your clothes … You must always work in an old
smock. Never nylon or a modern apron.” Martin is convinced the detail
came from his anecdote; it was one reason he decided to stop teaching
his course altogether.
As a crime, art forgery
can seem trifling – less a sinister outrage than a half-complete Robin
Hood jape that merely robs the rich. After Beltracchi’s arrest in 2010,
the Frankfurter Allgemeine called art forgery “the most moral way to
embezzle €16m”; Der Spiegel noted that, unlike crooked bankers,
Beltracchi hadn’t swindled the common man. But the crime can have real
victims, and Martin has met so many of them that he has developed a
gentle bedside manner to break bad news. He has seen people who used the
money set aside for their children’s education to buy a painting, only
to find it to be fake. “So we aren’t just talking rich people. In some
situations, it’s a person’s whole life.”
The
inflation of the art market, and its attendant litigiousness, imposes
fierce pressures upon anyone called to judge the authenticity of an
artwork. Martin’s harshest experience of this came during the bitter
legal battle over the fate of the Knoedler gallery. The Knoedler, once
New York’s oldest gallery, closed in 2011, days after Martin issued a
report concluding that a Jackson Pollock it had sold for $17m was fake.
The
bogus Pollock was only the inauguration of a scandal. Over 15 years,
Knoedler had sourced and sold 40 paintings ascribed to a range of
leading modern artists: Willem de Kooning, Mark Rothko, Richard
Diebenkorn and Robert Motherwell, among others, earning roughly $80m in
the process. When the ambiguity of the works’ provenance raised needles
of suspicion, 10 buyers sued Knoedler and its director, Ann Freedman;
all but one of these lawsuits have been settled out of court. In 2013,
investigators learned that the forgeries had been painted by a Chinese
immigrant, who was by then 73 years old, in his garage in Queens,
and placed with Knoedler by an art dealer who pleaded guilty.
Knoedler’s executives claimed they had no knowledge of the fraud, and
argued that scholars had verified the works before sale.
In
at least four of the lawsuits, which carried on for years, the
plaintiffs hired Martin to test the paintings they had purchased. He
found them all to be forgeries. A purported Rothko from 1956, which sold
for $8.3m, used a ground layer of white paint between the canvas and
the oils; through that decade, though, Rothko had used a transparent
ground layer. In an apparent Pollock, the artist seemed to have
misspelled his own signature as “Pollok”. Further, in 16 Knoedler
paintings he analysed, Martin found the same ground layer of white paint
and other anachronistic pigments repeating themselves across the works
of several artists, as if Motherwell, De Kooning and Rothko had all
travelled forward in time, met in a bar, and swapped tubes of paint.
A fake Mark Rothko painting is shown to the court during a trial in New York in 2016. Photograph: AP
Eventually,
Martin was proved right; when the FBI raided the Queens garage, it even
found the tubs of white that had coated the canvas in the fake Rothko.
But, until then, the trials were a torrid experience. Knoedler recruited
experts to attack Martin in court. “They went after him with a
vengeance, saying he’d soiled the evidence, accidentally or on purpose,”
said the lawyer John Cahill, who represented some of Martin’s clients.
Knoedler’s attorneys served six subpoenas on Martin, to extract more
than 8,000 documents and emails related to the case. Instead of being an
expert witness, he was forced to defend himself – the care and
soundness of his methods, his very character – in court.
When
Martin talks about the Knoedler trials, even the memory of the ordeal
draws a look of horror on his face. “He’s a real boy scout, and his
integrity means a lot to him, so he suffered,” Cahill said. It was an
attempted impeachment of Martin’s whole career. “His entire power relies
on being objective, on not being part of the party,” said Narayan
Khandekar, who runs Harvard’s Straus Center for Conservation and
Technical Studies. “He comes under a lot of pressure, because people
have a lot of money at stake on the outcome of his analyses. But he’s
been very, very brave to stand up and stay stolidly on track with what
he does.”
