1/28/2021

Coronavirus Cranks

 


Rise of the Coronavirus Cranks

I am no lockdown junkie. I’d like to get that straight before I explain why the most extreme variant of lockdown scepticism is rebarbative and destructive. I will never forgive the government for dragging out the first lockdown for 14 weeks, pointlessly exhausting the public’s patience and sowing the seeds of the non-compliance we see today. I think the second lockdown was an unnecessary overreaction to a surge in cases in the north-west that was being dealt with by local restrictions. I think the 10pm curfew was counter-productive and the tier system was clumsy and unfair.

I always thought “circuit breakers” caused unnecessary hardship and had no chance of nipping the problem in the bud, as their advocates claimed. It was criminal to not reopen the schools in June and I’m not entirely convinced they should be closed now. I scorn the likes of Piers Morgan and “Independent” SAGE who would have had us in lockdown all year if they’d had a chance. No amount of comparing Sweden to its immediate neighbours will persuade me that the Swedes didn’t have a better 2020 than most Europeans. Contrary to folk wisdom, you can put a price on life and it can’t be denied that most of the people who die of COVID have had a good innings.

I mention all this in the hope of establishing that I am not some wobbly-lipped pantry boy who’s scared of a bit of flu. I am a libertarian at a free market think tank who has spent most of his working life critiquing the excesses of the nanny state. I do not secretly harbour thoughts of creating a police state or bankrupting the economy.

Nevertheless, I don’t think it is necessarily a bad idea to prevent tens of thousands of people dying this winter from a disease for which we now have multiple vaccines. I had hoped that we could muddle through with local restrictions, but the emergence in December of an extraordinarily infectious new strain put an end to that. The number of COVID cases doubled in the first half of December and doubled again in the second half. Much of London, Kent, and Essex seemed impervious to even the stringent tier 4 restrictions. We did not need a model from Imperial College to see which way this was going. In London and the south-east, there are now more people in hospital with COVID-19 than at the peak of the first wave. There are more on ventilators too, despite doctors using mechanical ventilation less than they did in the spring. It is going to get worse for some time to come. We had to get the numbers down.

Source: https://coronavirus.data.gov.uk/

And so I reluctantly support this lockdown for the same reason I initially supported the first one, as a last resort. It seems to me to be the only way to ensure that everybody is able to access healthcare, whether they have COVID or not. As soon as it has achieved its goal, I will press for it to be lifted. I am fully aware of the social and economic havoc lockdowns cause. We will spend much of the remaining decade picking up the pieces.

I suppose my position is boringly centrist. If you want a more invigorating take, you might be drawn to the Zero COVID strategy supported by “Independent” SAGE or the plan laid out in the the Great Barrington Declaration to shield the vulnerable and achieve herd immunity the old-fashioned way. Both of these options carry significant downsides and have now been made redundant by the vaccines, but whilst these ideas might have been flawed or unrealistic, they were not crazy. The former had worked in New Zealand and the latter had been the preferred policy of the chief medical officer until the hasty U-turn of March 2020. These were ideas that reasonable people could debate without being considered cranks.

But now, in the final months of this nightmare, the conversation among many of the noisiest lockdown sceptics has become decidedly cranky. The debate unfolding on social media is not so much about how to deal with COVID-19 as about whether COVID-19 exists at all. Mention the latest official COVID statistics on Twitter and you will be inundated with replies from recently set up accounts telling you that the people who tested positive for COVID-19 do not actually have COVID-19 and those who are recorded dying from it probably got hit by a bus.

This would scarcely be worth worrying about if it were not spilling out into the real world. “Lockdown sceptics” have been recording footage of empty hospital corridors which they then post on YouTube as evidence that the health crisis is being manufactured. It saddens me to admit that this kind of thing is coming from people on my side of the argument, people who are anti-lockdown. Grifters, conspiracy theorists, and bad faith actors have been tolerated for too long by lockdown sceptics. You can draw a straight line from those who talked about a “casedemic” a few months ago to the crowds of protestors outside hospitals today screaming that “COVID is a hoax.”

Although debates about the lethality of the virus and the effectiveness of restrictions on social contact have been circulating on the margins since the spring, September was the point at which these talking points began to attract widespread attention. Ivor Cummins, a former Research and Development manager at Hewlett-Packard, first crossed my radar several years ago when he was promoting the low carb diet. At the time, he struck me as a relatively harmless nutritional entrepreneur with a mildly amusing name and a book to sell. He was an annoyance to scientists and dietitians who found his claims risible, but he was not a menace to public health. Cummins came to wider prominence on September 8th, 2020, when he published a 37-minute video entitled “Viral Issue Crucial Update Sept 8th: the Science, Logic and Data Explained!” In this presentation he claimed that “the epidemic largely ended around May/early June” and asserted that around 80 percent of Europeans were “already de facto immune” to the novel coronavirus. He claimed that increases in testing had created large numbers of false positives, leading to a “casedemic” in which the number of infections appeared to rise but there was “no mortality” because “the epidemic’s gone.” It attracted a million views on YouTube within days.

Cummins argued that the spring outbreak would have faded away naturally without non-pharmaceutical interventions such as lockdowns. Herd immunity, he theorised, had been largely achieved and he insisted that there would be no second wave. In the winter, he said, we would see “a natural rise in the virome [the combined total of viruses in the human body]; we’ll see influenza, we’ll see more impacts on hospitals, we’ll see SARS-CoV-2 rising again, but that will be more normal winter resurgent [sic] of influenza like prior years.” Cummins dismissed those who warned of a second wave in France and Spain, where case numbers were already growing, and described the rising caseload in the US as a “double hump” caused by the southern states experiencing their first wave. He assured viewers that the American spike was already on the wane. Within two months, France and Spain were recording more than 400 COVID deaths a day and the US was climbing its biggest “hump” yet, with every state except Hawaii experiencing uncontrolled community transmission.

Twelve days after Cummins’s video went viral, Michael Yeadon, a former Pfizer scientist, wrote an article for the Lockdown Sceptics blog arguing that the vast majority of positive tests for SARS-CoV-2 were false. If a test produces a non-trivial rate of false positives, he wrote, and if testing is performed at random on a population with a very low prevalence of a disease, it is possible for the majority—or even all—of the positive results to be false. Although he did not use the term, he was describing a familiar scientific concept known as the base rate fallacy. He was not wrong in theory, but he then went further. Based on the assumptions that 0.1 percent of the population had the virus and that the PCR test has a false positive rate of 0.8 percent, Yeadon made the striking claim that “almost every positive test, a so-called case, identified by Pillar 2 [testing in the community] since May of this year has been a FALSE POSITIVE. Not just a few percent. Not a quarter or even a half of the positives are FALSE, but around 90 percent of them.”

The mathematics were correct so long as Yeadon’s assumptions were correct, but they were not. People in Pillar 2 are not tested randomly. Many of them get tested because they have symptoms. People with symptoms are obviously more likely to have the virus than a random member of the public. The Office for National Statistics conducts a separate random weekly test which was reporting a prevalence rate of around 0.1 percent at the time. Strangely, Yeadon did not question the ONS figure and instead used it as the basis of his calculation. He did not draw the obvious conclusion that if the false positive rate of the PCR test was 0.8 percent, the ONS should find positives at least 0.8 percent of the time. Put another way, if every single positive test reported by the ONS was wrong—a far-fetched assumption—the false positive rate could not possibly be more than 0.1 percent. Moreover, the prevalence of SARS-CoV-2 in Britain was not low. Fewer than a thousand tests a day were coming back positive in July, but by the time Yeadon’s article appeared, they were exceeding 5,000. The number of tests performed each day had nearly doubled in this period, but that could not explain a fivefold increase in reported case numbers.

Yeadon’s concerns, which had always been largely theoretical, were now irrelevant and would become more so as the number of cases rose in the autumn. The claim that 90 percent of positive PCR tests are false was a back-of-an-envelope calculation based on flawed assumptions, but it was seized upon by COVID sceptics and given fresh impetus three days later when British foreign secretary Dominic Raab appeared on Sky News to explain why the UK was not testing inbound travellers at airports. “The challenge,” he declared, “is that the false positive rate is very high. It’s only seven percent of tests will be successful at identifying those that actually have the virus.”

