6/24/2021

limits of math, logic, computing, and artificial intelligence



1931: Kurt Gödel, founder of theoretical computer science, shows limits of math, logic, computing, and artificial intelligence


Abstract. In 2021, we are celebrating the 90th anniversary of Kurt Gödel's groundbreaking 1931 paper which laid the foundations of theoretical computer science and the theory of artificial intelligence (AI). Gödel sent shock waves through the academic community when he identified the fundamental limits of theorem proving, computing, AI, logics, and mathematics itself. This had enormous impact on science and philosophy of the 20th century. Ten years to go until the Gödel centennial in 2031!


Kurt Goedel, founder of theoretical computer science around 1931In the early 1930s, Kurt Gödel articulated the mathematical foundation and limits of computing, computational theorem proving, and logic in general.[GOD][GOD34][GOD21,21a] Thus he became the father of modern theoretical computer science and AI theory.

Gödel introduced a universal language to encode arbitrary formalizable processes.[GOD][GOD34] It was based on the integers, and allows for formalizing the operations of any digital computer in axiomatic form (this also inspired my much later self-referential Gödel Machine[GM6]). Gödel used his so-called Gödel Numbering to represent both data (such as axioms and theorems) and programs[VAR13] (such as proof-generating sequences of operations on the data).

Gödel famously constructed formal statements that talk about the computation of other formal statements—especially self-referential statements which imply that they are not decidable, given a computational theorem prover that systematically enumerates all possible theorems from an enumerable set of axioms. Thus he identified fundamental limits of algorithmic theorem proving, computing, and any type of computation-based AI[GOD] (some misunderstood his result and thought he showed that humans are superior to AIs[BIB3]). Much of early AI in the 1940s-70s was about theorem proving[ZU48][NS56] and deduction in Gödel style through expert systems and logic programming.

Leibniz, father of computer science around 1670Like most great scientists, Gödel built on earlier work. He combined Georg Cantor's diagonalization trick[CAN] (which showed in 1891 that there are different types of infinities) with the foundational work by Gottlob Frege[FRE] (who introduced the first formal language in 1879), Thoralf Skolem[SKO23] (who introduced primitive recursive functions in 1923) and Jacques Herbrand[GOD86] (who identified limitations of Skolem's approach). These authors in turn built on the formal Algebra of Thought (1686) by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz,[L86][WI48] which is deductively equivalent[LE18] to the later Boolean Algebra of 1847.[BOO] Leibniz, one of the candidates for the title of "father of computer science,"[LEI21,21a] has been called "the world's first computer scientist"[LA14] and even "the smartest man who ever lived."[SMO13] He described the principles of binary computers governed by punch cards (1679).[L79][LA14][HO66][L03][IN08][SH51][LEI21,21a] In 1673, he designed the first physical hardware (the step reckoner) that could perform all four arithmetic operations, and the first with a memory,[BL16] going beyond the first automatic gear-based data-processing calculators by Wilhelm Schickard (1623) and Blaise Pascal (1642). Leibniz was not only the first to publish infinitesimal calculus,[L84] but also pursued an ambitious project to answer all possible questions through computation. His ideas on a universal language and a general calculus for reasoning were extremely influential (Characteristica Universalis & Calculus Ratiocinator,[WI48] inspired by the 13th century scholar Ramon Llull[LL7]). Leibniz' "Calculemus!" is one of the defining quotes of the age of enlightenment: "If controversies were to arise, there would be no more need of disputation between two philosophers than between two accountants. For it would suffice to take their pencils in their hands, to sit down with their slates and say to each other [...]: Let us calculate!"[RU58] In 1931, however, Gödel showed that there are fundamental limitations to what is decidable or computable in this way.[GOD][MIR](Sec. 18)

Alonzo Church extended Goedel's results to the EntscheidungsproblemIn 1935, Alonzo Church derived a corollary / extension of Gödel's result by showing that Hilbert & Ackermann's famous Entscheidungsproblem (decision problem) does not have a general solution.[CHU] To do this, he used his alternative universal coding language called Untyped Lambda Calculus, which forms the basis of the highly influential programming language LISP.

In 1936, Alan Turing introduced yet another universal model which has become perhaps the most well-known of them all (at least in computer science): the Turing Machine.[TUR] He rederived the above-mentioned result.[T20](Sec. IV) Of course, he cited both Gödel and Church in his 1936 paper[TUR] (whose corrections appeared in 1937). In the same year of 1936, Emil Post published yet another independent universal model of computing,[POS] also citing Gödel and Church. Today we know many such models. Nevertheless, according to Wang,[WA74-96] it was Turing's work (1936) that convinced Gödel of the universality of both his own approach (1931-34) and Church's (1935).

Alan TuringWhat exactly did Post[POS] and Turing[TUR] do in 1936 that hadn't been done earlier by Gödel[GOD][GOD34] (1931-34) and Church[CHU] (1935)? There is a seemingly minor difference whose significance emerged only later. Many of Gödel's instruction sequences were series of multiplications of number-coded storage contents by integers. Gödel did not care that the computational complexity of such multiplications tends to increase with storage size. Similarly, Church also ignored the spatio-temporal complexity of the basic instructions in his algorithms. Turing and Post, however, adopted a traditional, reductionist, minimalist, binary view of computing—just like Konrad Zuse (1936).[ZU36] Their machine models permitted only very simple elementary instructions with constant complexity, like the early binary machine model of Leibniz (1679).[L79][LA14][HO66] Emil PostThey did not exploit this back then—for example, in 1936, Turing used his (quite inefficient) model only to rephrase the results of Gödel and Church on the limits of computability. Later, however, the simplicity of these machines made them a convenient tool for theoretical studies of complexity. (I also happily used and generalized them for the case of never-ending computations.[ALL2])