Martin had always loved science for
its ability to guide him in pursuit of truth, and he felt a deep
distress when his objective facts were countered with dirty tricks and
personal vilification. In 2016, after his clients settled with Knoedler,
Martin found it difficult to return to work. He wanted to never have to
provide expert testimony again, and to go away to paint for a while;
he’d already primed a set of boards.
“It was
surreal, what happened to me,” he said. “No scientist should have to go
to through this.” When, later that year, negotiations began for
Sotheby’s to buy Orion, Martin was ready to be cocooned within a larger
institution. He’d rather probe works before they hit the market, he
decided, than go through the acrimonious aftermath of a sale even once
more. Above his desk in Sotheby’s, Martin keeps pinned a pair of
sketches of himself from his time in the Knoedler courtroom, as if to
remind himself of what he has gratefully left behind.
In
conversation, Martin uses many homespun metaphors, but his favourite is
that of the three-legged stool. Deciding the authorship of artworks, he
says, relies on connoisseurship, technical analysis and provenance. He
values the opinions of connoisseurs, considers them complementary to his
own skills; his tests can definitively reveal if a painting is not by Da Vinci or Modigliani, but they are unable to affirm authorship, except in rare cases.
Science
has a habit, though, of showing up the sagacity of scholars. In a 1932
trial in Berlin – the first in which a forensic exam was used to
scrutinise art – two connoisseurs squabbled about the authenticity of a
set of 33 canvases, all purportedly by Vincent van Gogh, all sold by an
art dealer named Otto Wacker. It took a chemist, Martin de Wild, to
trace resins in the paint that Van Gogh had never used, and to prove the
paintings fake. Since then, the science has improved, even as human
judgment has remained the same, vulnerable to the potential thrill of
discovering new work, and to market pressures. During the Knoedler
trial, Cahill remembered, one expert admitted that he couldn’t tell one
Rothko canvas from another, or indeed whether a Rothko had been hung
upside-down or right side up.
In
any case, however fond he is of the three-legged stool, Martin may have
to think soon of a different item of furniture. The humanities are in
decline everywhere; in England, the art history A-level course came close to
being abolished altogether in 2016. The populace of connoisseurs is
thinning out. “In British art now, for a major artist like George
Stubbs, there’s no recognised figure that we can all go to and say: ‘Is
this by George Stubbs or not?’ Because various specialists have died
recently, and there’s no one to replace them,” Bendor Grosvenor, the art
historian, said. Meanwhile, researchers at Rutgers University have
developed an AI system that, in tests, detected forged paintings with
100% accuracy by scanning and comparing individual brushstrokes. One leg
is growing longer, another growing shorter, the stool becoming
decidedly imbalanced. And so, if the art market wants to beat back the
threats posed by sophisticated forgeries – if it wants to preserve its
financial vigour, rooted as it is so absolutely in the notion of
authenticity – it will have to turn more and more to the resources of
science.
As a thought experiment, it is
possible to envision the immaculate forgery – the one that defeats
scientist and connoisseur alike. Our villain is a talented copyist, well
practised in the style and the themes of his chosen artist. He is also a
resourceful procurer of materials, able to rustle up every kind of
age-appropriate canvas and frame, pigment and binder. He fits his
forgery neatly into a chain of provenance – giving it the title of a
now-lost work, or providing false documents to claim that it had been
part of a well known private collection.
In
theory, if each of these steps is perfectly performed, there should be
no way to expose the painting as fake. It will be a work of art in every
way save one. But the world of today, the world in which the forgery is
being created, is likely to fix itself in some form within the painting
– as radioactive dust, perhaps, or as cat hair, or a stray
polypropylene fibre. When that happens, only the scientist can hope to
nab it.
• This article was amended on 18 June
2018. A previous version stated that the last art history A-level was
cut in England in 2016, but in fact a campaign of protest led to a new
version being introduced in 2017.
• Follow the Long Read on Twitter at @gdnlongread, or sign up to the long read weekly email here.