The clip duly went viral on social media but its central claim was totally implausible. Even Yeadon had only claimed a 0.8 percent false positivity rate. Although conspiracy theorists were convinced that Raab had accidentally let slip the truth, the mundane reality was that he had misunderstood the data on which he was relying. He was referring to a report by Public Health England which claimed that only seven percent of infected travellers would be identified through airport testing. This happened to be wrong. PHE made the hopelessly unrealistic assumption that infected travellers who were symptomatic enough to test positive would not get on a plane in the first place and that only seven percent would become symptomatic in the course of the flight.

Subsequent analysis by other academics found that testing at airports would identify between a third and two-thirds of cases, but that is not the main point here. The point is that PHE’s findings had nothing to do with false positives and Raab was wrong to use the phrase. If anything, he was talking about false negatives, but the COVID sceptics had Raab’s words in black and white and decided it was more likely that a widely used diagnostic test would have an insanely high false positive rate than that an unscientific politician would get his scientific terms mixed up during a live interview.

The false positive meme should have faded into obscurity by the end of October when more than 20,000 cases a day were being reported and the number of people in hospital with COVID-19 had risen tenfold. Instead, it became the foundation of an alternative theory of the pandemic. During the summer months, it had become tempting to believe that the pandemic was over, as both Cummins and Yeadon claimed, and that only a “casedemic” remained. Maintaining this belief in October, when the death rate had risen to a level last seen in May, took a certain amount of mental agility but a significant number of people were able to do it. The core ingredients of this alternative theory are as follows:

  1. The PCR test has a staggeringly high false positivity rate, meaning that the great majority of “cases” (the word is usually enclosed in derisory speech marks) are either asymptomatic or fake.
  2. Most of the people admitted to hospital with COVID-19 tested positive after they arrived, either because they caught the virus in hospital or because they were misdiagnosed with the unreliable PCR test.
  3. For the same reason, most of the people who are counted as COVID-19 deaths were admitted for treatment of another illness which killed them, or just happened to die within 28 days of testing positive (by one official measure, any death within 28 days of a positive test is classified as a COVID death).
  4. Lockdowns don’t inhibit the spread of the virus in any meaningful way and therefore do not reduce the COVID death count.
  5. Lockdowns cause a large number of avoidable deaths, not only in the longterm from unemployment, poverty, and missed cancer screenings, but also in the short term, e.g., from suicide.

So long as you believe these five tenets, you have a theory with almost impregnable circular logic. The acid test of the casedemic theory is whether the number of people being hospitalised and dying with COVID-19 increases after the number of positive tests increases. It clearly does, but true believers dismiss this as another mirage created by the false positives.

A rise in the number of excess deaths would be compelling evidence that the people dying “with COVID” had died of COVID and would not have died of anything else that year. The ONS has recorded excess mortality every week since mid-October, with the north-west hardest hit at first followed by London and the south-east more recently. In total, there were 71,731 excess deaths in England last year and 76,610 people had COVID-19 mentioned on their death certificate. Coincidence? Why yes, say the sceptics. They claim that the excess deaths were not caused by COVID-19, but by the lockdowns themselves. In any case, they say, the rate of excess mortality is lower than it was in the spring and the current rate is not without historical precedent. Any suggestion that there would have been even more deaths without lockdowns is dismissed as impossible because “lockdowns don’t work.”

With the delusions of September colliding with the reality of a second wave that will kill more people than the first, true believers have had to double down or flee the scene. Many have doubled down. Ivor Cummins, who once insisted that there could be “no second wave without a second virus” now claims that he “foretold the second wave” and has shamelessly accused governments of not preparing for it. Yeadon, who claimed in October that the pandemic was “over” in London and was “most unlikely to return” still insists that PCR testing is “wildly unreliable,” but has made his argument more technical so his lay followers have to accept it on trust.

As the HMS Casedemic slowly sinks into the ocean, the arguments used to keep it seaworthy stop making sense even on their own terms. COVID-19 has now killed more than 0.1 percent of the population in 20 countries, including Britain, but that has not stopped COVID sceptics claiming that the infection fatality rate (IFR) is 0.1 percent or lower. This would obviously require more than 100 percent of the population to have had the virus and is a particularly odd claim coming from sceptics who believe that most cases are false positives. Since the IFR is derived from the number of deaths and the number of infections, a lower number of infections would produce a higher IFR. Some sceptics believe that so few people have had COVID-19 that the IFR should be closer to 100 percent.

Cummins, who has raised over £148,000 to make a documentary about “one man’s remarkable rise to prominence as a ‘go to’ COVID commentator,” is having to perform a particularly difficult balancing act as he seeks to reassure his fans that the second wave of COVID-19 is nothing more than the normal “winter resurgence” of seasonal viruses that he predicted. His followers and subscribers seem not to mind his failed predictions and general inconsistency. Cummins recently suggested that the lack of excess mortality in Ireland last year was evidence that the panic over COVID-19 was overblown. Simultaneously, he has claimed that lockdowns in the UK have killed tens of thousands of people. Ireland spent longer in lockdown than the UK and yet the Emerald Isle seems to have mysteriously avoided the lockdown deaths that have supposedly plagued Britain. Ireland has also suffered far fewer COVID-19 deaths, but that cannot be explained by their lengthier lockdowns because—you guessed it—lockdowns don’t work.

If we define lockdowns as laws commanding people to stay at home except for essential purposes, the claim that they don’t work is either trivial or wrong. It is trivial if it meant to tell us that lockdowns merely push the problem into the future, and wrong if it is meant to suggest that they do not reduce the infection rate. As the standard of discourse has deteriorated, the latter interpretation has dominated.

The logic behind lockdowns is difficult to refute. If you reduce human interaction, you will reduce the virus’s ability to spread. In countries where mass testing is in place, you can see the effect very clearly. Within five to 10 days of a lockdown being introduced, the infection rate falls. A dramatic recent example is Ireland which went into lockdown on December 31st after seeing an almost vertical rise in cases. We saw the same thing in Wales in October and in England in November. In country after country, you can tell when a lockdown began by simply looking at the case numbers on a graph. Of course lockdowns don’t make the epidemic disappear and of course there are less restrictive policies that can reduce the caseload, but the claim that they don’t work at all is, to put it charitably, disingenuous.

Source: Our World in Data

In the heads-I-win, tails-you-lose world of the hardened denier, countries which lock down and have few deaths are proof that COVID-19 is a paper tiger, but if COVID-19 deaths fall after a lockdown comes into effect, the death rate was going to fall anyway because the virus was tired or herd immunity had been reached. In countries such as Britain which have managed to combine sporadic lockdowns with a high death rate, the claim is that the deaths are not due to COVID-19, but to the lockdowns themselves. And yet, if lockdowns are indeed the true cause of excess mortality, the COVID sceptics need to explain why there has been no excess mortality in countries such as New Zealand and Australia which introduced lengthy and draconian lockdowns and experienced very few COVID-19 deaths. They can’t. Nor can they explain why excess mortality has been highest in the regions of the UK that have had the most COVID-19 cases. And while they believe that people are dying at home because the NHS has been turned into a “COVID Health Service,” they cannot explain how creating more COVID patients is going to help on that front.

If tens of thousands of deaths have been wrongly attributed to COVID-19, then we are left to wonder what it is about testing positive for SARS-CoV-2 that makes people so much more likely to die within 28 days? Why are so many doctors recording COVID-19 as the main cause of death on death certificates if these people actually died of cancer or got hit by a truck? Why is the government using a diagnostic test with a 93 percent false positive rate and why isn’t that test producing false positives 93 percent of the time? And if lockdowns produce no appreciable health benefits, then why are governments voluntarily cratering their own economies for no reason?

The claims made by Cummins, Yeadon, and other supposed authorities are demonstrably nonsensical and yet they are eagerly lapped up by an army of social media disciples who have adopted the yellow smiley face as a badge of their scepticism. The smiley symbol is supposed to represent optimism in the face of adversity, but instead it makes the whole movement look decidedly cultish, creepy, and faceless, like the children in John Wyndham’s Village of the Damned. This disconcerting impression is reinforced by their tendency to say exactly the same things over and over again. Misleading graphs and blatantly doctored images are circulated with abandon, spreading far beyond the hub of hardcore believers and planting doubt in the minds of normal people.