The Gödel Prize for theoretical computer science is named after Gödel. The currently more lucrative ACM A. M. Turing Award was created in 1966 for contributions "of lasting and major technical importance to the computer field." It is funny—and at the same time embarrassing—that Gödel (1906-1978) never got one, although he not only laid the foundations of the "modern" version of the field, but also identified its most famous open problem "P=NP?" in his famous letter to John von Neumann (1956).[GOD56][URQ10]

Konrad Zuse created the world's first working programmable computer 1935-41The formal models of Gödel (1931-34), Church (1935), Turing (1936), and Post (1936) were theoretical pen & paper constructs that cannot directly serve as a foundation for practical computers. Remarkably, Konrad Zuse's patent application[ZU36-38][Z36][RO98] for the first practical general-purpose program-controlled computer also dates back to 1936. It describes general digital circuits (and predates Claude Shannon's 1937 thesis on digital circuit design[SHA37]). Then, in 1941, Zuse completed Z3, the world's first practical, working, programmable computer (based on the 1936 application). Ignoring the inevitable storage limitations of any physical computer, the physical hardware of Z3 was indeed universal in the "modern" sense of Gödel, Church, Turing, and Post—simple arithmetic tricks can compensate for Z3's lack of an explicit conditional jump instruction.[RO98] Zuse also created the first high-level programming language (Plankalkül)[BAU][KNU] in the early 1940s. He applied it to chess in 1945[KNU] and to theorem proving in 1948.[ZU48]

It should be mentioned that practical AI is much older than Gödel's theoretical analysis of the fundamental limitations of AI. In 1914, the Spaniard Leonardo Torres y Quevedo was the 20th century's first pioneer of practical AI when he built the first working chess end game player (back then chess was considered as an activity restricted to the realms of intelligent creatures). The machine was still considered impressive decades later when the AI pioneer Norbert Wiener played against it at the 1951 Paris conference,[AI51][BRO21] [BRU1-4] which is now often viewed as the first conference on AI—though the expression "AI" was coined only later in 1956 at another conference in Dartmouth by John McCarthy. In fact, in 1951, much of what's now called AI was still called Cybernetics, with a focus very much in line with modern AI based on deep neural networks.[DL1-2][DEC]

Likewise, it should be mentioned that practical computer science is much older than Gödel's foundations of theoretical computer science (compare the comments on Leibniz above). Perhaps the world's first practical programmable machine was an automatic theatre made in the 1st century[SHA7a][RAU1] by Heron of Alexandria (who apparently also had the first known working steam engine—the Aeolipile). The energy source of his programmable automaton was a falling weight pulling a string wrapped around pins of a revolving cylinder. Complex instruction sequences controlling doors and puppets for several minutes were encoded by complex wrappings. The 9th century music automaton by the Banu Musa brothers in Baghdad was perhaps the first machine with a stored program.[BAN][KOE1] It used pins on a revolving cylinder to store programs controlling a steam-driven flute—compare Al-Jazari's programmable drum machine of 1206.[SHA7b] The first commercial program-controlled machines (punch card-based looms) were built in France around 1800 by Joseph-Marie Jacquard and others—perhaps the first "modern" programmers who wrote the world's first industrial software. They inspired Ada Lovelace and her mentor Charles Babbage (UK, circa 1840) who planned but was unable to build a non-binary, decimal, programmable, general purpose computer. The first general working programmable machine built by someone other than Zuse (1941)[RO98] was Howard Aiken's decimal MARK I (US, 1944).

Gödel has often been called the greatest logician since Aristotle.[GOD10] At the end of the previous millennium, TIME magazine ranked him as the most influential mathematician of the 20th century, although some mathematicians say his most important result was about logic and computing, not math. Others call it the fundamental result of theoretical computer science, a discipline that did not yet officially exist back then but effectively came about through Gödel's efforts. The Pulitzer Prize-winning popular book "Gödel, Escher, Bach"[H79] helped to inspire generations of young people to study computer science.

In 2021, we are not only celebrating the 90th anniversary of Gödel's famous 1931 paper but also the 80th anniversary of the world's first functional general-purpose program-controlled computer by Zuse (1941). It seems incredible that within less than a century something that once lived only in the minds of titans has become something so inalienable from modern society. The world owes these scientists a great debt. Ten years to go until the Gödel centennial in 2031, and twenty years until the Zuse centennial in 2041! Enough time to plan appropriate celebrations.


Acknowledgments

Creative Commons LicenseThanks to Moshe Vardi, Herbert Bruderer, Jack Copeland, Wolfgang Bibel, Teun Koetsier, Scott Aaronson, Dylan Ashley, Sebastian Oberhoff, Kai Hormann, and several other expert reviewers for useful comments. Since science is about self-correction, let me know under juergen@idsia.ch if you can spot any remaining error. The contents of this article may be used for educational and non-commercial purposes, including articles for Wikipedia and similar sites. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.


References

[GOD] K. Gödel. Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze der Principia Mathematica und verwandter Systeme I. Monatshefte für Mathematik und Physik, 38:173-198, 1931.

[GOD34] K. Gödel (1934). On undecidable propositions of formal mathematical systems. Notes by S. C. Kleene and J. B. Rosser on lectures at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey, 1934, 30 pp. (Reprinted in M. Davis, (ed.), The Undecidable. Basic Papers on Undecidable Propositions, Unsolvable Problems, and Computable Functions, Raven Press, Hewlett, New York, 1965.)