Doubt is at the heart of this phenomenon, and it is being unscrupulously exploited. Can we prove that every death attributed to COVID-19 was caused by COVID-19? No. Some of them almost certainly weren’t. How many deaths were caused by lockdown? No one knows. Has the government ever specified precisely what the false positive rate is? No. Can we prove beyond doubt that the decline in case numbers seen around the world shortly after lockdowns were introduced would not have taken place anyway? No. How could we?

Some data simply don’t exist. Definite proof is only to be found in mathematics. In life, as in court, you can only exclude reasonable doubt. Those who cling to unreasonable doubts cannot be persuaded by facts or logic. The smiley crowd are persistent in asking questions about trivial issues for which there are no definitive answers, but have no answer to the most fundamental questions asked of them in return. Smileys generally won’t spell out the conclusion that their “scepticism” leads them to because they know how contemptibly stupid it would sound, but the scenario must go something like this:

A virus that has killed millions of people, including 50,000 in Britain last spring, suddenly disappeared, and so the government approved a highly inaccurate diagnostic test to keep the panic going because Boris Johnson has always wanted the public to wear face masks or something. Very few people actually have SARS-CoV-2 and even according to the official figures only two per cent have it at the moment. As luck would have it, a hugely disproportionate number of them happen to be admitted to hospital and die from something else, thereby producing scary death counts which are corroborated by corrupt doctors.

Another stroke of luck for the government is that last year happened to have the largest number of excess deaths since 1940. This could be due to lockdown deaths, whatever they are, or some other epidemic unrelated to the coronavirus. Have you noticed how few flu deaths there are this year? Bit suspicious, isn’t it? One possibility is that despite a drastic reduction in air travel and an unprecedented amount of social distancing, hand-washing, mask-wearing, and self-isolation, Britain is suffering from an exceptionally severe flu season, with flu deaths being wrongly classified as COVID-19 deaths by corrupt and/or incompetent doctors.

Pretty far-fetched, isn’t it? And that’s before we get to the theories about Bill Gates and the Chinese Communist Party that are on the lunatic fringes even in the smiley universe.

What is driving this insanity? Almost all COVID sceptics admit that there was a pandemic in the spring which killed tens of thousands of people in Britain. Why, then, is it so hard for them to accept the overwhelming likelihood that the same coronavirus is doing what viruses do and spreading rapidly in the winter? This is perhaps the most puzzling and interesting aspect of the whole phenomenon. The casedemic theory is just one of many daft ideas that have been thrown around in relation to COVID-19 in the last 12 months. Why has it not been quietly forgotten like so many others? How has it managed to survive, spread, and mutate with all the tenacity of the virus itself?

The answer, I think, lies in despair. Since March, there has been a sense of living in a nightmare from which one cannot awake. The non-pharmaceutical interventions introduced to contain the virus—especially lockdowns—have been soul-destroying. The economy is battered beyond belief, redundancies have gone through the roof, and there are more grey weeks of a cold winter lockdown to endure. On the other hand, we also have a potentially lethal and frequently debilitating virus infecting at least 50,000 people a day, hospitalising 4,000, and killing close to a thousand. That, too, will go on for weeks and, assuming you believe in germ theory and exponential growth, these figures would be much worse if we resumed normal social contact.

It’s an awful situation to be in. It’s a zero-sum game in which disease and death is traded off against misery and poverty. Until the first vaccine arrived in December, COVID scepticism offered people a way out. If the dangers of the virus were being overhyped by fearmongers, and lockdowns were entirely ineffective, then societies could reopen secure in the knowledge that there was nothing that could be done to reduce the death toll (which would, in any case, be a fraction of what we were told). The comforting lie that trade-offs could be avoided has proved irresistible to those who have surrendered to confirmation bias and constructed a parallel and preferable version of reality.

In this project, they have been ably assisted by the ignorance and statistical illiteracy that pervades Twitter. People who are not used to dealing with statistics have been trying to familiarise themselves with concepts and figures they’ve never seen before and don’t properly understand. Words and phrases are confidently repeated by those who don’t really know what they mean. There is no shortage of stupidity on Twitter, but this is something different, something almost transcendent. The inability to absorb or even acknowledge the most basic facts is beyond anything I’ve seen before.

But perhaps it’s not inability. Perhaps it’s just a refusal to face the reality of agonising choices. It is an extreme form of motivated reasoning, the flip-side to which is total credulity when presented with claims that suggest that there is no problem, no trade-offs, no pandemic, only malevolent governments and elites who could end the nightmare any time they wanted, but prefer to terrify their populations and needlessly wreck their economies instead.

We are in a no-win situation. The trade-offs are horrible. And so, when confronted by someone who tells you that’s it’s all fake, that the hospitals are empty and the test doesn’t work and the disease is basically harmless and the government is lying, who wouldn’t want to believe it? What could be more appealing than the idea that the thing we hate is causing the problem we’re trying to solve?

It would be nice if the hospitals were empty and the hundreds of thousands of people being infected each week were false positives. But we don’t live in that world, we live in this one. The smileys are not bad people. They are not necessarily unintelligent people. They are unhappy people wearing a mask of happiness, confused and beaten and searching for an easy answer. They want someone to flick a switch and make everything normal again. Who doesn’t? The trouble is that there are no easy answers this time.

 

Christopher J. Snowdon is head of Lifestyle Economics at the Institute of Economic Affairs and the author of Killjoys and Polemics. You can follow him on Twitter @cjsnowdon.

 

Comments

  1. I fully agree with the author that too many people hold beliefs on this subject that are misleading, highly naive, or even gross nonsense, and that this can lead to an overly careless approach to a dangerous pandemic, rejection of reasonable countermeasures, and thus unnecessary suffering.

    Notwithstanding the above, I would like to point out one aspect of the current implementation of lockdowns and similar measures that seems worthy of criticism nonetheless and that is not addressed in the article: How the state now intervenes in the private daily lives of its citizens in an incredibly drastic way that would have seemed almost unimaginable until recently.

    Who would have thought not even ten months ago that our governments would dictate to people whether they are still allowed to meet with their family and friends? Where and with whom they are allowed to celebrate Christmas? At what times and on what grounds they are still allowed to leave their homes, and with whom their children are allowed to play?

    This is not to say that it is not wise to be cautious about these things. This is about how the government now uses its power to coerce people and punish dissenters.

    Which inevitably leads to scenes like in this video of Canadian police officers busting an “illegal” family reunion during the New Year’s holiday in Quebec:


    Or this video, where police in Scotland enter a home and arrest the parents in front of their children, who are screaming in fear, after a neighbor ratted them out because “there were too many people inside”:


    (more about this here)

    Is this really the kind of society we want to live in? How willing are we to pay that kind of price?

    Less than a year ago, such scenes would have been considered absolutely unworthy of a liberal society. Today, one might wonder how much of a safety buffer remains for a society in which this kind of situation is apparently becoming the accepted new normal. Historical fascism also arose as a response to a (real or perceived) threat to society that supposedly could not be countered in any other way than by all people submitting their liberties to a central leadership in favor of the common good.

    And all those who think that it is appropriate for the government to subject people to such measures because the situation demands it should at least be honest enough to admit that they only care about values like liberalism and personal self-determination as long as the weather is nice, and that they are willing to throw them under the bus as soon as circumstances require it.

  2. Critiquing the most extreme members of any movement is always like shooting fish in a barrel.

    A balanced article would have considered the average age and health of those that have died of Covid. Some attempt at assessing the QALY impact of lockdown would allow us to assess the trade-offs.

    It has been notable that the media coverage has lacked international perspective beyond the most superficial comparisons of case rates and death counts. It would be interesting to know the approach taken in other countries with respect to school exams and to everyday healthcare provision.

    It is pointless pointing to Ireland as an indicator of the apparent absence of lockdown deaths, without an assessment of their health system’s approach relative to the broad shutdown of non-Covid NHS services.

  3. I will never forgive the government

    Had I been a better person, I would have let this slide. As I’m not and the thinly veiled contempt in this piece rubbed me the wrong way, I have to point out that this quote from the beginning of the article is a particularly meaningless and virtue signalling statement.

    And so, when confronted by someone who tells you that’s it’s all fake, that the hospitals are empty and the test doesn’t work and the disease is basically harmless and the government is lying, who wouldn’t want to believe it? What could be more appealing than the idea that the thing we hate is causing the problem we’re trying to solve?

    I think this is completely backwards! Some people are more scared of government overreach than the disease. In that case, there not being a disease at all is the absolute worst case scenario. It seems to me that exaggeration is more likely to be rooted in fear than wishful thinking.

  4. There are many possible views on lockdowns and mask mandates (other than those presented in this article). My view, for example: a loss of .1% of the population is a risk-level that I (at age 66, BTW) am willing to accept. The amount of masking and business closure here in the USA is not acceptable (to me) because this is not “living.” I’d rather take my chances.

  5. Mmm. Well written article, but I rather dislike the idea that all skeptics should simply be seen as cranks. For example, who are the cranks in our day and age? Were people wrong to question climate change? Is Greta Thunberg a voice of reason? Was Al Gore? Which science do we trust? Is WHO, which has supported then rejected lockdowns, our savior? Is Big Tech, which modulates speech on the coronavirus, our leading health authority, and does it act purely altruistically? Honestly, name me the person who truly knows what the goddamn hell is going on, or someone who we know for sure isn’t operating with a hidden agenda.

  6. I think most of the facts are in on lockdowns versus no lockdowns. California and New York have locked down their economies yet Florida has never locked down. The death rate in Florida which has, as we all know, a very aged population, is lower than both New York and California. My self absorbed governor is n New York, chock-full of hubris, said in his press conference three weeks ago that the spread from indoor dining socially distant was 1.4%. The spread in households was 74%. Please tell me how locking down and eliminating indoor dining with safeguards made any sense at all. This is what we are dealing with in New York. Gross incompetence by a governor whose direct orders killed well over 8000 nursing home residents and then he wrote a book praising his performance and the left cheered him on. Yikes!

  7. Lockdowns are, and always have been, an inappropriate way of dealing with a respiratory virus. Because of the way the virus spreads such measure can only delay and not stop infections. Unless, of course, everyone in the world could be kept in strict quarantine for longer than the life cycle of the virus.

    Outbreaks of diseases caused by respiratory viruses have been a regular winter phenomenon since the dawn of time. But never before has so much effort has been made in documenting to course of the disease by governments, then the medical profession or the MSM. Most of us, therefore, have no context to put the events of 2020. Since the excess deaths, as a proportion of the population*, in 2020 was lower than for any year before 2010 I firmly believe that had the government not panicked and not ordered the first lockdown in March then we would be able to look back on 2020 as just another “bad flu’ year”

    The lesson that we all should learn from 2020 is just how dangerous the hubris of government is.

    *Using raw numbers instead of proportional ones is just the sort of misinformation the MSM excel at.

  8. Lastly, age- (and perhaps co-morbidity-)related excess deaths are absolutely critical to the lockdown discussion.

    Yes (per the article), it is claimed by many that the full population IFR of covid is < 0.1%. Yes, many countries and cities (NYC ~0.2%) already have a total population fatality rate of > 0.1%, with likely full-population exposure at low to mid 10’s of % (according to antibody studies which currently show 20%-60% previous exposure). These are not inconsistent statements, according to the following.

    Covid kills the elderly and otherwise infirm at an IFR about 8 orders of magnitude greater than children. The elderly and infirm are mostly clustered in enclosed care facilities. Infection rates or events of covid are correlated with indoor concentration of infected persons (care homes and hospitals unfortunately are perfect environments for spread). Care facilities have seen the majority of covid-related deaths.

    It has been established that the IFR is massively age dependent - something like 0.0003% IFR for <14 and 30% IFR for >80. Removing known co-morbidities from the equation increases the age correlation (since of course older age itself is correlated with chronic medical conditions, including those that are considered covid co-morbidities).

    Anyhow, thought I would attempt to correct the formal stats presented in the article.

    As a concrete example, in Indian slum areas, serology studies of many months back showed antibody prevelance at >50% (!) but relatively low excess mortality rates. The slum full population IFR was calculated as something like 0.003%. How can this be? Well high exposure is hardly a surprise in dense urban areas with little opportunity for good hygiene practices - hence the high antibody prevalence. Why the low fatality rates? Perhaps a combination of youth-dominated demographics, and unusually low prelavence of important co-morbidities - almost no obesity, low rates of hypertension. Also possibly high natural vitamin D levels - sunny environment and mostly outdoor lifestyle.

    Even assuming similar per-demographic mortality rates in different parts of the world, it still could be, and likely is, true that developed countries with flat (elderly-skewed) demographics will end up with full-population IFR that is orders of magnitude higher than that of developing countries with wide population pyramids (youth-skewed).

    Treating covid with a 1 policy fits all (ages and/or countries) is criminally negligent for all ages except the middle-aged (40’s odd). For the elderly (and highly at-risk) the criminality is lack of focused protection. For the young, the criminality is loss of opportunity (schooling and beneficial employment).

  9. There are four good reasons why we need the cranks.

    1. The media has relentlessly pushed a single narrative.
    2. That narrative will never allow the views of these so-called cranks to be expressed, except when ridiculing those views
    3. The cranks may be partly right, or sometimes right
    4. We will never know if the more reasonable views are right, unless we can hear from those who disagree

    And then there is this:

  10. Snowdon asks:

    [I]f lockdowns produce no appreciable health benefits, then why are governments voluntarily cratering their own economies for no reason?

    There are plausible alternative theories for this behavior, and as a libertarian you know this. They are plausible for the reason that Western governments have already, for decades, led their countries into steady plunder, wealth concentration, and liberty limitations, far beyond reason. The evidence is solid that the vast majority of top members of Western governments simply don’t care about the well-being of their constituents. That’s where the skeptics start. So, like the boy who cried “Wolf!”, the [magnanimous tool | Machiavellian weapon] of logic today begins severely handicapped.

    And of the skeptics:

    This disconcerting impression is reinforced by [skeptics’] tendency to say exactly the same things over and over again.

    and so, throwing his hands up in frustration, asks

    What is driving this insanity?

    Even the lay audiences are now well-trained in the techniques of successful evidence-free assertion-making. They have seen how, and how well, their “leaders” use bait-and-switch. Once trust is lost, propaganda from above deflates, and propaganda from below proliferates, because all people – capable or not – start coming up with their own ideas and their own ways of pushing them. So now Western governments are flailing (and failing) wildly in their attempts to shepherd their flocks.

    This communication war must, somehow, be turned back into communication diplomacy. How, without decades to spare, I don’t know.

  11. If you lie to the people, again and again, they will stop believing you. Shocking, huh? It has been a blizzard of lies, incompetence and corruption.

  12. Snowdon asks:

    [I]f lockdowns produce no appreciable health benefits, then why are governments voluntarily cratering their own economies for no reason?

    There are plausible alternative theories for this behavior, and as a libertarian you know this.

    Yes, it’s disappointing that Snowdon doesn’t grapple with the alternatives presented by both observation and thinking about these decisions in the context of public choice theory. There’s the “do something” bias of governments - both elected officials and unelected civil servants - when confronted with a problem. That’s there even if the solution does little to address the problem or badly fails a cost-benefit test.

    Think of the matrix of outcomes as hospitalizations and deaths increase.

    • Lockdown and they still increase? Either “the lockdown prevented far worse” or “people just didn’t follow the rules enough”. We’ve seen both of these non-falsifiable answers given on many occasions.

    • Lockdown and they decline? “Ah ha, the lockdown worked”. And again, we have no direct comparison to what would have happened without a lockdown.

    • Don’t lockdown and they increase? From the media, and the academic experts who get quoted in stories: “This result is due to government inaction. Thousands of deaths could have been prevented”.

    • "Don’t lockdown and they decline? Crickets from the media. I think that the U.S. national media only remembers that Florida and several other states exist when their respective COVID numbers get worse, not when they get better. Or - if forced to confront the situation - people and businesses took actions that were the same as a lockdown.