[GOD56] R. J. Lipton and K. W. Regan. Gödel's lost letter and P=NP. Link.

[GOD86] K. Gödel. Collected works Volume I: Publications 1929-36, S. Feferman et. al., editors, Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford, 1986.

[GOD10] V. C. Nadkarni. Gödel, Einstein and proof for God. The Economic Times, 2010.

[URQ10] A. Urquhart. Von Neumann, Gödel and complexity theory. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 16.4 (2010): 516-530. Link.

[BIB3] W. Bibel (2003). Mosaiksteine einer Wissenschaft vom Geiste. Invited talk at the conference on AI and Gödel, Arnoldsheim, 4-6 April 2003. Manuscript, 2003.

[CHU] A. Church (1935). An unsolvable problem of elementary number theory. Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society, 41: 332-333. Abstract of a talk given on 19 April 1935, to the American Mathematical Society. Also in American Journal of Mathematics, 58(2), 345-363 (1 Apr 1936). [First explicit proof that the Entscheidungsproblem (decision problem) does not have a general solution.]

[TUR] A. M. Turing. On computable numbers, with an application to the Entscheidungsproblem. Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society, Series 2, 41:230-267. Received 28 May 1936. Errata appeared in Series 2, 43, pp 544-546 (1937).

[POS] E. L. Post (1936). Finite Combinatory Processes - Formulation 1. Journal of Symbolic Logic. 1: 103-105. Link.

[WA74] H. Wang (1974). From Mathematics to Philosophy, New York: Humanities Press.

[WA96] H. Wang (1996). A Logical Journey: From Gödel to Philosophy, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

[H79] Douglas R. Hofstadter (1979). Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid. Basic Books, ISBN 0-465-02656-7, 1979.

[FRE] G. Frege (1879). Begriffsschrift: eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens. Halle an der Saale: Verlag Louis Nebert. [The first formal language / formal proofs—basis of modern logic and programming languages.]

[SKO23] T. Skolem (1923). Begründung der elementaren Arithmetik durch die rekurrierende Denkweise ohne Anwendung scheinbarer Veränderlichen mit unendlichem Ausdehnungsbereich. Skrifter utgit av Videnskapsselskapet i Kristiania, I. Mathematisk-Naturvidenskabelig Klasse 6 (1923), 38 pp.

[CAN] G. Cantor (1891). Ueber eine elementare Frage der Mannigfaltigkeitslehre. Jahresbericht der Deutschen Mathematiker-Vereinigung, 1:75-78. [English translation: W. B. Ewald (ed.). From Immanuel Kant to David Hilbert: A Source Book in the Foundations of Mathematics, Volume 2, pp. 920-922. Oxford University Press, 1996.]

[L79] G. Leibniz. De Progressione dyadica Pars I. 15 March 1679. [Principles of binary computers governed by punch cards.]

[L03] G. Leibniz (1703). In: Explication de l'Arithmetique Binaire / Die Mathematischen Schriften, ed. C. Gerhardt, Berlin 1879, vol.7, p.223. English link[Leibniz documented the binary arithmetics which allow for greatly simplifiying computing hardware and are employed by virtually all modern computers. Binary number encodings per se, however, seem to date back over 4000 years.]

[L84] G. Leibniz (1684). Nova Methodus pro Maximis et Minimis. [First publication on infinitesimal calculus.]

[L86] G. Leibniz (1686). Generales Inquisitiones de analysi notionum et veritatum. Also in Leibniz: Die philosophischen Schriften VII, 1890, pp. 236-247; translated as "A Study in the Calculus of Real Addition" (1690) by G. H. R. Parkinson, Leibniz: Logical Papers—A Selection, Oxford 1966, pp. 131-144.

[LEI21] J. Schmidhuber (2021). 375th birthday of Leibniz, founder of computer science.

[LEI21a] J. Schmidhuber (2021). Der erste Informatiker. Wie Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz den Computer erdachte. (The first computer scientist. How Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz conceived the computer.) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), 17/5/2021. FAZ online: 19/5/2021.

[BOO] George Boole (1847). The Mathematical Analysis of Logic, Being an Essay towards a Calculus of Deductive Reasoning. London, England: Macmillan, Barclay, & Macmillan, 1847.

[LL7] A. Bonner (2007). The art and logic of Ramon Llull. Brill Academic Pub, p. 290, 2007.

[RU58] B. Russell (1958). The Philosophy of Leibniz. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1958.

[LE18] W. Lenzen. Leibniz and the Calculus Ratiocinator. Technology and Mathematics, pp 47-78, Springer, 2018.

[LA14] D. R. Lande (2014). Development of the Binary Number System and the Foundations of Computer Science. The Mathematics Enthusiast, vol. 11(3):6 12, 2014. Link.

[BL16] L. Bloch (2016). Informatics in the light of some Leibniz's works. Communication to XB2 Berlin Xenobiology Conference.

[HO66] E. Hochstetter et al. (1966): Herrn von Leibniz' Rechnung mit Null und Eins. Berlin: Siemens AG.

[IN08] R. Ineichen (2008). Leibniz, Caramuel, Harriot und das Dualsystem. Mitteilungen der deutschen Mathematiker-Vereinigung. 16(1):12-15.

[SH51] J. W. Shirley (1951). Binary Numeration before Leibniz. American Journal of Physics 19 (452-454).