    Add to the mix that public health officials and academics have no sense of how the economy works. That’s both in theory and in practice. Their lived experience is that an entity magically deposits a paycheck every pay period, so there’s no intuitive sense of relying on paying customers as the way to earn a living. They also don’t seem to be much of multi-variate thinkers about lockdowns and COVID, even within their field of broader health outcomes. And, of course, the tendency for extreme predictions - hello, Mr. Ferguson - to be covered preferentially by the press.

    Underlying all of this is the reality that guiding lockdown policy gives them technocratic power of which they’d never dreamed prior to 2020. It has to be intoxicating to be in charge of so much of how society functions.

  13. This is a piece clearly from someone who has worked from home and enjoyed the lockdowns. This was a big test of science and philosophy and we have failed on both counts.

    a) The science was very clear: there shall be no lockdowns for flu-like viruses. The last they were tried was for Ebola in 2014 and an evaluation showed that they did not help (targeted quarantines did help). Substantial literature existed in the past to refute the idea of indiscriminate lockdowns, also because these infringe human rights. Snowdon obviously cares not for basic freedoms.

    b) The argument of lockdown opponents is not against social distancing per se. Voluntary social distancing and hand hygiene are a part of good practice, as followed by Sweden. They too had lockdowns but these were not coercive. That coercion is the real problem, not social distancing.

    c) Australia should never be cited as an example: it is nothing short of the most inhumane totalitarian society in the world today, not a role model for anyone in the civilised world or for anyone who considers himself human. Those of us who have lived through living hell in Melbourne and locked up in Australia like chicken in a coop (borders closed for a year), with wide-scale police brutalities on the young who underwent the most extreme mental torture ever, know that this is the worst form of civilisation in human history. That a few (extremely elderly) lives might have been saved from a natural cause is no excuse to cause such extreme harms. And hundreds of people have also died FROM lockdowns - See my complaint to the International Criminal Court for details. We do not authorise a government to take the life of person X while trying to save the life of person Y.

    d) Are we going to do this for all other pandemics in the future? Is this our new “science” - divested entirely from consideration of humanity and liberty? I’m afraid I will never support such “science”. There are thousands of smarter ways to deal with pandemics than the way we have dealt with them in the West, copying Jinping’s totalitarian program.

    I see from this article that the IEA might have now effectively become a promoter of police brutalities and totalitarianism. This is extremely unfortunate given the good impression I once held of this institution.

  14. Here is an even less contentious fact. 1% of Americans die every year.

    That figure is skewed compared to life-expectancy only because of immigration.

    Here is a simple compute. Take any country’s life expectancy, say 75 years for most developed countries. Divide 100 by that number for any country, e.g. 100/75 = 1.3%. That is your ambient full-population annual death rate.

    Covid has been with us for a year already and we’re arguing whether it’s IFR is 0.3% or 0.1% etc.

    It’s an order of magnitude less than the ambient mortality rate.

    Yes, this is what the world has managed to manufacture a fanny wobble, an existential crisis, call it what you will, about.

    Is our generation just a bunch of pansy’s? Which I think is the world that the author was trying to use when he substituted it with the unprecedented ‘pantry’ in this context.

    By comparison, 50 million people died of ‘Spanish Flu’ in one year when the population of the world was 1/10 of what it is now.

    In modern terms that’s equivalent to 500 million people dying.

    What do we have after a year of covid-19? Yes, 2 million deaths.

    And we have completely changed our lifestyles and life choices because of it.

    Shame on us, I reckon. Pansy boys we all are, as is the author who really should take some lessons in statistics before he pontificates again.

  15. (repost warning)

    Article a few weeks ago about how the hospitals were overwhelmed because of COVID. Written by reporter Denis Campbell.

    Articles from 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019 about how hospitals are overwhelmed (of note is the fun fact that 6 of the 8 scare articles about how hospitals are overwhelmed are by the same Denis Campbell).

    image



    And people wonder why the sheep no longer trust mass media?

Continue the discussion in Quillette Circle


1/27/2021

Neuromaani by Jaakko Yli-Juonikas

 

(In)visible Translations: An Interview with Douglas Robinson

 

(In)visible Translations: An Interview with Douglas Robinson

George Salis: Can you give us an overview (as descriptive as you’d like) of Finnish writer Volter Kilpi’s oeuvre?

Douglas Robinson: It’s strange. It comes in three disparate bursts: first, around the turn of the century, three neo-romantic novels focused on biblical and mythological characters and themes, along with a collection of ecstatic essays; then, after 15 years of silence, two impassioned political tracts in the years of Finnish independence from Russia (1917, 1918); then, after another 15 years of silence, the major modernist works of the 1930s: the Archipelago series, consisting of his magnum opus Alastalon salissa (“In the Alastalo Parlor,” 1933), his follow-up short story collection Pitäjän pienemmät (“The County’s Littler Guys,” 1934, partly consisting of bits and pieces that he cut from Alastalo), and the novel Kirkolle (“To the Church Village,” 1937); then the last two works, Suljetuilla porteilla (“At Closed Gates,” 1938) and Gulliverin matka Fantomimian mantereelle (Gulliver’s Voyage to Phantomimia), left unfinished at his death and published posthumously in 1944. Critics have tried to construct continuities—the meandering voices of the early novels as anticipating Alastalo, the right-wing zealotry of the political tracts projected onto Alastalo, etc.—but really there is no way to predict the explosion of brilliant modernist experimentation in the works of the 1930s.

Volter Kilpi

GS: Is Kilpi’s masterpiece Alastalon salissa truly comparable to Ulysses?

DR: In some ways, but to my mind rather peripheral ones. A brilliant Finnish poet, critic, and theorist named Leevi Lehto (1951-2019), who published an incredible Finnish translation of Ulysses in 2012, has made the case, and I talked to him about it before his death; but much as I admire his brilliance, his juxtaposition of the two always seemed circumstantial to me. Back in the late 1940s the avant-garde writer and composer Elmer Diktonius (1896-1961)—whom Kilpi tried to hire to translate his work (Diktonius gave up: too difficult)—made a rather different case for the parallels between the two novels. There are stream-of-consciousness chapters and sections in the novel, but they consist of more coherent discursive thinking than anything in Joyce, and they are often blended with Jamesian close third-person narrations and even some premodern omniscient third-person narrations. I would say, in general, that Alastalo is much closer to Proust than to Joyce. In fact, Alastalo was based on Kilpi’s ancestors: both of his grandfathers and his father play starring roles in the novel; Alastalo was his paternal grandfather’s real-life house, where his father was born (and the house still stands today, with the same name), and so on. If Proust’s Recherche is stylized modernist autobiography, Kilpi’s Alastalo is what we might call stylized modernist prenatal autobiography.

GS: In Books from Finland one would-be translator explains, “Reluctantly (I really have tried) I have been driven to conclude that Alastalon salissa is untranslatable, except perhaps by a fanatical Volter Kilpi enthusiast who is prepared to devote a lifetime to it.” Have you considered translating it or do you also think it’s untranslatable?

DR: I think what David Barrett meant by “untranslatable” is “very difficult (for me) to translate.” The novel was published in Thomas Warburton’s 1997 Swedish translation, and Stefan Moser’s German translation is due to be published in the next few months: not at all untranslatable! I have been translating bits and pieces of Kilpi’s novel for a monograph I’m writing titled “Translating the Monster: Volter Kilpi in Orbit Beyond (Un)translatability,” which will also feature this Gulliver book. I’ve translated the entire first chapter of Alastalo, and will print that in an appendix to the monograph. I find translating Kilpi daunting but heady. He reinvents the Finnish language, which makes translating incredibly difficult—but also (as I see things) gives me license to reinvent the English language. (I am certainly a Kilpi enthusiast, and I suppose I don’t take “fanatical” to be an insult; but I won’t be devoting my entire life to it. 2-3 years in retirement, probably.)

GS: What made you decide to translate the unfinished manuscript Gulliver’s Voyage to Phantomimia (Gulliverin matka Fantomimian mantereelle)? Before he died of a stroke, Kilpi told his son about how he had planned to finish the manuscript, but what gave you the artistic audacity to attempt to finish the unfinished Finnish (in Swiftian English, no less)? Is the original Finnish written with a Swiftian flair too?