[WI48] N. Wiener (1948). Time, communication, and the nervous system. Teleological mechanisms. Annals of the N.Y. Acad. Sci. 50 (4): 197-219. [Quote: "The history of the modern computing machine goes back to Leibniz and Pascal. Indeed, the general idea of a computing machine is nothing but a mechanization of Leibniz's calculus ratiocinator."]

[SMO13] L. Smolin (2013). My hero: Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz. The Guardian, 2013. Link[Quote: "And this is just the one part of Leibniz's enormous legacy: the philosopher Stanley Rosen called him "the smartest person who ever lived"."]

[T20] J. Schmidhuber (2020). Critique of 2018 Turing Award.

[HIN] J. Schmidhuber (2020). Critique of 2019 Honda Prize.

[GOD21] J. Schmidhuber (2021). 90th anniversary celebrations: 1931: Kurt Gödel, founder of theoretical computer science, shows limits of math, logic, computing, and artificial intelligence

[GOD21a] J. Schmidhuber (2021). Als Kurt Gödel die Grenzen des Berechenbaren entdeckte. (When Kurt Gödel discovered the limits of computability.) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 16/6/2021.

[ALL2] J. Schmidhuber (2000). Algorithmic theories of everything. ArXiv: quant-ph/ 0011122. More. See also: Hierarchies of generalized Kolmogorov complexities and nonenumerable universal measures computable in the limit. International Journal of Foundations of Computer Science 13(4):587-612, 2002. PDFMore. See also: The Speed Prior: A New Simplicity Measure Yielding Near-Optimal Computable Predictions. Proc. COLT 2002. PDFMore.

Goedel Machine[GM6] J. Schmidhuber (2006). Gödel machines: Fully Self-Referential Optimal Universal Self-Improvers. In B. Goertzel and C. Pennachin, eds.: Artificial General Intelligence, p. 199-226, 2006. PDF. Preprint arXiv:cs/0309048 (2003). See also: Ultimate Cognition à la Gödel. Cognitive Computation 1(2):177-193, 2009. PDFMore.

[DL1] J. Schmidhuber, 2015. Deep Learning in neural networks: An overview. Neural Networks, 61, 85-117. More.

[DL2] J. Schmidhuber, 2015. Deep Learning. Scholarpedia, 10(11):32832.

[MIR] J. Schmidhuber (2019). Deep Learning: Our Miraculous Year 1990-1991. Preprint arXiv:2005.05744, 2020.

[DEC] J. Schmidhuber (2020). The 2010s: Our Decade of Deep Learning / Outlook on the 2020s.

[VAR13] M. Y. Vardi (2013). Who begat computing? Communications of the ACM, Vol. 56(1):5, Jan 2013. Link.

[ZU36] K. Zuse (1936). Verfahren zur selbsttätigen Durchführung von Rechnungen mit Hilfe von Rechenmaschinen. Patent application Z 23 139 / GMD Nr. 005/021, 1936. [First patent application describing a general, practical, program-controlled computer.]

[ZU37] K. Zuse (1937). Einführung in die allgemeine Dyadik. [Mentions the storage of program instructions in the computer's memory.]

[ZU38] K. Zuse (1938). Diary entry of 4 June 1938. [Description of computer architectures that put both program instructions and data into storage—compare the later "von Neumann" architecture.[NEU45]]

[ZU48] K. Zuse (1948). Über den Plankalkül als Mittel zur Formulierung schematisch kombinativer Aufgaben. Archiv der Mathematik 1(6), 441-449 (1948). PDF. [Apparently the first practical design of an automatic theorem prover (based on Zuse's high-level programming language Plankalkül).]

[NS56] A. Newell and H. Simon. The logic theory machine—A complex information processing system. IRE Transactions on Information Theory 2.3 (1956):61-79.

[RO98] R. Rojas (1998). How to make Zuse's Z3 a universal computer. IEEE Annals of Computing, vol. 19:3, 1998.

[BAU] F. L. Bauer, H. Woessner (1972). The "Plankalkül" of Konrad Zuse: A Forerunner of Today's Programming Languages.

[KNU] D. E. Knuth, L. T. Pardo (1976). The Early Development of Programming Languages. Stanford University, Computer Science Department. PDF.

[Z36] S. Faber (2000). Konrad Zuses Bemühungen um die Patentanmeldung der Z3.

[SHA37] C. E. Shannon (1938). A Symbolic Analysis of Relay and Switching Circuits. Trans. AIEE. 57 (12): 713-723. Based on his thesis, MIT, 1937.

[AI51] Les Machines a Calculer et la Pensee Humaine: Paris, 8.-13. Januar 1951, Colloques internationaux du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique; no. 37, Paris 1953. [H. Bruderer rightly calls that the first conference on AI.]

[BRU1] H. Bruderer. Computing history beyond the UK and US: selected landmarks from continental Europe. Communications of the ACM 60.2 (2017): 76-84.

[BRU2] H. Bruderer. Meilensteine der Rechentechnik. 2 volumes, 3rd edition. Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG, 2020.

[BRU3] H. Bruderer. Milestones in Analog and Digital Computing. 2 volumes, 3rd edition. Springer Nature Switzerland AG, 2020.

[BRU4] H. Bruderer. The Birthplace of Artificial Intelligence? Communications of the ACM, BLOG@CACM, Nov 2017. Link.

[BRO21] D. C. Brock (2021). Cybernetics, Computer Design, and a Meeting of the Minds. An influential 1951 conference in Paris considered the computer as a model of—and for—the human mind. IEEE Spectrum, 2021. Link.