DR: I’m not sure I would call Kilpi’s Finnish in any obvious way Swiftian. His Finnish is weird, the way all of his writing of the 1930s is weird, and it’s archaic, so arguably Swiftian, but not recognizably so. My original idea to translate that unfinished novel was born out of Kilpi’s playful claim to have found Lemuel Gulliver’s original English manuscript and translated it into Finnish. The “found translation” meme! Rabelais used it in Gargantua and Pantagruel back in the 1530s; Cervantes used it in Don Quixote; it’s one of my favorites. And I thought: okay, so what if I were to pretend, equally playfully, to have found the same English manuscript and edited it for publication? Then I would need to translate Kilpi’s unfinished ms into Swiftian English (Gulliver would not have written the English of our day!) and write the novel to the end Kilpi told his son he was planning. The Pale Fire fun I had with the paratexts surrounding the original truncated Finnish novel just sort of emerged as I began to work on the project.

GS: Why do you think it took this long for any translation of Kilpi’s work to be published?

DR: Kilpi was forgotten for a half century after his death in 1939. He began to be rediscovered and read in the late 1980s—right around the time I moved out of Finland, so I missed it. In 1992 a poll launched by Finland’s major national daily voted his Alastalo the greatest Finnish novel ever—taking everyone by surprise. Everyone always expects Aleksis Kivi’s 1870 novel about seven brothers (Kilpi’s favorite novel, and one of my favorites as well) to win these polls. So really we’ve only had three decades to mull over his work. And it’s so difficult that no native speaker of Finnish feels entirely comfortable with it; his Finnish readers have observed that it feels like they’re reading a foreign language. That sets the bar very high for translators, obviously!

GS: You mentioned that you devoured Barth as a young man. What was that feast like back then and did The Sot-Weed Factor also animate you on some mental level as you wrote that archaic style? Perchance Pynchon’s Mason & Dixon?

DR: The Sot-Weed Factor and Mason & Dixon did both inspire me, yes—not just in the use of archaic English, but the rollickingly playful use of archaic English. The boisterous rhythms of those novels, and of Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels, and of Sir Thomas Urquhart’s 1663 translation of Rabelais, kept exploding inside me as I worked. That’s partly what makes translating Alastalo such a heady experience as well: here is an incitement to cut loose! I should say, too, though, that I translated Aleksis Kivi’s 1870s novel Seitsemän veljestä—the novel that everyone expected to be voted, again, as Finland’s greatest, because it truly is great—as The Brothers Seven in the same way, with boisterous, rambunctious archaic English. Kilpi’s late modernist work isn’t nearly as laugh-out-loud funny as Kivi’s, and the style is way more intricately convoluted; but there is a boisterousness to both writers that tickles me deep down.

GS: The novel is subtitled ‘a transcreation.’ To your knowledge, has anything like this been done before?

DR: Transcreation is an established term, certainly. The Brazilian poet Haroldo de Campos, who compared translation to cannibalism, compared transcreation to a blood transfusion. But I don’t know of any other transcreation that has done precisely what I do here—the Pale Fire experiment.

GS: You mentioned Pale Fire. What are your thoughts on that novel and how has it influenced this transcreation?

DR: I love that novel. I don’t claim to understand all the tricks Nabokov pulls in it—the idea that Kinbote’s “transcreation” of John Shade’s poem was actually written from the afterlife by Shade’s daughter Hazel, say—but the complexity of the intertwined genres (poem, commentary, index) is deeply appealing to me. The idea that Kinbote is clinically insane, and takes possession of Shade’s poem in order to tell a romanticized adventure story about his supposed royal escape from Nova Zembla, and so on … the many layers of twisted retelling that make up that novel stir my imagination in far-reaching ways. Pale Fire works on my imagination at such a deep level, however, that I didn’t consciously decide to filter Kilpi’s Gulliver through it; it just sort of started happening, and it wasn’t until I’d finished that the Pale Fire connection occurred to me. I mention in the “editor’s introduction”—narrated by a Kinbote-like paranoid named Douglas Robinson—that I was once quite viciously accused of Kinbote-like theft by the Finnish editor-in-chief of the Aleksis Kivi Critical Edition project, just because in the review I was asked to write (about one volume in the series) I pointed out a series of errors he had made. I was taken aback by the sustained malice of his attack on me, but accusing me of being like Kinbote didn’t hurt at all: it was a kind of flattery! (I recreate that vicious attack, playfully, in the “reader’s report” I wrote and attributed to the fictitious Prof. Julius Nyrkki, whose surname means “fist”—I use his attack to highlight everything I’m proudest of in the transcreation. In the course of calling me a shameless liar, thief, and hoaxer, too, he tells the most truth about the project in the entire volume.)

GS: Whereas your addition to the manuscript is satirical, Kilpi’s portions are loosely satirical at best. Why do you think Kilpi chose to adopt a Swift character while avoiding the Swiftian style of satire?

DR: Probably he didn’t have a satirical bone in his body. He got the idea for the novel while reading Bertel Gripenberg’s Swedish translation of Poe’s “Descent into the Maelström.” The idea must have been to write a sailing tale (Kustavi, where he lived most of his life, was a shipbuilding community, and his father and both of his grandfathers were shipbuilders who captained the ships that they built) that veers into the holes-at-the-poles theory (which Poe too uses in The Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym) and SF time travel in order to bring characters from the past into his time, 1938. My guess is that it was only at that point, fairly late in the brainstorming process, that he thought of Gulliver—of having Gulliver and his shipmates set out in 1738 and be propelled exactly two centuries into the future. I’m not sure Swiftian satire ever entered into his imaginings! Though if it did, it might have been the relatively superficial kind of satire that attacks: shows how appalled eighteenth-century people would have been at the modernity of his day. I love satire, and love writing it, and used it to vent my spleen at the Trump “presidency,” but much more pressingly than satire I had epistemological play on my mind—and indeed the whole sequence in which Gulliver and his shipmates are projected into the King James Bible was much more interesting to me for that reason. I guess I’m still doing satire there—satirizing the Old Testament, by having Gulliver embody one of the most bizarre characters in the entire book, Captain of the Host of the LORD in Joshua 5:13-15, and using him as a witness to horrific mindless genocide—but playing with the illusion of reality, propelling a novel character into the Bible, a text-within-a-text, was more interesting.

GS: What made you choose a European publisher of textbooks? Rather than, say, Deep Vellum or Archipelago Books, for instance?

Aleksis Kivi

DR: I sent proposals to both of those presses, and two dozen others like it—and never got a single acknowledgement. I had a long conversation about it with Chad Post at Open Letter Books, and he encouraged me to send a proposal—and then never got even an acknowledgement from him either. I tried university presses. I must have sent queries or proposals to 40-50 presses, and received a total of three (negative) replies. It was quite discouraging! And Zeta Books is an edgy publisher of philosophical books, not (to my knowledge) textbooks. I have a good friend who is also from Romania, and she encouraged me to publish my book on Friedrich Schleiermacher’s 1813 Academy address on the different methods of translating with them: I wanted to publish the book in Berlin in the bicentennial year, 2013, and none of the Berlin publishers were responding (I would have loved to publish it on June 24, 2013, exactly two centuries after the address was delivered). I met my Romanian friend at a conference in Germany that summer, and after I had complained about the German publishers giving me the cold shoulder, she recommended Zeta Books. I asked around about them, heard nothing but great things, and decided to take a chance—and they were amazing. They published my book in one month, start to finish—and did it with meticulous professionalism. So when I was unable to find a publisher for my translation of Aleksis Kivi’s The Brothers Seven, I turned to them, and they published it brilliantly as well. With Kilpi, I was determined to find a more traditional small press in the Anglophone world, but failed—so I turned to Zeta Books a third time. It’s an odd venue for a book like this, certainly: why Romania? But the press is owned and run by philosophers with a nose for the quirky, and they have responded to my quirky books with great enthusiasm and intuitive understanding! And to my delighted surprise, there has been a lot of advance excitement about this Gulliver book out in the world as well.

GS: In 1980, you wrote a monograph about John Barth’s Giles Goat-Boy. Barth became a nonagenarian this year. Can you reflect on his work and talk about why you love it?

DR: I have enjoyed all of his novels and stories, but especially love The Sot-Weed Factor and Giles Goat-Boy. Back when I was working on Barth, I was obsessed with the nature of postmodernism, and tended to define it along lines marked out by those big books of Barth’s, and also Coover’s (The Public Burning) and Pynchon’s (especially Gravity’s Rainbow back then, but later also Mason & Dixon). I guess what I loved about that flavor of postmodernism was the idea that you could write metafiction, playing epistemological games with the illusion of reality, and have enormous fun doing it, and bringing the reader into your fun—and also write compelling stories. I hated the notion that metafiction meant mauling the joy of reading—that playing with the illusion of reality was a purely intellectual activity, to be admired but not enjoyed. I love reading fiction, and don’t want to be deprived of that pleasure! And the two extremes of domestic realism and, say, Robbe-Grillet’s nouveau roman both seem to suck the pleasure out of reading. Writers like Barth, Coover, Pynchon, Gass—and Kilpi, and Shishkin, etc.—get my blood pumping!

GS: What are some other Finnish masterpieces that you’d like to see in translation and what can you tell me about them?

DR: Possibly Neuromaani (a punning title that could be translated Neuronovel, Neuromaniac, or My Neurocountry), the big 2012 novel by Jaakko Yli-Juonikas, who has been called Finland’s greatest living writer. I’ve been hired to translate several contemporary novels, notably comic novels by writers like Arto Paasilinna and Mikko-Pekka Heikkinen; and I’ve translated the play script of a brilliant stage adaptation of Maria Jotuni’s Huojuva talo (“Tottering House”). Simon & Schuster just published my translation of Mia Kankimäki’s 450-page feminist travel memoir. I wouldn’t mind translating a comic novel by Veikko Huovinen. Of the classical works, though, I’m really only excited by Kivi and Kilpi; there’s a lot more Kilpi to translate, but I’ve translated almost all of what is great by Kivi. Perhaps one more play of his that would be fun to translate might be Olviretki Schleusingenissa (“Beer Expedition in Schleusingen”).

GS: You’ve written many books about translation. If you could synthesize that knowledge into a succinct piece of advice to translators worldwide, what would you say?

DR: Translation is a derivative art, yes, and it is ringed round with constraints; but translators have a lot more freedom than they have been taught to believe. We can take risks; we can push the envelope. You pay a price for that, certainly. As I say, it was very difficult to find a publisher for my Gulliver. One of the few rejections I got (as opposed to simply being ignored) said specifically that I draw too much attention to myself as the translator! I wasn’t sure Kilpi’s Gulliver was in the public domain, so I sent it to his grandson, who is in charge of his estate, asking permission to publish it—and was denied. Fortunately I did some more research and learned that the novel is indeed in the public domain—Kilpi died in 1939, and the required 70 years after that were up in 2009. So I wrote to Kilpi’s grandson to ask what the status of the estate’s denial was; he said it was a recommendation. So it can be a bit tricky pushing the envelope! But it can be done.

GS: Do you think translators get enough recognition? For instance, it’s not even a rule that a publisher must put the translator’s name on the book cover.

DR: In one sense, no, of course we don’t get enough recognition! The title of my very first book on translation, The Translator’s Turn, was a pun on two senses of turn: on the one hand, the translator turns from the source text into the target language, but like a bulldozer creating a new road turning into the woods; on the other, now it’s the translator’s turn to get recognized. And I do think that translators are increasingly getting the recognition they/we deserve! There’s a boom in translation these days. But in another sense the translator’s mandated invisibility lets us practice some ninja subversions. I’ve just submitted a dialogue on the avant-garde use of invisibility to Asymptote’s world literature special issue, arguing that the call for translators to be more visible, to get more recognition, is a call for a questionable kind of heroization, one that is problematically grounded in victim discourse. Poor put-upon us! That victim-heroism is also highly individualistic: I did it, I deserve credit for it! The avant-garde answer would be not only ninja subversion but participation in community. Fansubbers—crowd-sourced subtitling of movies and TV shows by fans who flout international copyright law—are participatory avant-garde translators in this sense. There’s a new concept in translation studies, “translaboration,” based on the idea that all translation is collaborative.

GR: Who are some of your favorite translators?

DR: Too many to name all of them! But I recently read Marian Schwartz’s brilliantly innovative translation of Mikhail Shishkin’s Maidenhair, and was blown away by it. I knew Marian back in the 1990s, when I was very active in the American Translators Association, and picked up the book when I saw that she had translated it. I have to say, though, that in admiring and loving the translation, I was also envious: if only someone would hire me to translate a book this brilliant, and specifically one that made so many mind-bending demands on the translator! Shortly after that, though, a publisher began to put out feelers for me to translate Yli-Juonikas’s Neuromaani, and I got very excited about that. So we’ll see.

Douglas Robinson has been translating Finnish literature since 1975, when his Finnish girlfriend dragged him to a summer theater performance by this dead guy named Aleksis Kivi (1834-1872). Turned out he was the founder of Finnish-language literature and is still considered the greatest Finnish writer, or one of the two greatest, including Volter Kilpi. Kivi’s Finnish, Doug’s girlfriend warned him, is pretty difficult, so he might want to read the play (Nummisuutarit > “Heath Cobblers”) before they went. He did, and fell head over heels with Kivi’s writing. The performance was even more wonderful, and gave the words on the page brilliant comic body. When they returned from the play, Doug began rereading the play, and by some magic rereading turned into translating. Having translated all of Kivi’s greatest works—his three best plays and his exuberantly iconoclastic 1870 novel The Brothers Seven-—Doug turned to Finland’s other great novelist, Volter Kilpi, with a transcreation of Kilpi’s unfinished posthumously published novel Gulliver’s Voyage to Phantomimia now and In the Alastalo Parlor in the hopefully not-too-distant future. Robinson is also considered one of the world’s leading translation scholars; his books include Aleksis Kivi and/as World Literature (Brill 2017), and he’s hard at work on another book tentatively titled Translating the Monster: Volter Kilpi in Orbit Beyond (Un)translatability.

George Salis is the author of Sea Above, Sun Below (River Boat Books / corona/samizdat). His fiction is featured in The DarkBlack DandyZizzle Literary MagazineHouse of ZoloThree Crows Magazine, and elsewhere. His criticism has appeared in IsacousticAtticus Review, and The Tishman Review, and his science article on the mechanics of natural evil was featured in Skeptic. He is currently working on an encyclopedic novel titled Morphological Echoes. He has taught in Bulgaria, China, and Poland. Find him on FacebookGoodreads, Instagram (@george.salis), and at www.GeorgeSalis.com.

 

 

The Collidescope

1/26/2021

REVS

 

REVS’ Underground Autobiography

Text is broken up by gaps in the wall: PAGE 22 (BTK) OF STILLWELL — WE WERE BOTH CHECKIN SHIT OUT MY PIECE ROLLED IN + THERE ON IR … ABOVE ME THAT … WE GO THRU THE … WRITES … THEN HE POINTS … A FEW SECONDS OF … HE NIPPED ME BUT I LET IT GO … BECOME FRIENDS—HE HAD A … WHO WROTE … I GOT TO KNOW … BKLYN WRITERS … NSA. ETC ONE DAY ME + IR … LUNCH AT THIS … ON SMITH ST — I BOCKROCKED … MEAT — HE DIDN’T ROCK … ASTOR DT CAUGHT ME + CUTTED ME IN THE BACK … + HE LET ME GO … LUCKY – REVS! | Photo courtesy of Rebecca Fuller | Click any image to launch a slideshow with more of REVS’ work

“To Joe Public: You might be askin yourself right now, what is this shit…what is this all about? Its about a kid who is just livin his life and tellin his story. The only one he knows how.”

So begins REVS’ autobiography, worlds under New York in the farthest folds of the subway, the words written in black on top of a white-washed section of wall. It’s an underground memoir: the stories of a New York childhood, adolescence, and adulthood etched into a space few can see and even fewer know how to access. A private life in a public place, both hidden and protected by the plexiglass windows that shield straphangers from the filthy subterranean world of New York City. Press your face to the window and watch the tags stream by, REVS standing out among the scrawls in huge white block letters, as though REVS had nothing to hide, as though REVS had nothing to fear, standing there on top of the third rail in the dark, taking his sweet time writing on the wall. He makes the other writers look scared, and besides you can hardly read their tags as the train rushes by. But REVS’ pieces jump out at you for their size, their whiteness, their audacity. “We think art should be dangerous,” REVS said in a rare 1994 interview. “It’s considered mindless vandalism by most people but there’s really a lot to be said about a guy who scribbles his name on the wall. Why would a guy risk being hurt to do that?”