[BAN] Banu Musa brothers (9th century). The book of ingenious devices (Kitab al-hiyal). Translated by D. R. Hill (1979), Springer, p. 44, ISBN 90-277-0833-9. [Perhaps the Banu Musa music automaton was the world's first machine with a stored program.]

[KOE1] [21] T. Koetsier (2001). On the prehistory of programmable machines: musical automata, looms, calculators. Mechanism and Machine Theory, Elsevier, 36 (5): 589-603, 2001.

[RAU1] M. Rausch. Heron von Alexandria. Die Automatentheater und die Erfindung der ersten antiken Programmierung. Diplomica Verlag GmbH, Hamburg 2012. [Perhaps the world's first programmable machine was an automatic theatre made in the 1st century by Heron of Alexandria, who apparently also had the first known working steam engine.]

[SHA7a] N. Sharkey (2007). A programmable robot from AD 60. New Scientist, Sept 2017.

[SHA7b] N. Sharkey (2007). A 13th Century Programmable Robot. Univ. of Sheffield, 2007. [On a programmable drum machine of 1206 by Al-Jazari.]

[LIL1] US Patent 1745175 by Austrian physicist Julius Edgar Lilienfeld for work done in Leipzig: "Method and apparatus for controlling electric current." First filed in Canada on 22.10.1925. [The patent describes a field-effect transistor. Today, almost all transistors are field-effect transistors.]

[LIL2] US Patent 1900018 by Austrian physicist Julius Edgar Lilienfeld: "Device for controlling electric current." Filed on 28.03.1928. [The patent describes a thin film field-effect transistor.]
.

Highlights of over 2000 years of computing history. Juergen Schmidhuber. 











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1931: Theoretical Computer Science & AI Theory Founded by Goedel. Juergen Schmidhuber.
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6/13/2021

Pikachu’s Transmedia Adventures

 


CFP: Pikachu’s Transmedia Adventures: The Continuing Adaptability of the Pokemon Franchise

By 

In 2021, the Pokemon franchise celebrates the 25th anniversary of its debut in Japan and the fifth anniversary of its popular worldwide AR cellphone game Pokemon Go. In fact, Pokemon is arguably experiencing something of a resurgence and renaissance within the current cultural moment. When a pop-up Pokemon Centre store was opened in London in 2018 to mark the release of Sword and Shield, queues for entering the retail space frequently had to be closed due to demand whilst product lines regularly sold out on a daily basis. In 2019, when the long-running cartoon’s main character Ash Ketchum finally won a Pokemon tournament, major news sites humorously deemed this victory a newsworthy event (Bissett 2019). More recently, a revival in Pokemon card collecting has left retail shelves bare and scalpers running rampant whilst mint-condition ‘graded’ cards have sold for hundreds of thousands of dollars at auction (Koebler 2021). Meanwhile, the games themselves continue to be adapted to Nintendo’s console platforms, with the Nintendo Switch releasing both remakes of previously popular titles (Pokemon Let’s Go! Pikachu and Let’s Go! Eevee, Pokemon Snap) as well as new titles exploring hitherto unknown regions (Pokemon Sword and Shield). Much more than a franchise intended to commercially target and exploit children, the Pokemon franchise represents an enduringly popular intellectual property that continues to attract interest across generations. 

Despite this, in-depth and continuous academic study of this hugely popular intellectual property has been infrequent at best. In fact, the last time that a dedicated collection of essays exploring the franchise in a holistic manner was published was in 2004, with many of the contributors positioning the property as a ‘fad’ whose cycle of popularity was apparently at its end (see Tobin 2004; N.B. the augmented reality game Pokemon Go (Niantic 2016- ) has bucked this trend by generating considerable academic attention – see Kulak, Purzycki, Henthorn and Vie 2019; Saker and Evans 2021). Where Pokemon has attracted infrequent academic discussion, this has occurred in the context of assessing how wider cultural flows from Japan to the West have impacted on children’s media (Allison 2006; O’Melia 2020). What is absent, then, is a volume that takes the Pokemon franchise on its own terms and which situates the property within a much-changed media environment. Thus, a study is needed which considers Pokemon in terms of multiple contemporary debates within media and cultural studies. These include – but are no way limited to – cultural, technological, and media convergence (Jenkins 2006), discourses of transmediality and media mix (Steinberg 2012; Williams 2020), paratextuality (Gray 2010), licensing and/or (transgenerational) media industries studies (Santo 2015; Johnson 2019), material culture (Geraghty 2014; Bainbridge 2017) and fan cultures (Scott 2019; Stanfill 2019). Whether approached as a transmedia franchise, corporate intellectual property, system offering ludic possibilities, fan community, or otherwise, academic scholarship should better consider how the Pokemon franchise has engaged with, adapted to, and challenged the contours of the ever-evolving transmedia environment.

This call for papers seeks abstracts of 300-500 words for chapters of approx. 6000 words that explore topics including (but not are limited to):

  • The Industrial development of The Pokemon Company and its corporate relations with Nintendo and other licensed partners.
  • Pokemon and the historical development of media industries studies.
  • The evolution of Pokemon: The Card Game and its relationship to industrial contexts.
  • The evolution of the Pokemon computer games (e.g. games studies perspectives; remediation relating to Let’s Go!, Snap, etc.)
  • Pokemon and/as character licensing.
  • Pokemon and transmedia storytelling and/as transmedia text.
  • Pokemon, transmedia tourismand the Experience Economy (e.g. the Pokemon Cafe; the annual Pikachu Parade).
  • Pokemon Go and developments in augmented reality experiences and/or the gamification of space.
  • Detective Pikachu and Pokemon’s other cinematic adaptations.
  • Pokemon’s historical developments as anime.
  • Pokemon’s historical developmentsas manga
  • Pokemon and/as fan fashion (e.g. high-fashion licensees, jewelry, make-up).
  • Pokemon and/as paratextual theory.
  • Interventions concerning Pokemon and identity politics (e.g. feminism, critical race theory, queer theory).
  • Pokemon and/as the global expansion of kawaii/cute culture.
  • Thematic analyses of the Pokemon franchise (e.g. its ties with environmentalism).
  • Pokemon’s links to Japanese ‘soft power’.
  • Fan practices and transformative works related to the Pokemon franchise across multiple forms and platforms.
  • Pokemon and/as children’s culture.

We are especially interested in soliciting chapters featuring non-Western perspectives as well as ones engaging with historically marginalised or underrepresented groups. 

We hope to include work from both established and emerging scholars; junior scholars & graduate students are encouraged to apply.

Please email abstracts of 300-500 words with an accompanying Author Bio of approx. 150 words to Ross Garner (GarnerRP1@Cardiff.ac.uk) and EJ Nielsen (ejnielsen.ephemera@gmail.com) by 27 August, 2021.


https://fanstudies.org/


6/10/2021

Generative Pre-trained Transformer 3

 

Generative Pre-trained Transformer 3 (GPT-3) is an autoregressive language model that generates text using algorithms that are pre-trained. It was created by OpenAI (a research business co-founded by Elon Musk) and has been described as the most important and useful advance in AI for years.

Last summer writer, speaker, and musician, K Allado-McDowell initiated a conversation with GPT-3 which became the collection of poetry and prose Pharmako-AI. Taking this collection as her departure point, Warburg PhD student Beatrice Bottomley reflects on what GPT-3 means for how we think about writing and meaning.

 

GPT-3 is just over nine months old now. Since the release of its beta version by the California- based company Open AI in June 2020, the language model has been an object of fascination for both technophiles and, to a certain extent, laypersons. GPT-3 is an autoregressive language model trained on a large text corpus from the internet. It uses deep-learning to produce text in response to prompts. You can direct GPT-3 to perform a task by providing it with examples or through a simple instruction. If you open up the twitter account of Greg Brockman, the chairman of Open AI, you can find examples of GPT-3 being used to make computer programs that write copy, generate code, translate Navajo and compose libretti.

Most articles about GPT-3 will use words like “eerie” or “chilling” to describe the language model’s ability to produce text like a human. Some go further to endow GPT-3 with a more-than-human or god-like quality. During the first summer of the coronavirus pandemic, K Allado-McDowell initiated a conversation with GPT-3, which would become the collection of poetry and prose Pharmako-AI. Allado-McDowell found not only an interlocutor, but also co-writer in the language model.  When writing of GPT-3, Allado-McDowell gives it divine attributes, comparing the language model to a language deity:

“The Greek god Hermes (counterpart to the Roman Mercury) was the god of translators and interpreters. A deity that rules communication is an incorporeal linguistic power. A modern conception of such might read: a force of language from outside of materiality. Automated writing systems like neural net language models relate to geometry, translation, abstract mathematics, interpretation and speech. It’s easy to imagine many applications of these technologies for trade, music, divination etc. So the correspondence is clear. Intuition suggests that we can think the relation between language models and language deities in a way that expands our understanding of both.”

What if we follow Allado-McDowell’s suggestion to consider the relationship between GPT-3 and the language deity Hermes? I must admit that I would hesitate before comparing GPT-3 to a deity. However, if I had to compare the language model to a god, they would be Greek; like Greek gods, GPT-3 is not immune to human-like vagary and bias. Researchers working with Open-AI found that GPT-3 retains the biases of the data that it has been trained on, which can lead it to generate prejudiced content. In that same paper, Brown et al. (2020) also noted that “large pre-trained language models are not grounded in other domains of experience, such as video or real-world physical interaction, and thus lack a large amount of context about the world.” Both the gods and GPT-3 could be considered, to a certain extent, dependent on the human world, but do not interact with it to the same degree as humans.

Lead votive images of Hermes from the reservoir of the aqueduct at 'Ain al-Djoudj near Baalbek (Heliopolis), Lebanon, (100-400 CE), Warburg Iconographic Database.

Lead votive images of Hermes from the reservoir of the aqueduct at ‘Ain al-Djoudj near Baalbek (Heliopolis), Lebanon, (100-400 CE), Warburg Iconographic Database.

Let us return to Hermes. As told by Kerenyi (1951) in The Gods of the Greeks, a baby Hermes, after rustling fifty cows, roasts them on a fire. The smell of the meat torments the little god, but he does not eat; as gods “to whom sacrifices are made, do not really consume the flesh of the victim”. Removed from sensual experience of a world that provides context for much human writing, GPT-3 can produce both surreal imagery and factual inaccuracies. In Pharmako-AI, GPT-3, whilst discussing the construction of a new science, which reflects on “the lessons that living things teach us about themselves”, underlines that “This isn’t a new idea, and I’m not the only one who thinks that way. Just a few weeks ago, a group of scientists at Oxford, including the legendary Nobel Prize winning chemist John Polanyi, published a paper that argued for a ‘Global Apollo Program’ that ‘would commit the world to launch a coordinated research effort to better understand the drivers of climate change…”. Non sequitur aside, a couple of Google searches reveal that the Global Apollo Programme was launched in 2015, not 2020, and, as far as I could find, John Polanyi was not involved.