 

PAGE 25 OF MANY 1/16/98 LUCKY ME, TOOK ALL MY DOE THAT I SAVED UP FOR 3 YEARS ABOUT 6 GRAND THAT WAS 2 JOBS — SODA CAN CHANGE + THE SELLIN OF SOME SHIT — MY LIFE SAVINGS — WENT DOWN TO ATLANTIC CITY WITH HOPE, J. YOUNG AND BLITZ — PUT IT ALL ON RED!!! AND CAME BACK TO BKLYN WITH 12 GEES! GEE. MAN IT FELT GOOD — IT WAS ABOUT TIME!! THANKX – REVZ | Photo courtesy of Mike Epstein

REVS is one of the most notorious graffiti artists in the history of New York street art. He got his start in the early ‘80s, covering New York in REVLON, his tag before he decided to cut out the “LON” during a suicidal epiphany on the Manhattan Bridge. In 1993, REVS started running with COST. Together they covered Manhattan in tens of thousands of posters and wheat pastes, blanketing the city in Krylon and vegetable starch. The city was their canvas, a stage for their humor (COST FUCKED MADONNA, scribbled in your subconscious after seeing it pasted to every WALK / DON’T WALK sign in Manhattan), their existential crisis (SPECIMEN REVS, taped to every trashcan in New York), or their need to let people know that, for a moment, they’d been right here. “I’m trying to let people know that I’m here during this time period,” COST once told the New York Times. “Let it be remembered or forgotten, that’s up to the people.”

 

PAGE 37 OF MANY 5/22/98 … ALWAYS FIGHTIN WITH EACH … TAN AND SKINNY HE REMINDS ME OF SPONE … REAL FOUL MOUTH … THEY USED TO CURSE THEIR MOTHER — IT WAS FUNNY — THEY WERE LIKE A COMEDY TEAM!! ID GO TO THEIR HOUSE + LISTEN TO KISS AND CHRIS WOULD RECITE “SATURDAY NITE LIVE” WITH “JANE YOU IGNORANT SLUT!” + WHEN THIS MAN WOULD GET MAD CHRIS WOULD TELL HER “HEY”… | Photo courtesy of Rebecca Fuller

 

NO RIGHTS… PAGE 38 OF MANY 5/22/98 THEN THERE WAS THIS FAT OLD LADY WITH A CANE WHO LIVED NEXT DOOR TO FELIX — SHE HAD DYED CURLY BLONDE HAIR — WED PLAY PUNCH BALL IN FRONT OF FELIX’S BUILDING + SHE’D STORM THE STOOP + RIFF HARD! SHE’D TELL US “GO AWAY” — “PLAY IN FRONT OF YOUR OWN BUILDING” … DONT LIVE HERE! WED SAY YEAH “FELIX” LIVE HERE + SHE’D SAY SO WHAT! … PLAYIN ON THE SIDEWALK OR HANGIN ON THE STOOP! SO WE… – REVS DOOLES- | Photo courtesy of Fredrick Douglas

Aboveground, REVS is prolific (even more so 20 years ago), his rollers massive and highly visible, inaccessible spots that clearly can’t be reached without 30 foot tall ladders or a harness system. Below ground, he’s a legend, a hero in the graffiti community. From roughly 1994 to 2000, he kept a subterranean diary of sorts, 235 “pages” total chronicling various thoughts and events in his Brooklyn-based existence. The New York Times has described his work as “feverish diary entries worthy of a Dostoyevsky character.” For years, he had the Vandal Squad (the NYPD task force committed to bringing graffiti artists to justice) and the MTA befuddled by what was evidently a massive safety breach that allowed someone to take his time chronicling his life in the tunnels between Brooklyn and Manhattan. Cops were reading the pages, trying to track REVS through the biographical details he supplied in his writing — his birth date, the hospital in Bay Ridge where he was born. Who was this guy, and how the hell was he getting away with this?

 

PAGE 91 OF MANY 2/20/99 THERE WAS NO SUCH THING AS YUPPIES BACK THEN SCOOTIN ROUND IN THEIR SAABS AND BMWS – EATIN FAKE GOURMET FOOD AND 7 GRAIN BREAD MOST OF US GREW UP ON WONDER BREAD WITH PEANUT BUT & JELLY OR BOLOGNA SANDWICHES (WITH MUSTARD)! WATCHIN ZOOM ON T.V. OR SESAME STREET OR SIGMUND + THE SEAMONSTER OR FAT ALBERT OR THE BUGS BUNNY ROAD RUNNER SHOW — YEAH … WAKIN UP AT 5AM ON A SATURDAY MORNIN + WATCHIN CARTOONS!! WHATS UP DOC?? REVS | Photo courtesy of Dan Curran

After half a decade, REVS was ratted out, caught in the act, charged, and convicted. It turned out he was “a 33-year-old iron worker from a working class neighborhood, not so different really from any of the cops pursuing him,” as described in a segment of the This American Life episode themed “Cat and Mouse.” Not so different especially because he was in uniform when they found him — all these years he’d been dressing in a stolen MTA track worker outfit. Ryan Thomas Gallahard, for This American Life, continues, “Everyone who saw him with the buckets of paint just thought he belonged down there.”

 

​ PAGE 143 OF MANY 10/14/99 PERSONALITIES — LOUD POLITICS IN THE HARDCORE WORLD … GAME I KNOW — WHOSE DOWN — WHOSE “COOL,” WHO AINT!! — A SOCIAL GAME … ANTI-SOCIAL PEOPLE! — JUST LIKE EVERYTHING ELSE BUT HOT … DIFFERENT IS THERES NO OFFICIAL FORMULA, WRITTEN RULES OR LEGAL … JUST UNDERSTOOD ONES! BUT ITS STILL BETTER THAN ALL THE SHIT THATS OUT THERE — THE LITTLE SCAM AT CBGBS WAS FOR 1 PERSON DAY … GET STAMPED + THEN TRANSFER IT TO AS MANY FRIENDS AS POSSIBLE (FRESH INK) – REVS | Photo courtesy of OverUnder

REVS’ autobiography is a rare moment where New York’s infrastructure serves as both canvas and transportation, the past and the present co-mingling in his stories of growing up in a different Brooklyn while you ride under the present one, reading the writing on the wall. It exemplifies the fact that some artists use graffiti as their voice. And beyond a form of expression, graffiti is also a form of documentation. Today, subway cars are spotless compared with what they once were, but history still visibly bleeds from the walls just beyond the train windows. It’s actually surprising that there’s only one such autobiography in the subways, considering how many people have lived, worked, and passed through these tunnels.

 

PAGE 221 OF MANY MIR (BTK) DIED IN 87 — HE WAS DRIVIN ON THE BQE … SOMETHING HAPPENED TO THE CAR — HE GOT OUT TO LOOK — A DRUNK OFF DUTY COP SWERVED INTO HIM + KILLED HIM — HE WAS SUPPOSED TO PICK ME UP — I KNOW IF I WAS THERE … OUT TOO! IT AINT SMART TO HANG BY A DEAD CAR IN A LIVE LANE. BUT WHEN YOUR 18-19 YOU DONT KNOW NO BETTER — NOTHIN HAPPENED TO THE COP CAUSE COPS PROTECT YOUR OWN … ONE OF A BILLION INSTANCES… | Photo courtesy of Rebecca Fuller

MADE IN BKLYN | Photo courtesy of AeroFennec

SELF-CENTERED | Photo courtesy of AeroFennec

USE THE SYSTEM AGAINST THE SYSTEM | Photo courtesy of AeroFennec

RUNNIN THRU… | Photo courtesy of AeroFennec

FACTS OF THE MATTER | Photo courtesy of AeroFennec

NONE OF THIS MATTERS | Photo courtesy of AeroFennec

 

Hannah Frishberg is a fourth generation Brooklynite and freelance writer and photographer.

The views expressed here are those of the authors only and do not reflect the position of The Architectural League of New York.

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