Such inaccuracies do not only suggest that GPT-3 operates at a different degree of reality, but also relate to the question of how we produce and understand meaning in writing. From Aristotle’s De Interpretatione, the Greeks developed a tripartite theory of meaning, consisting of sounds, thoughts and things (phōnai, noēmata and pragmata). The Medieval Arabic tradition developed its own theory of meaning based on the relationship between vocal form (lafẓ) and mental content (maʿnā). Mental content acts as the intermediary between vocal form and things. In each act of language (whether spoken or written), the relationship between mental content and vocal form is expressed. Avicenna (d.1037) in Pointers and Reminders underlined that this relationship is dynamic. He claimed that vocal form indicated mental content through congruence, implication and concomitance and further suggested that the patterns of vocal form may affect the patterns of mental content. Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d.1274) brought together this idea with the Aristotelian tripartite division of existence to distinguish between existence in the mind, in entity, in writing and in speech.

When producing text, GPT-3 does not negotiate between linguistic form and mental content in the same way as humans. GPT-3 is an autoregressive language model, which offers predictions of future text based on its analysis of the corpus. Here the Hermes analogy unwinds. Unlike Hermes, who invented the lyre and “sandals such as no one else could devise” (Kerenyi, 1951), GPT-3 can only offer permutations based on a large, though inevitably limited and normative, corpus created by humans. Brown et al. (2020) note “its [GPT-3’s] decisions are not easily interpretable.” Perhaps this is unsurprising, as GPT-3 negotiates between patterns in linguistic form, rather than between the linguistic, mental and material. Indeed, GPT-3’s reality is centred on the existence of things in writing rather than in the mind or entity, and thus it blends, what might be referred to as, fact and fiction.

Hermes as messenger in an advert for Interflora,(1910-1935), Warburg Iconographic Database.

Hermes as messenger in an advert for Interflora,(1910-1935), Warburg Iconographic Database.

By seeking a co-writer in GPT-3, Allado-McDowell takes for granted that what the language model is doing is writing. However, taking into account an understanding of language and meaning as developed by both the Greek and Islamic traditions, one might ask – does GPT-3 write or produce text? What is the difference? Is what GPT-3 does an act of language?

To a certain extent, these questions are irrelevant. GPT-3 remains just a (complex) tool for creating text that is anchored in human datasets and instruction. It has not yet ushered in the paradigm shift whispered of by reviewers and examples of its use are often more novel than practical (though perhaps this isn’t a bad thing for many workers). However, were GPT-3, or similar language models, to become more present in our lives, I would want to have a clearer grasp of what it meant for writing. As Yuk Hui (2020) points out in his article Writing and Cosmotechnics, “to write is not simply to deliver communicative meaning but also to ponder about the relation between the human and the cosmos.” In acknowledging GPT-3 as an author, would we not only need to make room for different theories of meaning, but also different ways of thinking about how humans relate to the universe?

Beatrice Bottomley is a doctoral student at the Warburg Institute, University of London, supported by a studentship from the London Arts and Humanities Partnership (LAHP). Her research examines the relationship between language and existence in Ibn ʿArabi’s al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, “The Meccan Openings”. Beatrice’s wider research interests include philosophies of language, translation studies and histories of technology. Beatrice also works as a translator from Arabic and French to English.

Beatrice was introduced to the work of K Allado-McDowell after hearing them speak last December in an event that celebrated the launch of two new books, Aby Warburg: Bilderatlas Mnemosyne: The Original and The Atlas of Anomalous AI. Watch the event recording here

6/09/2021

Data Science

 

MATH REFRESHER FOR DATA SCIENTISTS

Statistical Moments in Data Science interviews

Essential math for Data Scientists explained from scratch


Moments are set of statistical parameters used to describe a distribution. The calculations are simple, so are often used as a first quantitative insight into the data. A good understanding of data should always be the step before training any advanced ML model. It allows minimizing the time required to choose the methodology and interpret results.

In physics, moments refer to mass and inform us how the physical quantity is located or arranged. In math, moments refer to something similar — the probability distribution — a function that explains how probable are different possible outcomes of an experiment. To be able to compare different data sets we can describe them using the first four statistical moments:
1. The expected value
2. Variance
3. Skewness
4. Kurtosis

Let’s go through the details together!

The article is organized into two parts:
I. Math Refresher
II. Questions from data science interviews related to the topic

I. Math Refresher

1. The expected value

The first moment — the excepted value, known also as an expectation, mathematical expectation, mean, or average is the sum of all the values the variable can take times the probability of that value occurring. It can be intuitively understood as the arithmetic mean:

This is true when all outcomes have the same probability of occurrence (e.g. throw of a classical dice — all numbers from 1 to 6 have the same chance to be thrown). The more general equation including the probability of each event is:

For rolling a single die, when each value has a probability of occurrence of 1/6, the expected value would be:

Or:

For equally probable events, the expected value is the same as what the arithmetic mean. This is one of the most popular measures of central tendency, often called averages. The other common measures are:

  • median — the middle value
  • mode — the most likely value.

For example, taking the set of seven values: 2, 4, 4, 5, 8, 12, 14, we have:

  • Mean:
  • Median- this is “the middle” value, being exactly in the middle of a data set. For our example, this is 5, as it separates the greater and lesser halves of data: we have 3 values lower than five and 3 values higher than 5. For a data set with an even number of values (e.g. adding 15 to our data set), we take two values in the middle and calculate the mean out of them:
  • Mode- the most frequent value in a set of data. For our example above, the mode is 4, since it appears twice.

2. Variance

The second central moment is variance. Variance explains how a set of values are spread around their expected value. For n equally likely values, the variance is:

Where μ is the average value. So the variance depends strongly on the expected value.

For the exemplar data series above, the variance is:

Where n is 7, since we have 7 elements in our data set, and μ is 7, as calculated above.

When the spread of values is lower and the same mean, the variance is also lower, e.g.:

Standard deviation

Standard deviation is a square root of the variance and is commonly used since its unit is the same as of X:

Variance and standard deviation inform us how strong data is spread around the mean, as shown in the plot below:

The greater the variance/ standard deviation (e.g. blue line), the wider the spread of values around the mean. If a variance is lower, the values are cumulated closer to the mean (red line) and the peak is higher.
The next picture summarizes the interpretation of the first two moments:

3. Skewness

Skewness, which is the third statistical moment measures asymmetry of data about its mean. The formula for calculating skewness is:

We can distinguish three types of distribution with respect to its skewness:

  • symmetrical distribution: as in examples above. Both tails are symmetrical and the skewness is equal to zero.
  • positive skew (right-skewed, right-tailed, skewed to the right): the right tail (with larger values) is longer. This informs us about ‘outliers’ that have values higher than the mean.
  • negative skewed (left-skewed, left-tailed, skewed to the left): the left tail (with small values) is longer. This informs us about ‘outliers’ that have values lower than the mean.

In general, skewness will impact the relationship of mean, median, and mode in the following way:

  • for symmetrical distribution: mean = median = mode
  • for positively skewed distribution: mode < median <mean
  • for negatively skewed distribution: mean < median <mode

But this is not true for all possible distributions. For example, if one tail is long, but the other is heavy, this may not work. The best way to investigate your data is to calculate all three estimators and draw conclusions based on the results, rather than general rules.

4. Kurtosis

The fourth statistical moment is kurtosis. It focuses on the tails of the distribution and explains whether the distribution is flat or rather with a high peak. Kurtosis informs us whether our distribution is richer in extreme values than normal distribution.

There is no strict consensus for the formula used to calculate kurtosis and there are three main formulas used by different programs/packages. A good habit would be to check which one is used by your software before you draw conclusions on your data. The formulas containing the correction term of minus 3 refer to the excess kurtosis. So, the excess kurtosis is equal to kurtosis minus 3.

In general, we can distinguish three types of distributions:

  • Mesokurtic — having the kurtosis of 3 or excess kurtosis of 0. This group involves the normal distribution and some specific binomial distributions.
  • Leptokurtic — the kurtosis is greater than 3, or excess kurtosis is greater than 0. This is the distribution with fatter tails and a more narrow peak.
  • Platykurtic — the kurtosis is smaller than 3 or negative for excess kurtosis. This is a distribution with very thin tails compared to the normal distribution.

For those of you who have a better visual memory, take a look at my sketch:

We went through the first four statistical moment. It is time now for checking ourselves in the interview questions.

II. Questions from Data Science interviews

1. What is the kurtosis of normal distribution?

This is a tricky question! As mentioned in Math Refresher, there is no strict consensus for the formula used to calculate kurtosis and three formulas are commonly met. The most significant difference, especially for large samples where the choice of equation does not matter that much, is to understand whether your formula involves a correction term of -3. If so, the formula calculates excess kurtosis. This means that normal distribution may have a kurtosis of 3 or excess kurtosis of 0. But be careful since the excess kurtosis is also sometimes shortened to simpler kurtosis.

Some languages allow you to choose the type of formula in your calculations (e.g. R) or define which definition of normal kurtosis you want to use (Python). Knowing what you calculate will allow you to compare the results with normal distribution and draw conclusions.

2. When would you consider using median instead of mean?

A sample mean is a well understood and common estimator of an unknown population mean. However, it tends to be easily affected by outliers, especially when the sample size is small. So, if the data set is small, skewed, and there are outliers, it is worth checking the median.

3. You want to invest your money and have two distributions of returns available: with positive and with negative skew. Which one would you choose and why?

There is no good or bad answer here, as long as you can give a rationale for your choice. It depends on your risk appetite.

Personally, with mean and variance held constant, I would invest in positive skew. In general, having a greater chance of getting a high return costs a higher probability of having a large loss. So, in the choice between:
1. 85% chance to win at least $1000 and 1% to lose $99000 or more
2. 1% chance to win at least $99000 and 85% to lose $1000 or more
I go for the first option — a smaller but more probable win over the hope for a big win in the lottery. But the choice depends on you!

4. In your opinion, how informative is the average salary in a given country?

I believe it should be always reported together with the median. This way, we can learn much more about the salary distribution in society. For example, if there is a small group of people with super huge salaries, but the rest earns very little, it will be visible when comparing median and mean. From these two estimators, we can understand whether decent pay can be treated as normal or rather as an outlier. Of course, salaries should be alsocompared with the cost of living in a given country to get a better picture of the quality of life.

Thanks for reading!

We went together through the first four statistical moments: the expected value, variance, skewness, and kurtosis. I hope it was an exciting journey for you.

Remember that the most efficient way to learn (math) skills is by practice. So don’t wait until you feel ‘ready’, just grab a pen and paper or your favourite software and try few examples on your own. I keep my fingers crossed for you.

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I will be happy to hear your thoughts and questions in the comments section below, reach me directly via my LinkedIn profile or at akujawska@yahoo.com. See you soon!

Agnieszka Kujawska, PhD